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Abstract
John Hick argues for a two-fold typology of Christian theodicies, namely,
those which offer monist accounts of good and evil and those which offer dualist
accounts. Neither approach, he goes on to argue, is compatible with the basic claims
of Christian thought. On the one hand, monism risks denying the distinction between
good and evil by incorporating evil into the unitary intentionality of the one sovereign
God. Dualist accounts, on the other, risk undermining the sovereignty of God by
affirming the existence of evil as that which conflicts with God’s good (and singular)
will. Hick’s typology presents us, therefore, with the option of either affirming the
full sovereignty of God and denying the truly malevolent nature of evil, or affirming
God’s opposition to evil but then undermining the full sovereignty of God.
Two immensely influential Christian thinkers, namely, Karl Barth and Alvin
Plantinga, are considered as a means of testing this claim. Barth, who is the primary
focus, tends toward a dualistic understanding of good and evil whereas Plantinga
toward a more monistic understanding. Hick’s typology, however, fails to serve their
differing understandings of good and evil adequately. An alternative analysis of this
distinction is proposed drawing on their distinctive understandings of the relationship
between sin and evil and God’s creative purposes. This leads to an analysis of the
conditions under which it is possible to affirm the truly malevolent nature of evil and
God’s full sovereignty. It is contended that Barth’s approach offers a consistent means
of affirming God’s radical opposition to evil while also affirming his full sovereignty.
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1I. Introduction
In his book Evil and the God of Love John Hick argues, “Christian thought
concerning theodicy has always moved between the opposite poles set by the inherent
logic of the problem – monism and dualism.”1 On the one hand, Hick recognises
monism and dualism as “the only two wholly consistent solutions that are possible”2,
on the other hand, however, he also understands that “neither of them is compatible
with the basic claims of Christian theology.”3 Monist philosophies maintain, as
Edward Craig writes, “that there is, ultimately, only one thing, and that ‘the Many’
are aspects of it or, to a more radical way of thinking, simply an illusion resulting
from our mis-perception of the One.”4 In relation to evil, monism would seem to
suggest, as Hick writes, “that evil is only apparent and would be recognised as good if
we could but see it in its full cosmic context.”5 Dualism, however, holds that there are
ultimately two things. With regard to the nature of evil, a dualist account would
suggest that, as Hick writes, “good and evil are utterly irreconcilably opposed to one
another and that their duality can be overcome only by one destroying the other.”6
As Hick notices, the monist position has had a huge influence on Christian
thought throughout the years and this is largely because the Christian faith holds to a
monotheistic understanding: there is only one God who is sovereign over all things.
Hick writes,
“If God is God, and God is good, there cannot be any co-equal
contrary reality; and therefore evil must in the end be subject to God’s
sovereignty and must exist by a permission flowing from his purpose
for his creation. There seems here to be an undeniable truth, to neglect
which would be to forfeit the fundamental Christian belief in the
reality of God as the sole Creator and ultimate ruler of all things.”
1 Hick, 1977, p21 (full references in bibliography).
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 Craig, Edward, ‘Monism’ in Craig, 1998, pp474-475.
5 Hick, 1977, p21.
6 Ibid.
2Monism, however, as Hick also notes, does not come without its problems.
The Christian faith is not solely concerned with affirming the full sovereignty of God.
It is also significantly concerned with affirming God’s direct opposition to sin and
evil and his victory over it through the triumphant life, death and resurrection of his
Son Jesus Christ. From this perspective, sin and evil are genuinely malevolent and
cannot be attributed to the creator God. The problem with a monist understanding is
its tendency to suggest that evil is ultimately a good thing (or a fundamental
characteristic of a good thing), even although it might seem bad from our immediate
perspective. Hick writes,
Christian thought may so strongly emphasise the divine sovereignty
that evil is no longer recognised as being genuinely evil and as utterly
inimical to God’s will and purpose. Evil can thus become
domesticated within the divine household and seen as a servant instead
of a deadly enemy; and then the theodicist finds himself calling evil
good and preaching peace where there is no peace.7
As a result of the problems evident in monism, some form of dualism can
sometimes be considered as a more appropriate option. The problem with holding to
this alternative position, however, as Hick suggests, is that it can undermine the
sovereignty of God and tend toward the heresy of Manichean dualism. When
choosing between the options of monism and dualism (with respect to evil) it would
seem that a person is faced with the option of either affirming the full sovereignty of
God and denying the truly malevolent nature of evil, or affirming evil as something
genuinely negative but then undermining the full sovereignty of God. Is this the case?
To consider this question I shall examine the thought of two immensely
influential Christian thinkers, namely, Karl Barth and Alvin Plantinga. As I will
suggest, Barth, who will be the primary focus, seems to tend toward a dualistic
understanding8 of good and evil whereas Plantinga leans toward a monistic
interpretation. This distinction, however, does not serve their differing understandings
7 Ibid. p21-22.
8 This is not to associate Barth with a ‘Manichean’ dualism. This will be discussed in further detail
when looking specifically at Barth.
3of good and evil adequately9. In order to develop a much clearer picture of this
distinction there needs to be a consideration of their distinctive understandings of the
relationship between sin and evil and God’s creative purposes. In the course of thesis
we shall consider how far Plantinga and Barth can be accommodated within Hick’s
two-fold typology and whether it is appropriate to associate them with a monist or
dualist approach respectively. This will raise the question as to whether Hick is
correct in his suggestion that there are only two ‘wholly consistent’ options.
As has been noted, the primary focus of this thesis will be to evaluate the
viability of Barth’s account in the face of the positions he is challenging, namely,
Manichean dualism on the one hand and monism on the other. The secondary
discussion of Plantinga will, however, make an important contribution to the
framework of this thesis. The reason for this is that Plantinga would seem to provide a
‘monist’ approach that, unlike Manichean dualism, finds much more credence and is
thus more persuasive within contemporary Christian thought. We shall argue,
however, that Plantinga’s account carries implications which appear to be in tension
with established interpretations of the Gospel message. A brief analysis of his
reasoning and its potential problems will lead directly to a discussion of Barth.
Hopefully, this analysis will serve to bring into focus both the applicability and
significance of Barth’s argument.
9 The haziness of this distinction is made apparent when it is considered that Barth seeks to affirm
God’s full sovereignty over good and evil and Plantinga wants to hold that good and evil are not one
and of the same thing.
4II. Alvin Plantinga’s Monist Account of the Relationship Between Sin
and Evil and God’s Creative Purposes
In both his exposition of the free-will defense and his article ‘O Felix Culpa’
Alvin Plantinga would seem to develop a monist understanding of the relationship
between evil (as this includes sin) and God’s creative purposes. This is made apparent
when he incorporates the existence of sin and evil into the one sovereign will of God
by holding that God ultimately intends their existence for the purpose of achieving
some greater good. Sin and evil are, in other words, a required means through which
God is able to create the best of all possible worlds. They are ultimately aspects of
God’s one all-encompassing creative purpose.
Two of the greater goods which Plantinga holds to be necessary characteristics
of this best of all possible worlds are, first, human ‘freedom’ defined in a particular
way, which inevitably leads to sin and evil, and second, the atonement, which is
conditional upon there being sin and evil. As such, because sin and evil are an
intended means whereby God creates the best of all possible worlds they are
ultimately granted status as a purposeful good10, even if they might not appear to be
so when viewed from our present perspectives within this world and, moreover, even
if Scripture does not seem to present them in this way.
1. Plantinga’s Monist Understanding of the Relationship Between Sin and Evil and
God’s Creative Purposes
When a person is given a painful injection for the purpose of vaccination they
are given it for the good reason of preventing illness or disease. This action provides a
reasonable analogy for the monist understanding of how sin and evil can relate to
God’s creative purposes. For Plantinga, God directly intends the pains of sin and evil
for the world with the good purposes of first, providing humanity with all the
immense goods of the atonement11, as he argues in his article ‘O Felix Culpa’12, and
10 Kevin Diller also argues that Plantinga would seem to present evil as a ‘functional good’ in his
article, ‘Are Sin and Evil Necessary for a Really Good World?’ (Cf. Diller, 2008, p96).
11 Plantinga also argues that sin and evil pave the way to the incarnation. It does not, however, appear
that Christ’s becoming incarnate is conditional upon there being sin and evil in the world. For this
reason, the incarnation will not be considered in this context because this discussion is primarily
5second, by giving it the very great good of ‘contra-causal’ ‘freedom’, as he argues in
his account of the free will defense. One major non-parallelism with the vaccination
analogy however (in relation to Plantinga’s accounts), is that in this analogy the pain
received in an injection is not a directly intended means for the purpose of the
vaccination but an inevitable consequence.13 Furthermore, if it were possible for
doctors to give out pain-free injections it would indeed be the case that most good-
natured doctors would opt for this possibility. Plantinga’s monist understanding,
however, presents the pains of sin and evil as a purposeful condition (or means) in
and of themselves to the end of giving the world the atonement and ‘contra-causal’
‘freedom’. They are, it could be said, the desired ‘collateral damage’ or integral
collateral features of the possible world that God chooses to actualise.14
Plantinga is clearly correct in asserting that if there were no sin and evil then
there would be no need for the atonement. Furthermore, his suggestion that if there
were no sin and evil in the world, then creatures would not be living by a ‘contra-
causal’ ‘freedom’ but a ‘God-caused’ freedom is also defensible given that, from a
Christian standpoint, righteousness is conditional upon the intervening, redemptive
and reconciling action of God.15 The problem with Plantinga’s account, however, is
that he would seem to suggest that the atonement and ‘contra-causal’ ‘freedom’ are an
“aim”16 or ‘ultimate end’ of God’s creative purposes (i.e. a desired part of their
realisation and ultimate goal) as opposed to a means whereby he can achieve an even
greater ultimate end i.e. the right relationship with his creatures. Plantinga writes, “No
matter how many excellent creatures there are in the world, no matter how rich and
beautiful and sinless their lives, the aggregated value of their lives would not match
that of the incarnation and atonement; any worlds with incarnation and atonement
would be better yet.”17 In this statement Plantinga seems to suggest that the present
sinful state of affairs with its need for the atonement is even greater than the full
focused on the existence of sin and evil with relation to God’s creative purposes. Cf. Diller, 2008, p90-
92.
12 Cf. Plantinga in Van Inwagen, 2004, pp5-14.
13 As such there is an inherent duality in this analogy – the pain neither comes from, nor is intended by
the doctor but, rather, comes from and is intended by something else i.e. the victim’s neurological
make-up.
14 In Plantinga’s account, God creates the best of all possible worlds. God’s creative intentions are,
however, limited by transworld depravity such that what he desires for creation is constrained by what
is compatible with (what Plantinga considers to be) significant human ‘freedom’.
15 Cf. Rom. 3.10-26 and Phil. 2.13.
16 Plantinga in Van Inwagen, 2004, p12.
17 Ibid. p10.
6actualisation of the new creation would be, had it been possible for God to bring it
about without subjecting it to a prior sinful and evil state of affairs. In other words, it
would appear that Plantinga presents sin and evil as actually willed by God to the
extent that they provide warrant for the atonement and, still more controversially, the
incarnation. This problem becomes even more apparent when he writes,
Contrast two kinds of possible worlds. In the first kind, there are
free creatures who always do only what is right, who live in
harmony with God and each other, and do so, let’s add, through all
eternity. Now for each of these worlds W of this kind, there is a
world W* of the second kind. In W* God creates the very same
creatures as in W; but in W* these free creatures rebel against him,
fall into sin and wickedness, turn their backs upon God. In W*,
however, God graciously provides a means of salvation by way of
incarnation and atonement. My claim is that for any such worlds W
and W*, W* is a better world than W.18
As I shall argue, neither the atonement nor ‘contra-causal’ ‘freedom’ should
be considered as an ‘end’ in themselves but as a ‘means’ whereby God is able to
develop the right relationship with his creation. As such, were it possible for God to
develop the right relationship with his creation without the existence of sin and evil he
would have chosen to do so. The simple reason for this is that sin and evil constitute
nothing less than a real enemy and menace to God and his creative purposes.19
The main difficulties that lie in Plantinga’s understanding and the factors that
tie him to a monist understanding are, first, his view that God ultimately desires the
existence of sin and evil as a means to the greater end which is the atonement20 and,
second, his view that God ultimately wills creation’s present ‘contra-causal’
‘freedom’ as it is consumed by sin and evil.21 The Gospel, however, presents neither
the atonement nor creation’s present ‘freedom’ as ends in themselves but as a means
to the ultimate end of God’s developing a loving relationship with creation (Cf. Eph.
18 Ibid. pp10-11.
19 This does not mean, however, that sin and evil’s consequent existence cannot be incorporated into
God’s creative purposes and used for a greater good, what it means is that they are ultimately not a
directly intended nor desired part of God’s creative purposes.
20 Cf. Plantinga in Van Inwagen, 2004, pp12-13.
21 Cf. Plantinga, 1974, pp184-191 and Plantinga, 1967, pp135-149.
71.4-5). From this Christian perspective sin and evil are not presented as a means
willed by God but, rather, as a genuine problem that arises when creatures are subject
to their own ‘contra-causal’ ‘freedom’. The consequent problem of sin and evil is then
portrayed as being dealt with by God in the atonement (as opposed to being a directly
intended set of circumstances that would pave the way to the atonement). Sin and evil
are not therefore presented as a problem willed by God, as Plantinga seems to
suggest. They are problems that arise from within creation as the result of God’s
intending to subject it to a life consumed by its own individualistic form of ‘contra-
causal’ ‘freedom’, as opposed to a life animated by the Holy Spirit, in Jesus Christ
lived out in obedience to the Father.22
2. The Nature of Evil in Plantinga’s Free Will Defense and his Article ‘O Felix
Culpa’.
The argument that Plantinga presents in his recent article ‘O Felix Culpa’
suggests that he interprets the relationship between evil23 and God’s creative purposes
monistically. It claims that evil is a predetermined part of God’s creative purposes. In
this article he argues that God requires and desires evil as the necessary condition and
means to the ends of the atonement; the pain of evil is, as it were, a required
instrument of God’s creative purposes.
Although Plantinga’s Felix Culpa approach might suggest a monist position,
this does not necessarily mean that all forms of the Felix Culpa approach entail a
monist understanding. If, for example, one held that although God did not directly
desire sin and evil, he was able consequently to incorporate their existence into his
creative purposes24, this sort of Felix Culpa approach would not necessarily imply a
monist understanding. Such a position will be discussed further in dialogue with Barth
who would also seem to hold to a Felix Culpa understanding. The latter, however,
unlike Plantinga, does not commit himself to a ‘monist’ understanding that portrays
sin and evil as a desired part of God’s creative purposes.
22 Cf. Rom. 8.1-17.
23 Plantinga refers specifically to evil and not sin. However, his account of evil would seem to imply
sinfulness.
24 E.g. he was able to use the atonement to achieve the right relationship with his creatures.
8As suggested above, Plantinga’s Felix Culpa approach tends in the direction of
a monist understanding. However, it is difficult to argue that his free will account
implies such a position. If, on the one hand, Plantinga is suggesting in his free-will
account that God created creatures for the ends of having a particular form of ‘contra-
causal’ ‘freedom’ that is consumed with sin and evil, then he would be incorporating
this sinful form of ‘freedom’ into God’s ultimate creative purposes. In so doing he
would be presenting this sinful ‘freedom’ as the true and perfect form of ‘freedom’
and would indeed be taking the monist stance with respect to sin and evil. If, on the
other hand, he is merely suggesting that God gave creatures their particular form of
‘contra-causal’ ‘freedom’ as a means whereby he could ultimately develop the right
relationship with his creatures, he would not be interpreting this sinful ‘freedom’ as
an end itself but as a means to another end in his ultimate creative purposes.25 As
such, he would not be holding that this world has been created by God to live by this
sinful form of ‘freedom’, but to have been created to live temporarily by this
‘freedom’ such that it could ultimately be raised into a true and perfect freedom. If
Plantinga were to hold this latter position he could not consider God to have caused
both the sinful and sinless forms of freedom directly because, apart from a number of
other reasons, this would imply a division in God’s creative purposes.26 As such, the
sinful form of ‘freedom’ would need to be understood as achieving its sinfulness on
the basis of something else distinct from God.
Plantinga understands that there is indeed something other than God which
causes creation to be consumed by sin and evil. He considers this ‘something else’ to
be creation itself as it lives by its own ‘contra-causal’ ‘freedom’.27 What this ‘contra-
causality’ implies is not that there is no cause to influence creation’s ‘freedom’ but,
that there is no cause external to creation itself that influences creation’s ‘freedom’.
As such creation’s sinfulness needs to be understood as being caused by creation to
the extent that it is guided by its own ‘free-will’. It is, in other words, the result of
25 When suggesting that contra-causal freedom is a sinful form of freedom and is given to the world by
God (Rom. 8.20), this does not necessarily mean that God gave sin to the world. Creation’s ‘contra-
causal’ freedom is not sinful, in and of itself, but is a freedom that inevitably leads to sin and evil.
26 Such a division of God’s will into a will for a sinful form of freedom and a will for a sinless form of
freedom would suggest an eternal conflict within the mind of God. This would also mean, unless one
wanted to separate God’s being from his will, a dichotomisation of God and therefore imply some new
form of Sabellianism.
27 Cf. Plantinga, 1974, pp184-191 and Plantinga, 1967, pp135-149. In holding that God does not cause
sin and evil, Plantinga is not adhering to the monist position with respect to sin and evil itself. This
does not, however, rule out the possibility of him holding to a monist understanding of the relationship
between sin and evil and God’s creative purposes.
9creation existing freely apart from the guiding and sustaining hand of God and being
guided by ‘nothing’ external to itself. In holding to this position, Plantinga is
advocating a duality between goodness (as it comes from God) and sinfulness or evil
(as it arises from within creation) and therefore, in this respect, he is not a monist.
However, as his argument develops he does seem to move towards a monist account
with respect to his understanding of the role of sin and evil within God’s creative
purposes.
In the next stage of his argument Plantinga appears to suggest that God created
the world, not for the end of establishing a sinless relationship between him and his
creatures, but for the end of its living by its own particular ‘contra-causal’ ‘freedom’
as it is apart from God and consumed by sin and evil. As such, although Plantinga
might not seem to portray sin and evil as being caused by God, he fails to protect
himself sufficiently from the charge that he portrays them as goods belonging to his
creative purposes. If this submission to sin and evil is understood, from Plantinga’s
‘Christian’ epistemic base, as an essential characteristic of ‘significant’ ‘freedom’
then he would also need to be holding them to be an ultimately intended and desired
part of God’s creative purposes. Under these circumstances the permitted ‘contra-
causally free action’ is given a higher and more significant standing in God’s creative
purposes than the guided ‘righteous action’. Plantinga writes,
A world containing creatures who are sometimes significantly free is
more valuable, all else being equal, than a world containing no free
creatures at all. Now God can create free creatures, but he cannot
cause or determine them to do only what is right. For if he does so,
then they are not significantly free after all; they do what is right
freely. To create creatures capable of moral good, therefore, he must
create creatures capable of moral evil; and he cannot leave these
creatures free to perform evil and at the same time prevent them from
doing so.28
If Plantinga had wanted to continue to avoid a monist understanding the next
stage in his argument would have needed to focus on God’s delivering this world
28 Plantinga, 1974, pp166-267 (emphases mine on ‘significantly’).
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from its present situation to its ultimate end as the new creation, as this is
characterised by a true and righteous freedom.29 This stance, which corresponds to
Barth’s, conflicts with the monist position by implying a duality within God’s creative
purposes - between his intention to raise creation to a new level of koinonia with him
(what amounts to a new reality) and his temporary intention to leave creation partly
subject to itself.30 This duality very importantly, however, does not suggest a division
in God’s creative purposes, nor does it present God as changing his mind. What it
suggests is that there are two stages in God’s creative purposes: a short-term stage and
a long-term stage. The first ‘short-term’ stage involves God subjecting his creation to
an existence that is temporarily and somewhat apart from him. It is an existence
characterised by ‘contra-causal’ ‘freedom’ and creation’s own sinful and evil
frustrations. Such a ‘contra-causal’ path is portrayed as a fallen way that is in radical
need of God’s causal intervention and determination – God’s redemption and
reconciliation. It is a way that is “groaning in labour pains” (Rom. 8.22) for adoption
into a life of participation within the Trinity: a life animated by the Holy Spirit, in
Jesus Christ lived out in obedience to the Father.31
This first stage, however, is not an end in itself but a means to the end of the
second stage. The second ‘long-term’ stage is the new creation as it is raised out of its
first sinful stage into perfect communion with God.32 In this understanding sin and
evil are presented as a reality that God temporarily permits, but does not ultimately
intend. This approach contrasts with Plantinga’s understanding because it does not
present the fallen ‘contra-causal’ ‘freedom’ of the first stage as a desired part of
God’s creative purposes. By understanding the sin-and-evil-inducing ‘freedom’ as a
29 It is not being suggested here, that when creation is raised into new life it suddenly becomes
‘automated’ by God. What is being suggested, is that creation is freely raised and awakened into
subjection to God by being brought into participation within the triune koinonia. When creation is
raised into new life, in this manner, it becomes free from its bondage to sin. In Christian thought, the
world has not been created for individuality and sinfulness but for a loving obedience under God, and
so, therefore, it is in this new life that a person finds their essential freedom. A more detailed
discussion of how creation sustains its freedom through this transformation would be highly significant
here. However, such a discussion warrants its own thesis and would extend past the boundaries of this
one.
30 It is fundamental, for Barth, that the present creation is not considered to be leading a life completely
independent from God. For Barth, creation is always dependent on its Creator for its continuing
existence and preservation. Cf. Barth, CD III:1, 1958, p94.
31 Cf. Rom. 8.1-17.
32 Between these two stages God’s will does not change. In both these stages God desires one thing – to
develop the right relationship with his creation. The factors that distinguish the first stage from the
second stage – such as sin and evil - are not factors that God directly wills for, but are ‘consequent
inevitabilities’ which God permits in order to fulfil his one particular will for creation.
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desired part of God’s creative purposes, Plantinga makes them out to be a part of
God’s ultimate will and in so doing attaches himself to a monist understanding of the
relationship between sin and evil and God’s creative purposes.
Before entering into a further discussion of whether Plantinga wholly commits
himself to a monist understanding of the relationship between sin and evil and God’s
creative purposes it is important to grasp the distinction between permission (indirect
intention) and direct intention with respect to God’s creative purposes. Within the
context of this thesis the distinction will be made as follows: if a particular aspect of
creation is directly intended by God, it is God that is directly responsible for causing
that aspect to exist;33 if, on the other hand, God merely permits a particular aspect of
creation, although it might have been God that intended to let that aspect come into
existence, this does not necessarily mean that he directly caused its existence.
Although this distinction might seem to be fairly clear it becomes much more difficult
to affirm when God’s omniscience and particularly his foreknowledge are taken into
account. If God creates the world ex nihilo with the foreknowledge of how it will turn
out, including the occurrence of each and every instance of sin and evil, it is much
harder to suggest that God merely permits, and does not directly or intentionally cause
sin and evil to become a reality.
In order to suggest that God merely permitted sin and evil to come into
existence, it might appear that one needs to affirm some form of Manichean dualism
in order to explain how there could be something else, apart from God, which directly
caused the existence of sin and evil (and which God can permit to cause directly the
existence of sin and evil). If, however, as suggested above, sin and evil are understood
as caused by creation itself as the indirect result of God’s giving it its own ‘contra-
33 The word ‘intention’, in and of itself, does not necessarily imply direct responsibility. For example,
in Acts 2. 23-24 it is written, “[Jesus of Nazareth], handed over to you according to the definite plan
and foreknowledge of God, you [that are the Israelites] crucified and killed by the hands of those
outside the law.” Then in Acts 4.27-28 it is written, “Herod and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles and
the peoples of Israel, gathered together against your holy servant Jesus, whom you anointed, to do
whatever your hand and your plan had predestined to take place.” Although this passage clearly
suggests that God intended his Son to die on the cross, it does not suggest that God was directly
responsible for causing his Son to suffer and die on the cross; it was moreover, ‘Herod and Pontius
Pilate’ with ‘the Israelites’ and ‘those outside the law’/’the Gentiles’. Jesus died at the hands of the
sinful world and, although it might be God who, in his foreknowledge, directly intended and was
directly responsible for sending and leading his Son to suffer and die on the cross, he cannot be
considered as the one who was directly responsible for causing his Son to suffer and die on the cross.
In other words, he did not move the lips, hands, legs, etc. of Herod, Pontius Pilate, the Gentiles and the
people of Israel.
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causal’ ‘freedom’, this is not such a problem. Under these circumstances, although it
might be God who directly gives creation its ‘contra-causal’ ‘freedom’, he is not the
immediate cause of everything that results from creation’s being subject to this
‘freedom’. Furthermore, although God might foreknow all that would occur within
this set of circumstances, it would not be his foreknowledge that was responsible for
causing all that occurs, but, rather, all that occurs that is responsible for causing God
to have his particular foreknowledge. This position will be discussed in more detail
when considering Barth. For now, however, I wish to focus on Plantinga’s approach.
Consider the following three points that Plantinga makes in his understanding
of what it means to be free:
1. If a “possible person P is free, P contains neither the property of
performing that action nor the property of refraining from
performing it.”34
2. If God wills to create a world with free persons as opposed to
‘quasiautomata’35, Plantinga argues, “he cannot causally or
otherwise determine them to do only what is right; for if he does so
then they do not do what is right freely.”36
3. “[I]t is clear that the proposition Every possible free person
performs at least one wrong action is possibly true.”37
In these claims Plantinga suggests that it is possible that God created creatures
for the purpose of living by a ‘contra-causal’ ‘freedom’ that is characterised by every
possible free creature performing at least one wrong action. When it is taken into
account that God would have foreknown that giving creatures ‘contra-causal’
‘freedom’ would lead to every possible free creature performing at least one wrong
action, such a consequence would need to be considered to be not only possible but
inevitable. As such, living by ‘contra-causal’ ‘freedom’ would also imply unfreedom:
34 Plantinga, 1967, p145.
35 “These are beings who always do what is right because the way that they have been created means
that they are unable to do otherwise.” Ibid. p132.
36 Ibid. p132.
37 Ibid. p146. This possibility is what Plantinga refers to as transworld depravity.
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living in bondage to performing at least one wrong action or living as, to refer to
Rom. 6.18, “slaves to unrighteousness”.
This raises the question as to whether Plantinga’s understanding of what it
means to be free is in tension with the Pauline understanding of true freedom as a life
lived in Christ and by the Holy Spirit.38 Christian freedom on Paul’s account, is
diametrically opposed to being “slaves to sin… [and] free from the control of
righteousness” (Rom. 6.20). It is defined as being “free from sin and… slaves to
righteousness” (Rom. 6.18).39 This freedom, brought about through the causative
work of the Trinity, cannot be fully achieved in this present world. It is attained in
death when the ‘old self’ (the person animated by the flesh (soma psychikon)/the
person in Adam) is brought to an end and the ‘new self’ (the person animated by the
Spirit (soma pneumatikon)/the person in Christ) is raised up in the ultimate fulfilment
and consummation of God’s creative purposes.40 As it is written in Romans 6.6, “We
know that our old self was crucified with [Christ] so that the body of sin might be
destroyed, and we might no longer be enslaved by sin.”
The difficulty that Plantinga’s account would seem to have with the Pauline
account of what it means to be free is that unlike his account of ‘contra-causal’
‘freedom’, freedom for Paul is wholly dependent upon an external causal agency i.e.
God.41 In holding to the criterion of ‘contra-causality’ in his definition of freedom
Plantinga would seem to elevate the importance of the permitted ‘contra-causally free
action’ over the ‘guided righteous action’.
An important thing to note here is that the problem of causality impinging on
freedom is not only in tension with the Christian account of freedom. It is also a
problem for Plantinga’s account because, as it is written in 2 Pet. 2.19, “people are
slaves to whatever masters them”. What this verse would seem to imply here is that
no freedom is completely free from causality. Even Plantinga’s ‘contra-causal’
freedom is still subject to an internal or individualistic causality i.e. to the self as
master. To live solely by this freedom is to live in bondage to the self - to live
incurvatus in se, to use Luther’s expression. It is on this basis that the Pauline account
of freedom that I am proposing, would appear to be in conflict with Plantinga’s.
38 Cf. Rom. 8.2, 1 Cor. 15.42-44 and 2 Cor. 3.17.
39 Cf. Barth, CD III: 2, p306.
40 Cf. Eph. 4.22-24; and Col 3.9-10.
41 Cf. Barth, CD III: 2, 1960, p194.
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The self-oriented, self-seeking individuality, which possibly (or inevitably)
leads to every possible free creature performing at least one wrong action, is
portrayed by Christian thought as the very negation of love and as defining what it
means to be a slave to sin.42 To live solely by this proud and (apparently) self-
grounded freedom is to be led astray and, to commandeer Plantinga’s word,
‘automated’ by ones own selfish desires; it is to be guided by sin and evil over and
against being guided by God.43 As such, from a Christian perspective Plantinga’s
interpretation of ‘freedom’ cannot be understood as meeting an essential Pauline
criterion for what it means to be free. It should, moreover, be understood as
articulating a misguided or disordered form of unfreedom44 that stands in direct
conflict with the essential freedom ‘in Christ’ – the freedom that for which Christian
thought considers the world to have been created. From a theological perspective, true
human freedom requires to be defined in terms of the world’s telos rather than with
exclusive recourse to our natural state of apparent freedom. To quote Karl Barth, “Not
by virtue of our own freedom are we what we are; but rather we are what we are not –
by the freedom of God.”45
Although Plantinga might seem to advocate a misguided form of ‘freedom’ as
true freedom, this does not necessarily tie him down to a monist understanding of sin
and evil. To associate him with such a position would depend on whether a) he
considered God as giving creation its particular ‘freedom’ with the direct intention of
its leading to unrighteousness and unfreedom or whether b) he considered creation to
be given its particular ‘freedom’ with the consequent possibility of its leading to the
existence of sin and evil. The latter non-monist account would seem to be the case for
Plantinga because he holds that if creation is to attain its particular ‘contra-causal’
‘freedom’, “[God] cannot causally or otherwise determine them to do only what is
right”46. In this understanding it is the particular ‘freedom’ and not the sin and evil
that is the goal of God’s creative purposes. Therefore, although this might suggest a
monist account of the particular ‘freedom’ that leads to sin and evil within God’s
42 Cf. Ps. 119.36; Prov. 18.1; Rom. 2.8; 1 Cor.10.24, 13.5; Phil. 2.3.
43 Cf. Rom. 8.1-17 and 1 Cor. 15. 42-44.. Also, cf. Barth, CD IV:1, 1956, pp745-756 – “But the
freedom of [man] is not the evil freedom which man in his pride has made foe himself and which he
thinks he can possess for himself and use for himself. As a genuine freedom for this counter-movement
it is completely alien to the personal reason and power of proud man entangled in his pride. It is a new
freedom and therefore his true freedom.”
44 Cf. Jas. 3.16.
45 Barth, Epistle to the Romans, 1933, p237.
46 Plantinga, 1967. p132.
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creative purposes47, it would not imply a monist account of sin and evil within God’s
creative purposes. As such, for Plantinga it seems that it is not the wrong actions that
are an essential part of God’s creative purposes but the ‘free’ capacity that leads
creatures to perform wrong actions.
Although there might seem to be some problems in Plantinga’s account, he
would seem to be right in asserting that unrestricted secular ‘freedom’, logically
involves the capacity to perform wrong actions and the very fact that Plantinga is
drawing a distinction between right and wrong actions would again seem to imply that
his free will account does not tie him down to a monist understanding of sin and evil.
However, when it is considered that Plantinga also holds that the capacity to do wrong
may include a desire to do wrong, as is implied by the statement, “it is clear that the
proposition Every possible free person performs at least one wrong action is possibly
true”48, it becomes difficult to ascertain that Plantinga’s free will account does not
entail a monist understanding of the relationship between sin and evil and God’s
creative purposes. If Plantinga holds that true ‘freedom’ may be characterised by a
will to perform wrong actions and that God gave creatures this particular ‘freedom’
because it is the ‘significant’ form of freedom, it would seem that Plantinga holds
God to have given his creatures this specific ‘contra-causal’ ‘freedom’ with the full
knowledge that it leads to unrighteousness and a life bound by a sinful will.
This interpretation of Plantinga, however, could very easily be countered by
another suggestion. It is clear that Plantinga does not hold that God has given his
creatures ‘contra-causal’ freedom with the direct intention of their being led into an
unrighteous and imprisoned state. Moreover, it would seem he holds that God gave
his creatures this freedom with the intention of wanting to create a world with free
persons as opposed to ‘quasiautomata’; the inevitable consequence of which is that
the world becomes consumed by sin and evil.
This counter-interpretation, however, could also be countered by yet another
suggestion. It might be correct to assert that having ‘contra-causal’ ‘freedom’ might
stop persons from becoming ‘quasiautomata’ in Plantinga’s sense of the term, i.e.
“beings who always do what is right because the way that they have been created
means that they are unable to do otherwise”49. However, having this ‘contra-causal’
47 I.e. it might suggest that this particular freedom is included within God’s creative purposes.
48 Plantinga, 1967, p146.
49 Ibid. p132.
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‘freedom’ would not stop persons from becoming ‘quasiautomata’ in another sense:
‘beings who will always freely perform at least one wrong action because the way
that they have been created means that they are unable to do otherwise’. As cited
above, “people are slaves to whatever masters them” (2 Pet. 2.19), and therefore
people are always going to be ‘quasiautomata’ in at least one respect, even if it is
through being ‘automated’ by the natural, internal and wrongful conditions of one’s
own existence. As such, Plantinga cannot easily be reconciled with the view that God
has given his creatures ‘contra-causal’ freedom with the direct intention of wanting to
create a world with truly free persons. Rather, Plantinga must be understood as
suggesting that God wanted to create a world in which his creatures had a particular
type of freedom.
If Plantinga is right in his affirmation that a ‘contra-causally’ free world is
what God ultimately intended, then there are, at least two aspects of a theological
account with which it is hard to come to grips, namely:
1. God’s causal intervention in the transformative processes of redemption and
reconciliation. Would God’s causal intervention in the processes of redemption,
justification and reconciliation not undermine Plantinga’s suggestion that ‘contra-
causal’ ‘freedom’ lies at the heart of what it means to be free? Furthermore, would
Scripture’s account of God’s redemption and reconciliation of the world to himself
not strongly conflict with Plantinga’s suggestion that “God does not bring it about or
cause it to be the case either that I take or that I refrain from [an] action; he neither
causes this to be so through the laws he establishes, nor by direct intervention, nor in
any other way”50? Is Barth not right to suggest (in accordance with Jn. 8.32-36), “A
man does not have freedom unless the Son makes him free”51?
2. What it means to be a slave of righteousness (Rom. 6.17-22). On the one hand,
Scripture holds that significant freedom is found when a person becomes a slave to
righteousness (lives in obedience to God) while, on the other hand, Plantinga holds
that significant freedom is found when an individual can and may decide to do what is
50 Plantinga, 1974, p171 (emphasis mine on ‘any other way’).
51 Barth, CD IV:1, 1956, p745. He also writes here, “The Son makes the man free to believe in Him.
Therefore faith in Him is the act of a right freedom, not although but just because it is the work of the
Son.”
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right or what is wrong (what a person does is solely up to them).52 One could say that
for Plantinga a person is ‘significantly free’53 when they are a ‘slave’ to their own
individual will54 (aside from God’s desire for them to be righteous) - to their own
impurity and iniquity.55 If this is the case, then Plantinga’s account of what it means
to be ‘significantly’ free is clearly in tension with scripture’s account56. 57
Scripture affirms that God created the world for a covenantal relationship with
him that is mediated through the person of Jesus Christ.58 Therefore, from a
specifically Christian standpoint, this may be taken to suggest that it is only through a
life of full participation within this relationship, in Christ and by the Spirit, that true
freedom is found.59 Under these circumstances, it is not the ‘contra-causally’ free
action that is righteous but, rather, the obedient action; the goal of creation is not
individual freedom but a loving obedience to God. For actions to be truly obedient to
God, and therefore truly loving and righteous60, creatures cannot depend upon their
individual will but must depend upon the external influence of God in Christ to raise
them into this true freedom.61 This movement, it should be affirmed, is a Trinitarian
52 Plantinga, 1967, p131ff – “Whether the free men created by God would always do what is right
would presumably be up to them; for all we know they might sometimes exercise their freedom to do
what is wrong.” (139) This leads us to ask the question, does the Christian God really desire to free his
creatures for wrongdoing as opposed to free them from wrongdoing? Are we not in danger of moving
towards a semi-Pelagian understanding if we accept an account that draws on the importance of God
leaving things up to us? Is it really the case that God desires to leave his creatures to “do what is right
freely” (132) (i.e. ‘freely in Plantinga’s sense - without God’s guiding hands to cause or determine our
righteousness (132))? Would it not be better to emphasise God’s desire for his creatures to find
righteousness through a life lived in Christ, by the Spirit in obedience to the Father? (Cf. 1 Cor. 26-31,
2 Cor. 10.17, Gal. 2. 15-21, 6.13-14)
53 Cf. Plantinga, 1974, pp166-167
54 In Plantinga’s account of what it means to be significantly free it is not God that is master over the
creature, but the creature that is master over the creature i.e. the self as master.
55 Cf. Rom. 6.19.
56 If Plantinga is going to be considered as writing in accordance with scripture’s account of freedom
he would need to be implying that righteousness is the consequence of a creature’s individual ‘free’
will. As such, all ‘contra-causally’ ‘free’ would also need to be considered as righteous actions. This
would inevitably mean that sin could not be understood as a transgression from God’s will but as its
very outworking and expression. Furthermore, it would also entail that creation’s present state of
existence is not sinful but righteous. This, however, is clearly not the case and Plantinga himself holds
that self-led actions (as oppose to God-led) can sometimes be wrong actions. If this is the case, then
Plantinga would not seem to be consistent with Scripture when he affirms that having a ‘free’ will to
perform right and wrong actions is central to what it means to be significantly free.
57 Cf. 2 Pet. 2.19.
58 Cf. Heb. 8.6-13, 9.11-15.
59 Cf. Rom. 8.1-17 Cor 3.17 and Gal. 5.1.
60 Cf. Rom. 6.16-18 and 2 Jn. 1.6.
61 Cf. Gal. 2.19-21.
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movement: it is by the Spirit that a person is raised up in Christ to participate in a new
life characterised by true freedom and obedience to the Father.62
By understanding this present fallen freedom as describing what it means to be
free, Plantinga does not leave sufficient room for the Christian belief that true
freedom is found when the world enters into a new life of obedience in Christ by the
Spirit through the caused transformative processes of redemption and reconciliation.
Although Plantinga’s account of what it means to be free is problematic, he does
make the important point that God does not desire to create a world of what he refers
to as ‘quasiautomata’, but did indeed will to give creatures a personal autonomy that
would enable them to develop their own personal identities. It is precisely such
creatures, who develop their own particular identities and who live as part of a
particular community, with whom God desires to develop a real relationship.63
By giving his creatures this ‘freedom’ God would have been able to create a
world of self-aware individuals with whom he could develop a genuine relationship.64
For God to develop a mutual and genuinely loving relationship with his creation, his
creatures need to be given the opportunity to live by their own ‘contra-causal’
‘freedom’. Scripture, however, does not present this stage of God’s creative purposes
as an ultimate end nor does it present it as a stage characterised by true freedom.
Scripture holds true and righteous freedom as being achieved when individuals are
raised into a new life in Christ through God’s causal intervention in the ultimate
consummation of God’s creative purposes.65 This resurrection does not involve God
‘automating’ his creatures into a relationship, to use Plantinga’s wording, but
involves, as Barth writes, “a relationship between two persons in which these are
brought into perfect mutual coordination within the framework of a definite order, yet
with no destruction of their two-sided identity and particularity, but rather its
62 Cf. 2 Pet. 1.3-4.
63 A key problem that arises here concerns those creatures who do not have the opportunity to develop
their own particular identities in this present world e.g. those who die as infants. This problem perhaps
warrants its own section. However, to engage in a bit of guesswork and make a brief suggestion for
how this problem might be resolved it might be suggested that such creatures could have the
opportunity to develop their own particular identities after death. Such identities (that are not
‘automated’) could be achieved by participating in a new life not just with God but also with their
fellow creatures who have had the opportunity to start developing their own particular identities in this
world.
64 This direct intention of God to create an ‘other’ will be discussed further when looking at Barth. Cf.
Barth, CD III: 2, 1960, p92.
65 Cf. Eph. 1.8-14.
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confirmation and expression”66. As will be discussed later, this is, for Barth, the very
essence of what it means to have freedom in communion with God. Furthermore it is
the very essence of what it means to be truly human because it is this sort of freedom
for which humanity has been created.67
By holding that ‘contra-causality’ and a depraved desire for wrongdoing (to
which ‘contra-causality’ inevitably leads) are at the heart of what it means to be free,
Plantinga would seem to consider his account of ‘freedom’ and all that results from
it68 as a desired end of God’s creative purposes. In so doing he would seem to present
sin and evil as an ultimate part of God’s creative purposes suggesting a monist
understanding of the relationship between sin and evil and God’s creative purposes. It
may be argued at this point that it is unfair to make these accusations of Plantinga
because his account does not aim to concern itself with the possibility of another
freedom that awaits creation in the future. To the extent, however, that Plantinga
wants to engage in a consistently Christian account (that is, from his specifically
Christian epistemic base), he should at the very least leave room for the possibility of
such a future redeemed world: the new creation which Christian thought considers to
be the fulfilment of the best of all possible worlds.69 By disregarding this possibility
of a further ultimate end, Plantinga’s monist understanding would seem to elevate the
‘freedom’ of the present fallen world, and all that results from it, over and above
Scripture’s account of what it actually means to be free.
3. The Present State of Affairs
If it is the case that such major problems arise when holding to Plantinga’s
position, then the question still remains as to how else it is possible to proceed when
asking the question of how evil could end up as a ‘feature of’ God’s good creation? If
it is considered that creatures really do live a life consumed by sin and evil and that
66 Cf. Barth, CD IV.3, 1956, p535.
67 Cf. Barth, CD IV:1, 1956, pp100-101
68 Unless, he wanted to suggest that the ultimate outworking of God’s creative purposes is imperfect.
This would, of course, significantly undermine God’s omnipotence and/or good/consistent purposes
(for something to be bad within God’s creative purposes it would have to be inconsistent with another
one of his creative purposes).
69 Plantinga would want to hold that this present creation and the new creation are the same possible
world. However, he does not seem to take into sufficient account the Christian understanding that the
present creation will ultimately find fulfilment when it is transformed into the new creation. Rather, he
tends to present this world as a world that has already found its fulfilment, for example, through its
‘freedom’ to make ‘significantly free’ decisions apart from God’s guiding hands.
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this state of affairs is not desired by the all sovereign God, then it would perhaps need
to be considered that sin and evil which temporarily consume this situation are the
unwilled but inevitable consequence of an existence that is not ultimately willed by
God.70 However, there is a problem that might seem to arise here: if something within
creation is inevitable and is not understood as a part of God’s will, is God’s
omnipotence and sovereignty not being called into question?
In order to respond to this problem a consideration is needed of the place of
sin and evil in relation to God’s creative purposes. If sin and evil are given a high
standing then they could be considered to be an ultimate intention in God’s creative
purposes. If, on the other hand, they are given no standing then they could be
considered an unwilled but inevitable ‘consequence’ of God’s creative purposes – to
speak analogically, the ‘collateral damage’ of God’s creative agency.71 The key
distinction here is between ‘ultimate intention’ which implies predetermination on
God’s part, and ‘consequence’ which does not. If it is the case that God foreknew sin
and evil would come into existence, this does not necessarily mean that they are to be
understood as a ‘predetermined’72 part of his creative purposes. Sin and evil could,
moreover, be understood as an unwilled but inevitable consequence of the particular
creation that God ultimately intended to create to be other than himself.73
In his Felix Culpa theodicy, Plantinga considers evil to be an instrument that
God desired for the purpose of bringing about the atonement.74 If, however, evil is
understood as an unwilled but inevitable consequence (e.g. a consequence of God’s
giving creatures the ‘freedom’ to become self-aware individuals), then evil can be
understood as a genuine and serious problem that is dealt with in the atonement. This
position would not risk undermining God’s omnipotence and would simultaneously
70 This will be considered in further detail when discussing Barth.
71 Of course, when it is considered that the main distinction between the terms ‘intention’ and
‘consequence’ is temporal (i.e. intention implies prior planning and consequence implies successive
happening), these different terms might seem to lose their particular relevance in reference to the
foreknowing God. These terms, however, are being used to express non-temporal ‘priority’ or
importance within God’s creative purposes. Under these circumstances ‘intention’ implies ultimate
significance and ‘consequence’ entails no ultimate significance.
72 This term is being used to express non-temporal priority within the order of God’s creative purposes.
73 That sin and evil are a ‘consequence’, however, does not necessarily suggest that sin and evil
couldn’t become incorporated into God’s creative purpose and used to develop the right relationship
between God and his creation in the atonement. As it is written in Matthew 5.45, “for [your Father in
heaven] makes his sun rise on the evil and on the good”. What the term ‘consequence’ suggests,
however, is that they should not be understood as ultimately being caused by God for the ends of the
atonement. Moreover, they should be considered as being caused by creation and then ‘consequently’
confronted through the means of the atonement, in which God becomes triumphant over sin and evil.
74 Cf. Plantinga in Van Inwagen, 2004, pp11-13.
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be compatible with the denial of a monist account of the relationship between evil and
God’s creative purposes. One of the main distinctions that separates this position from
the monist position becomes apparent when there is a consideration of the place of
‘evil’, ‘the creation of the world’ and ‘the atonement’ in God’s creative purposes.
Consider the following two orders:
1. If, on the one hand, a) the atonement is understood as God’s
response to evil, and b) evil is understood as an inevitable consequence
of God’s creating this particular world, then c) the atonement is
presented as an event intended to deliver creation from evil and bring
about the right relationship between God and creation. Consequently,
the creation of this particular world takes primacy over the atonement
(in the ordering of God’s creative purposes75).
2. If, on the other hand, as Plantinga would appear to argue in his
article ‘O Felix Culpa’, a) evil is understood as purposefully fulfilling
a condition for the “good-making feature”76 of the atonement, and b)
this particular world is presented as the ground from which the
required evil can arise, then c) creation is given the purpose of
producing evil so that the atonement can take place. Consequently,
God’s atoning the fallen world is given primacy over God’s creating
this particular world (in the ordering of God’s creative purposes77).78
Although this present world might be consumed by sin and evil, this does not
necessarily imply that God willed this part of creation’s existence in order to bring
about some ‘good making feature’, such as the atonement. It is possible and
seemingly much more compatible with Scripture for sin and evil to be understood as
an unwilled consequence of God’s decision to create this particular world. God’s
75 I.e. the creation of this particular world is of primary importance in the order of divine intentionality
– evil is the unwilled consequence of God’s desire to create this particular world – the atonement is the
event that deals with the unwilled consequence of evil.
76 Plantinga in Van Inwagen, 2004, p7.
77 I.e. the atonement itself is of primary importance in the order of divine intentionality – evil fulfils a
condition that is needed for the goal of the atonement – creation provides a situation in which the
required evil can develop.
78 As Kevin Diller also argues, “[Plantinga’s] Felix Culpa view treats the cost of atonement as an end
rather than a means, elevating the action of suffering love over God’s purpose and goal of right
relationship between God and creatures. (Cf. Diller, 2008, p97)
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opposition to sin and evil is made manifest in the fact that God sent his Son to suffer
and die on the cross not as a self-glorifying end (not that it wasn’t glorifying) but as a
genuine means of redeeming his particular creation from its sinful existence. If this is
the case, however, then the question arises as to what is so significant about this
present sinful existence that it led the omnipotent God to sacrifice (temporarily) the
possibility of initially creating the world to exist in a sin-and-evil-less state?
The present state of creation, as it is consumed by wrongdoing and ‘contra-
causality’, could be described as a kind of a cocooned existence: it is a temporal and
short-term state of affairs that is enslaved but yet also preserved. Creatures exist in
this cocooned state for reasons that, whilst their vision is constrained by such a state,
can only be guessed at. This does not mean, however, that creatures cannot know that
these reasons are good reasons. With the knowledge that such reasons have been
willed by the creator God, creatures can entrust them to be purposeful. Furthermore,
given the revelation that the depravity and ‘contra-causality’ which enslave creation
have no perpetuity, creatures do not need to find themselves overburdened with a
concern for that short-term state of affairs which constitutes the present. As a
caterpillar exists in its cocooned existence only temporarily, so creation only exists in
its imprisoned state in the short-term. Creation should, therefore, live out its present
existence in anticipation of the new life that awaits it. It is this new long-term life
rather than the present short-term life for which humanity has been created. Such an
account, however, raises the question as to why God did not choose to create the
world to exist in this new long-term life from the outset i.e. without any prior
unsatisfactory stages?
If one holds that the omniscient God does all things purposefully then one
must also trust that there is something to be achieved by creation’s existing in a
cocooned state – a purpose that is, for example, of the utmost eschatological
significance. What this achievement might be, however, can again only be guessed at.
Such guesswork, however, is not necessarily to be considered a useless discipline. It
is extremely significant when trying to confront, by way of counter-example, some of
the atheistic philosophies that challenge and attempt to undermine the mission of the
Christian Church. Plantinga clearly sees this need and it is perhaps for this reason that
he is so ready to engage in this type of guesswork, which generally serves an
apologetic purpose. When engaging in such a discipline, however, it is necessary to
avoid suggestions that unintentionally conflict with the message and thrust of the
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Gospel (even if such suggestions are able to develop a seemingly less confusing and
more constructive/productive theory).
The cocoon effect means that creatures have no capacity to know God’s
rationale apart from the knowledge that has been given to them through special
revelation. This special revelation, which is recognised to be true revelation through
the power of the Holy Spirit, not only reveals God’s creative purposes in Christ79 but
also reveals to creatures the limits of their capacity for theological speculation – in
other words, it reveals to creatures their incapacity to know God apart from Scripture.
Any attempt to do so is to engage in potentially anthropomorphic forms of ‘natural
theology’. This is a risk that Plantinga runs in over-emphasising the status and
ultimate significance of creation’s present ‘cocooned’ state e.g. when he portrays the
present ‘contra-causal’ ‘freedom’ of this world as genuine freedom. By attempting to
focus on how this world already exhibits its most significant qualities as the best of all
possible worlds,80 Plantinga inevitably risks incorporating the ‘contra-causal’
‘freedom’81 and wrongdoing of this present world into the divine intentionality.82
4. The Long-Term State of Affairs
What is the problem with Plantinga’s placing too much emphasis on the
significance of this present existence in his approach to theodicy? Should this present
state of affairs be considered as the best of all possible worlds in itself or should it be
considered as the best of all possible worlds when together with its ultimate
fulfilment?
79 Cf. Eph. 8-10.
80 Cf. Plantinga, 1974, p168 and his article ‘O Felix Culpa’ in Van Inwagen, 2004, p12.
81 This ‘contra-causal’ ‘freedom’ is a ‘freedom’ apart from God, which (because it is apart from God)
will inevitably be misused and lead to wrongdoing. As Scripture would want to suggest, the only
freedom is freedom under God, which is dependent upon the intervening (and hence causal) work of
Christ and the Spirit cf. Lk. 4.18; Jn. 8.32-36; Rom. 6.6-7, 6.18-22, 8.1-3. 8.20-21; 1 Cor. 7.21-22; 2
Cor. 3.17; Gal. 5.1, 5.13-14; Eph. 3.12; 2 Pet. 2.16-19.
82 Again, Plantinga would want to consider the present creation and the new creation as the same
world. As such, they are both, together, the best of all possible worlds. However, if Plantinga wants to
avoid undermining the fallen creation’s need for redemption and reconciliation (that will lead to its
fulfilment), it would have been beneficial for him to show more eschatological focus. In other words,
draw on how creation presently exists in anticipation of a transformation that will change (for the
better) many of the features that this world presently exhibits, e.g. its unrighteousness and self-oriented
desires.
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Plantinga writes, “I believe, that God not only has created a world
that is very good, but that there aren’t any conditions under which
he would have created a world that is less than very good.”83
Consider the mother who temporarily places a harsh limit on the kinds of food
she gives her child in order to achieve some greater good, such as delivering her child
from pathological obesity. As a result the child ends up developing hunger pangs,
which the mother knew would be the inevitable consequence of subjecting her child
to temporary constraints on food intake. In this state of affairs it is not ‘very good’
that the mother does something (or does not do something) that would lead her child
to suffer from hunger. However, she knows that subjecting her child to such an
existence will only be temporary and in so doing will save her child from becoming
seriously ill. As such the short-term state of affairs of the child suffering from hunger
will be justified by the long-term state of affairs of the child becoming healthy. If,
however, there were no anticipated long-term state of affairs and the mother
unendingly subjected her child to hunger, then it would be much harder to justify the
mother’s actions. Furthermore, any attempt to do so would look very different from
those attempts that take into account the possibility of a long-term state of affairs. For
example, without the possible long-term benefits, a person might suggest that the
mother is justified in withholding food from her child in order to make the child’s
hunger induce a greater sense of appreciation for the limited food that the child does
receive. As a result, the child’s hunger would also induce a much greater feeling of
gratitude for the mother when she does graciously provide them with food.
When Plantinga develops his theodicy he does not seem to take into sufficient
account the possibility of a future long-term state of affairs.84 As such his Felix Culpa
theodicy and free-will defense would seem to be developed out of a much greater
emphasis on the present state of affairs than the long-term. Although these two
approaches provide highly legitimate philosophical accounts, especially when taken
83 Plantinga in Van Inwagen, 2004, p8.
84 It is not being suggested here that Plantinga does not hold there to be a long-term state of affairs. In
fact, it would seem that in his Felix Culpa approach it is his intention to imply that the good
relationship that results from the atonement is of eternal significance. What is being suggested here,
however, is that the possibility of an eternal state of affairs could have played a much more significant
part in his though and, perhaps, could have been used to shed greater light on some of the apparent
problems that the world faces in its present situation.
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together,85 by placing insufficient emphasis on the possibility of a long-term state of
affairs they ultimately become less significant as specifically Christian approaches
(that is, as the outworking of the ‘Christian epistemic base’, which Plantinga
advocates so strongly in his article ‘Advice to Christian Philosophers’, for example86).
In Scripture this present state of affairs, as it is consumed by sin and evil, is
not presented as the long-term state of affairs (or as a desired end in God’s creative
purposes). It is portrayed as a short-term state of affairs that should be lived out in
hope and anticipation of the new and everlasting state of affairs that begins after
death.87 If Plantinga were more willing to engage with this and look ‘outside the box’
of this present world, his theodicy might have looked very different. It might have
come across as being less focused on how this world presently finds fulfilment as the
best of all possible worlds and more concerned with asking how this ‘best of all
possible worlds’ exists in anticipation of its ultimate fulfilment as the new creation.88
Furthermore, it might have been less oriented towards asking how the world’s present
‘freedom’ defines what it means to be significantly free89, and more concerned with
how the world’s present freedom exhibits a quality that might ultimately be able to
contribute to the new lives for which we have been created (lived out as ‘slaves to
righteousness’ - in Christ, by the Spirit and in obedience to the Father). When taking a
specifically Christian approach to apologetics one should be concerned primarily with
how this present world provides the right set of circumstances out of which God can
bring about the consummation of his creative purposes and achieve the right
relationship with his creation.90
85 Both these approaches greatly compliment each other and it would be very interesting if Plantinga
had developed a piece of work that brought these two approaches into discussion. For example, if
Plantinga’s Felix Culpa argument had not made in isolation, but as a further support to consider why
God might have given creatures free-will (its leading to the good of the atonement). Such a
compounding of his accounts would still, however, be problematic and would still not take into
significant enough account the long-term state of affairs.
86 Plantinga, 1984.
87 Cf. Rom. 6.5-11.
88 When Plantinga refers to this world as the best of all possible worlds he will have almost certainly
been assuming that people would take this to mean the best of all possible worlds prior to the new
creation. If this is the case, however, then it needs to be asked why this possibility does not seem to
shape and influence, for example, his account of the free will defense.
89 Plantinga, 1974, p166-167.
90 This is not to suggest, however, that Plantinga’s approach is incompatible with an eschatological
view of the Christian faith. Plantinga would, for example, want to suggest that the outworkings of our
present lives have eschatological significance. If, however, Plantinga really wanted to emphasise this
point he should have perhaps made this a more central part of his argument. In so doing his argument
might have looked very different.
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One of the key problems with attempting to justify the ultimate goodness of
this present state of affairs is that it can end up undermining creation’s need for
redemption. For example, when Plantinga emphasises the significance of creation’s
present ‘freedom’ he would at times seem to be doing so at the expense of creation’s
future freedom ‘in Christ’. This radically contrasts with the position of Barth who
would seem to be so orientated towards emphasising the significance of creatures’
future freedom that he tends to undermine the present ‘freedom’ of creatures.91
Whereas, Plantinga wants to suggest that creation is free because it can and does
perform wrong actions, Barth would not want to suggest that creation is not free if it
is locked into a situation that leads to the (foreknown) inevitable performance of
actions that are wrong.92
For Barth, when creatures discover their true and essential freedom in Christ,
by the Spirit in obedience to the Father, they no longer live by a desire for
wrongdoing but by the grace of God.93 When entering into this new life, a person’s
desires are awakened and become so defined by a love for God and neighbour that
any wrong actions that they might previously have desired become senseless and
cease to be temptation. It is by living a life consumed with this love that a person is
freely able to become a ‘slave to righteousness’.94 From this more Pauline (and
Barthian) perspective, creatures are not portrayed as being created for
unrighteousness, as Plantinga would seem to suggest, but for righteousness. Whereas
Plantinga’s position might seem to make more sense to the world in its present
situation, Barth’s position finds much more accordance with Scripture and its central
affirmation that creation is in radical need of redemption from its present condition.
Although, this thesis could focus exclusively on a discussion of Plantinga and
his understanding of evil, space does not allow for this if there is to be significant
discussion of Barth. As such, this brief discussion on Plantinga serves as an extended
prolegomenon to a discussion of Barth’s position. Many of the issues and problems
raised in this first section will now be considered in more detail by focusing on how
Barth deals with such problems.
The main factor that will be considered to divide these two contrasting
thinkers is, as briefly noted in the introduction, Plantinga’s inclination towards a more
91 Cf. Barth, CD III.2, pp74, 194-7, 306 and CD IV.1, p43, 101, 745.
92 Cf. Rom. 7.14-20, 8.20-21.
93 Cf. Barth, CD III.1, pp265-266.
94 Cf. Gal. 4.14.
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monist understanding with respect to the relationship between sin and evil and God’s
creative purposes in contrast to Barth’s inclination towards a more dualist
understanding. Consequently, Plantinga would seem to portray sin and evil and that
which leads to wrongdoing as a desired part of God’s creative purposes, whereas
Barth portrays them as nothing less than a menace and enemy to God and his creative
purposes. Furthermore, it is this factor that has led to their two understandings of
freedom: Plantinga’s understanding of ‘freedom’ in terms of being “slaves to sin…
[and] free from the control of righteousness” (Rom. 6.20) and Barth’s understanding
of freedom as “free from sin and… slaves to righteousness” (Rom. 6.18).
Before moving onto a discussion of Barth there is perhaps one last point of
clarification that should be reiterated with respect to Plantinga. Although it has been
argued that Plantinga holds to a monist understanding of the relationship between sin
and evil and God’s creative purposes, this does not imply that he holds to a monist
understanding of the relationship between sin and evil and God. Although Plantinga
might argue that sin and evil are an intended element in God’s creative purposes, he
does not argue that sin and evil are a part of God. Moreover, he argues that they are a
consequent part of the particular creation he chose to create. In this respect Plantinga
is quite similar to Barth and perhaps leans more towards a dualist account of God’s
goodness in relation to sin and evil. Where Barth and Plantinga differ, however, is
with respect to their understandings of the relationship between sin and evil in God’s
creative purposes. Whereas Plantinga holds sin and evil to retain precedence within
God’s creative purposes, Barth, we shall suggest, holds them to be an inevitable
consequence that God does not directly will, but which he is able consequently to
incorporate into his creative purposes. A notable feature of Barth’s account, in
comparison with Plantinga’s, is that at each and every turn he seeks to uphold a strong
understanding of God’s sovereignty while refusing to make sin and evil an element in
God’s creative purposes. To develop a strong Christian account of the relationship
between sin and evil and God’s creative purposes, the sovereignty of God needs to be
upheld whilst also keeping sin and evil separate from God. By failing to sustain this
separation between sin and evil and God’s ultimate purposes Plantinga’s approach to
theodicy is ultimately inadequate as a specifically Christian account.
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III. Karl Barth’s Dualist Account of the Relationship Between Sin
and Evil and God’s Creative Purposes
1. Is Barth’s account of Das Nichtige, “Halfway Towards a Manichean
Dualism”? 95
Karl Barth’s interpretation of sin and evil as an impossible possibility seeks to
address some of the difficulties and paradoxes that arise in his understanding of evil
as das Nichtige. On the one hand, Barth argues that sin and evil - “[confirm] the real
existence of nothingness”96; are “actual”97, “something”98and “real”99; are “not
nothing or non-existent”100; are “an imprisoning power”101; and, furthermore, have
their “own ponderable reality”102. On the other hand, they are “that which is not, that
which is empty, which is necessarily nothing “103; “the non-existent” 104; “that which
God did not will”;105 and, of course, das Nichtige (nothingness or ‘that which is not’).
These apparent paradoxes develop when Barth refuses to adhere either to a monist
understanding, which considers sin and evil as a desired created reality, or to some
form of dualism, which undermines the sovereignty of God. One could argue, that by
refusing to adhere either to monism or dualism Barth is inevitably going to end up
being illogical or inconsistent. This, however, is not the case and his rationale will
hopefully become clear when I consider the context in which Barth uses such terms
as, ‘real’, ‘actual’, ‘existent’ etc. Before doing this, however, it would be significant
to consider Hick’s misinterpretation of Barth as a theologian bordering on Manichean
dualism.
When Barth refers to das Nichtige as something existent, something real etc. it
might seem that he is bordering on some form of Manichean dualism. John Hick
makes this accusation of him in his book Evil and the God of Love when he suggests
95 Hick, 1977, p193.
96 Barth, CD III.3, 1960, p352.
97 Ibid. p74.
98 Ibid. p296.
99 Ibid. p352.
100 Ibid. p349.
101 Ibid. p356.
102 Ibid. p76, (emphasis mine).
103 Ibid.
104 Ibid.
105 Ibid. p366.
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that Barth’s understanding of das Nichtige “is halfway towards a Manichean
dualism.”106 By looking solely at some of the language that Barth uses to describe das
Nichtige, out of context, it could be argued that Hick’s accusation has a certain
amount of gravity. However, when this language is understood in its proper context
there is much more to what Barth is suggesting. By considering this further it will
hopefully become clear that Barth is neither a theologian bordering on the heresy of
Manichean dualism nor halfway towards it (whatever this means?). Moreover, Barth
has developed an understanding that affirms both the full sovereignty of God and the
genuinely malevolent nature of sin and evil. Before considering his position further,
however, it will be useful to consider Hick’s accusation in its proper context. Hick
writes,
Barth’s argument – that in creating, God chooses good and rejects evil,
which henceforth has the character of being denied and opposed by
God – would be in order if this were a human choice. But when
applied to the Godhead arguments become highly questionable. It
requires the premise that God in creating, must choose between
realities which already stand in some way before him, seeking his
election. But such a premise ignores, and by implication denies, the
distinctively Christian doctrine of creation ex nihilo. By postulating a
previously existing situation within which God acts… Barth is halfway
towards a Manichean dualism.107
Hick’s accusation that Barth denies the doctrine of creation ex nihilo is a
misunderstanding that is quite likely generated by Hick’s two-fold typology into two
kinds, namely, monist and dualist.108 Barth holds, in no uncertain terms, that God
creates ex nihilo. This particular act of creation is brought about, for Barth, “by [God]
distinguishing that which He willed from that which he did not will, and giving
[creation] existence on the basis of that distinction. To that divine distinction it owes
the fact that it is. And to that same distinction it owes the fact that it can continue to
106 Hick, 1977, p193.
107 Ibid.
108 As mentioned in the introduction, Hick argues for a two-fold typology of Christian theodicies,
namely, those which offer monist accounts of good and evil and those which offer a dualist account.
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be.”109 When Barth refers to “nothingness” as the reality out of which God creates, he
is not referring to it in a manner that undermines the doctrine of creation ex nihilo.
For Barth, das Nichtige truly is both nothingness and the non-existent. As Nicolas
Wolterstorff writes on Barth,
Before God created – if we may speak of “before” – before God
created, there was God and God alone. Nothing else, not anything
else… That is, there were no other things than God. If things other
than God were to exist they must be brought forth from not being. The
only one who can do that is God – by creating. Creation is bringing
things forth from the abyss of non-being.110
For Barth, however, this understanding of das Nichtige does not necessarily
entail that ‘nothingness’ or das Nichtige does not exist in its own manner. Das
Nichtige exists in its non-existence. As Wolterstorff writes further on Barth,
For Das Nichtige is not non-being as such. Non-being is, precisely, not
anything; whereas das Nichtige is something: there is das Nichtige.
Yet it’s not the case that before God creates there is God and
something else – namely, das Nichtige. Before God creates there is
God and not anything else.111
By using such terms as ‘real’, ‘actual’, etc. to refer to das Nichtige Barth is
affirming that there really was a time112 when creation did not exist but that this
reality was overcome when God brought creation into existence.113 By distinguishing
between the reality of das Nichtige (when creation was not) and the reality of creation
(when creation was), Barth is able to affirm that creation is not eternal and, therefore,
did not always exist but was brought into existence ex nihilo in accordance with the
free will of God.
109 Barth, CD III.3, 1960, p73.
110 Wolterstorff, 1996, p587.
111 Ibid.
112 This thesis will be using words such as ‘prior’ and ‘before’ which refer to a single system of time
and so a degree of analogy must come into play here.
113 Cf. Barth, CD III.3, 1960, p73.
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Although Barth might want to affirm the reality of das Nichtige in one sense,
Barth would also want to make it clear, however, that das Nichtige does not have its
own independent reality. Its reality is, moreover, dependent upon God’s will to create
through his confrontation of and victory over the non-existent. Following this
triumph, das Nichtige finds its reality as the shadow of creation114. If God had not
chosen to bring creation into existence there would have been no shadow to fall
behind creation and the only thing that would have existed would have been, as
Wolterstorff writes on Barth, ‘God and God alone’, ‘Nothing else, not anything
else.’115 When God chose to create something else apart from him, he did so in
opposition to what would have eternally been the ‘unrealised nothing else’. Under
these circumstances creation, as ‘that which God willed for’, is distinguished from
das Nichtige, as ‘that which he did not will for’. Furthermore, because God willed for
creation over das Nichtige, for Barth, creation should be understood in positive terms
and associated with what is good. Das Nichtige, on the other hand, is uncreated and
needs to be understood in malevolent terms and can only be associated with what is
evil.
If Barth had not drawn the distinction between the reality of das Nichtige and
the reality of creation, when holding to the doctrine of creation ex nihilo, he would
have had to affirm the eternality of creation and adhere to some form of monism.116 In
so doing he would have denied the fundamental distinction between God and creation
and affirmed creation to have been begotten from God - ‘out of God’. If there were no
non-existent existence of das Nichtige or nihil apart from God, as the shadow of
creation, then there could be no nihil out of which God could have created. This
would mean that creation would need to be understood as begotten from God. Unless,
of course, one chose to hold to some form of dualism and argued that creation was
‘out of something’. This understanding, however, is also highly problematic because
114 As will be considered in more detail later, following God’s triumph over sin and evil, das Nichtige
also finds reality within the fallen creation as it exists in the shadow of the new creation. The shadow
metaphor finds significant accordance with Scripture Cf. 1 Chr. 29.15, Job 8.9, 10.21, Ps. 17.8, 23.4,
36.7, 57.1, 63.7, 91.1, 144.4, Eccl. 6.12, Isa. 59.9, Mt. 4.16, Lk. 1.79, Heb. 10.1.
115 Wolterstorff, 1996, p587. It should perhaps be noted that the ‘nothing else’ has always existed with
God in its non-existence but that this non-existence is only realised when God brings creation into
existence. In other words, the ‘nothing else’ did not develop a newfound existence alongside creation,
but only developed the realisation of its non-existent existence.
116 It is not being implied here that there was a time when nothing else existed apart from God and then
there was a time when all that existed apart from God was creation. God should not be understood as
creating in time, but as creating time and, therefore, this account should not be understood temporally.
If time did exist prior to creation and apart from God, then creation could not be understood as being
‘out of nothing’ but ‘out of time’.
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it denies the full sovereignty of God and places preconditions and limitations on
God’s creative activity. Furthermore, it undermines the possibility of God being able
to engage in an act of creation at all because, as Jürgen Moltmann shows by drawing
on the distinction between ‘creating’ (bara) and ‘making’ (asah): “Creation is
something absolutely new. It is neither actually or potentially inherent or present in
something else... ‘Making’ [on the other hand] is the term for the purposeful
‘manufacture’ of a work, in which something is given its particular character and
aptitude.”117
When affirming that there really was a ‘time’, prior to creation, when nothing
existed apart from God, Barth is in no way interpreting the ‘nothing’ as a
‘something’. He holds in no uncertain terms that before creation, there really was
nothing else apart from God; there was God and no-thing. This reality of ‘nothing
else apart from God’ is, for Barth, the reality of das Nichtige; it is the non-existent
reality that only exists as the shadow of the existent creation (and, as shall be
discussed later, as the shadow of the new creation118). As such, it is only through
creation that das Nichtige is realised as a reality i.e. with relation to creation. As
Wolterstorff writes, “Das Nichtige…comes about as the inevitable accompaniment of
God’s bringing forth creatures.”119 The difficulty with this understanding, however, is
that it might seem to conflict with the previous assertion that there needs to be a nihil
out of which God could create.
The need to understand that there is a nihil out of which God creates is for the
purpose of affirming both the full sovereignty of God and the distinction that lies
between him and his creation. When God originally created, it was not a case of him
needing nihil out of which to create but, moreover, that there was nihil (nothing else
apart from God) out of which he created. It is this assertion that the doctrine of
creation ex nihilo seeks to affirm when it presents nihil in real terms. Presenting nihil
in such ‘real’ terms, however, is dependent upon there being a creation that is able to
117 Moltmann, 1985, p73 and cf. Irenaeus, accessed 2008, 4.20.1.
118 Das Nichtige only exists in the shadow of a next stage in God’s creative purposes. Thus when God
brings about the final stage and consummation of his creative purposes, das Nichtige is brought to an
end.
119 As Wolterstorff describes through the analogy of a dissonance in a Bach fugue - “Barth wants
nothing to do with any of the multitude of theories which say that those phenomena which he, Barth,
identifies as sins and evils, are not really evil but merely “negative aspects” of human existence – like
the dissonance in a Bach fugue which, if heard all by themselves, are repulsive, but which, when heard
within the context of the whole, are seen to contribute indispensably to the goodness of the whole. It’s
not the case that reality is good through and through. There is evil in it: that which is in opposition to
God and to which God is therefore in opposition.” (Wolterstorff, 1996, p587.)
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look back in retrospect at the shadow from whence it came. If there were no creation,
then there would also be no retrospect and, therefore, no possibility of considering
nihil or das Nichtige in real terms. For this reason, any realisation of nihil is
dependent upon there being the perspective of creation.
With all this complication, the question might arise as to why there is a need
to consider nihil or das Nichtige in real terms? Would it not be easier simply to
suggest that God has existed for all eternity and then ‘when’ he chose to create, he
existed with creation? This position is no different from Barth’s and it is more than
likely that Barth would have agreed that this simpler understanding, interpreted
correctly, would be ideal. However, by bringing the term ‘nothing’ (or one of its
many forms) into the equation and considering it in real terms, for example, when
creation is understood as ‘out of nothing’, Barth and his predecessors avoid the risks
of monism or dualism. This approach appears to have been successful in achieving
this task. However, it can only continue to be successful if ‘nothing’ is merely being
understood in terms that suggest existence and not as something that actually exists.
This is the mistake that many critics make when considering Barth’s understanding of
das Nichtige. For Barth, nothing is not something disguised under the pseudonym of
nothing. Rather, it really denotes no-thing.
If it were the case that Barth had chosen to adhere to a monist understanding
and misinterpret creation as being begotten from God, Barth would have also needed
to deny the reality of evil as something truly negative, that is, as an opponent to both
God and his creation, in favour of considering it in positive terms as a misconceived
good.120 By considering evil and das Nichtige in real terms as a reality separate from
God, Barth does not undermine the doctrine of creation ex nihilo but affirms it over
and against a variety of monist theories that really would undermine this doctrine by
affirming that creation is ‘out of God’. In his assertion that evil is a very real threat
against God’s creation Barth is also making it clear that God takes sin and evil
seriously. If this assertion is not made and evil is not taken seriously, a mockery is
made of God’s decision to send his Son to suffer and die in order to overcome this
threat. For Barth, the standpoint from which sin and evil must be understood is the
revelation of its confrontation in the life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ. When
sin and evil are understood from this perspective all attempts to consider them as
120 Cf. Barth, CD III.3, 1960, p305, 307, 310, 315, 333, 352 and cf. Augustine, On the Nature of the
Good, chap. 1, (accessed 2008).
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anything other than the negation of God’s will and opponent to his creative purposes
can only be regarded as inadequate and trivialising evil. Barth writes,
But nothingness is neither God nor His creatures. But it would be
foolhardy to rush to the conclusion that it is therefore nothing, i.e., that
it does not exist. God takes it into account. He is concerned with it. He
strives against it, resists and overcomes it. If God’s reality and
revelation are known in his presence and action in Jesus Christ, he is
also known as the god who is confronted by nothingness, for whom it
constitutes a problem, who takes it seriously, who does not deal with it
incidentally but in the fullness of the glory of His deity, who is not
engaged indirectly or mediately but with his whole being, involving
Himself to the utmost. If we accept this we cannot argue that because
it has nothing in common with God and His creature nothingness is
nothing, i.e., it does not exist. That which confronts God in this way,
and is seriously treated by Him, is surely not nothing or non-
existent.121
To come to a clearer understanding of what Barth is trying to do here and to
challenge further the accusation that he is in danger of developing some form of
Manichean dualism it is important to is important to consider what precisely is being
argued when he refers to das Nichtige as something ‘real’. When he uses this term,
for example, to suggest that there is “real evil and real death as well as real sin… real
devil with his legions, and a real hell”122, he is not using it in the same respect as he
does when referring to the reality of God and creation. Relative to God and creation,
das Nichtige is, for Barth, ‘that which is not’. This does not necessarily mean,
however, as Barth wants to emphasise, that das Nichtige does not retain some form of
relative reality. By using the term ‘real’ to refer to das Nichtige he is using it to imply
an “opposition to the totality of God’s creation.”123 As such, just as it is highly
problematic to deny that there is ‘something’ (das Nichtige) in opposition to the
totality of God’s creation, it is also problematic to deny that das Nichtige is real in a
121 Barth, CD III.3, 1960, p349.
122 Ibid. p310.
123 Ibid.
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certain respect. If das Nichtige is not considered to have its own peculiar form of
being it becomes very difficult to consider there to be an object of jealousy, wrath and
judgement.124 When God creates something he does so in opposition to the
nothingness (das Nichtige) that exists with an “ontic peculiarity”125 as the shadow of
God’s creation. For Barth, when God creates he does so ‘out of nothing’ and,
therefore, in this creative act he distinguishes creation from the non-existent reality of
das Nichtige. Barth writes,
That nothingness has the form of evil and death as well as sin shows us
that it is what it is not only morally but physically and totally. It is the
comprehensive negation of the creature and its nature. And as such it
is a power which, though unsolicited and uninvited, is superior, like
evil and death, to all the forces which the creature can oppose to it. As
negation nothingness has its own dynamic, the dynamic of damage and
destruction with which the creature cannot cope.126
Affirming the negativity of das Nichtige, in relation to the positivity of
creation, is very important to Barth.127 He holds that das Nichtige can only be realised
as an actuality because it is the negation of the positive reality of God and his
creation. If there were no existent reality of ‘that which is’ (God and creation), then
there could be no negative reality of ‘that which is not’ (das Nichtige). Furthermore,
without the positive action of God raising creation out of das Nichtige there would be
no negative action of creation being subsumed by the sphere of das Nichtige.128 It is
only through God’s positive actions, such as creation and redemption, that there can
be the possibility of negative actions, as the perspective inverse of the positive actions
124 Ibid. p356.
125 Ibid.
126 Ibid. p310.
127 This position of Barth’s follows on in the tradition of Augustine, who held that everything that God
created and gave existence to is good. Like Augustine, Barth was keen to undermine the various
Platonist, Gnostic and Manichaean philosophies that denied the reality and/or goodness of particulars
(kosmos aisthetos – the phenomenal realm of things that do change) in favour of affirming the sole
reality and/or goodness of universals (kosmos noetos – the noumenal realm of things that do not
change). By affirming the doctrine of creation ex nihilo both Barth and Augustine could affirm the
reality of particulars as a reality distinct from God but yet purposefully created by him. If God creates
out of nothing, it is both through him and for him that all things are created. There is much to Barth’s
thought that follows on in the tradition of Augustine. This will be looked at further and discussed in
more detail later in this thesis.
128 Cf. Barth, CD III.3, 1960, p74.
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e.g. annihilation as the inverse of creation. For Barth, when God creates ex nihilo he
brings about a meaningful and positive change. What this implies is that total
nothingness, which only exists as the shadow of this positive change, needs to be
understood in negative terms. It also implies that creation and das Nichtige stand at
opposite poles and so the goodness of creation implies the evil on das Nichtige. As
such, the reality of das Nichtige finds adequate description, as Barth writes, “by
defining it as the possibility which God in his eternal decree rejected and therefore
did not and does not will, which has and can have its actuality in that sense.”129
Barth is unwilling to deny that das Nichtige and evil are a reality. He writes,
“Nothingness rejoices when it notices that it is not noticed.”130 He is also, however,
unwilling to advocate any form of Manichean dualism, which would suggest that das
Nichtige is a real thing in the same manner as God and creation are real things. He
wants to affirm that “there is a positive as well as a negative aspect of creation and
creaturely occurrence.”131 If God’s creative activity is considered from its positive
aspect, on the one hand, creation is understood as the process whereby God brings
creation out of das Nichtige and then, through the life, death and resurrection of Jesus
Christ – the process whereby he brings about the renewal of creation into its final and
perfect consummation. If, on the other hand, it is considered from its negative aspect,
as the inverse of God’s positive action, Barth writes, “creation is as it were on the
frontier of nothingness and orientated towards it.”132 From the negative aspect,
creation is moving from createdness towards annihilation; das Nichtige is pulling
creation away from its consummation. This does not, however, mean that creation has
to concern itself with this negative aspect because, as Barth writes, “The true
nothingness is that which brought Jesus Christ to the cross, and that which he
defeated there.”133
As his beloved creation, God is always preserving and upholding it, pulling it
away from the menace of das Nichtige in a positive direction towards its ultimate
consummation. God wills to be the creator and as such, wills not to be the annihilator.
This, however, does not mean that he is not free to become the annihilator. What it
means is that in the person of Jesus Christ he has revealed himself as the loving
129 Ibid.
130 Ibid. p526.
131 Ibid. p296.
132 Ibid. p296.
133 Ibid. p305.
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Father and ever-persevering Shepherd and, in the utmost respect, as a God who does
not will for the annihilation of creation.134 He is a God that creates with progressive
purpose and not with a penchant for surrender or resignation. As Barth writes,
“[God’s] will for His creature is liberation for a life in fellowship with himself,
because he wills to be known and praised by the creature as its liberator and because
he thus wills its continuation and not its destruction.”135
When God creates, he creates with the purpose of embracing his creation into a
new and eternal life of koinonia with him. His creative purposes for his creatures and
the world they inhabit, are not ones of annihilation, but ones for transformation and
redemption. The fulfilment of his creative purposes is not characterised by surrender
and defeat, as the former would imply, but is rooted in his loving determination and
unswerving perseverance for his creation. The final consummation of God’s creative
purposes, however, has not yet been brought about. God is still working to bring
about the new creation through his Son Jesus Christ in accordance with the power of
the Holy Spirit who, as Irenaeus writes, are the two hands of the Father “by whom
and in whom, freely and spontaneously, He made all things.”136 Barth writes,
“[A]ccording to the work and revelation of God in Jesus Christ it is not
at all the will of God to abandon the creature in its proximity to the
non-existent, in its conflict with chaos; to withdraw to the secure
height of His own remoteness from contradiction, and then (in
consideration perhaps of its greater or lesser merit) to grant or not to
grant it His assistance, preserving or not preserving it in its need. On
the contrary, from all eternity – that is, in the eternal counsel of His
grace as it is effective and revealed in Jesus Christ – His merciful will
was to take up the cause of the creature against the non-existent, not
from the safe height of a supreme world-governor, but in the closest
possible proximity, with the greatest possible directness, i.e., Himself
to become a creature. He placed himself within the contradiction. He
drew to himself and bore away the whole enmity and problem and
power of the non-existent… This is the eternal will of God fulfilled
134 Cf. Wolterstorff, 1996, p595.
135 Barth, CD III.3, 1960, p290.
136 Irenaeus, accessed 2008, 4.20.1.
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and accomplished once and for all in time in Jesus Christ. And in the
light of this will and work we have to regard the question of the
conservatio of the creature as one which has already been decided.”137
Although the final consummation has not yet come about and therefore has
not yet been realised this does not mean that it cannot be known. It is the present state
of the Christian believer to have some knowledge of the truth that awaits it, such that
they can live by the faith and hope that this knowledge entails; to know that the day
will come when Christ’s defeat of the sin and evil on the cross will be fully realised.
On this day creation will enter into the kingdom of God and will see with
unimaginable clarity the creation that it has been created to become. Until this day,
however, the Christian can only live by and find vision through the message that has
been given to them in the Gospel and made true to them through the Spirit. Under
these circumstances, the Gospel is not the glasses, which clarify a person’s obscured
vision, but, moreover, the stick of a blind person, which provides the blind person
with some feeling of the way that lies ahead of them.
When considering Barth’s seemingly paradoxical understanding of das
Nichtige as ‘something’ that is ‘very real’, it is easy to see why such thinkers as Hick
consider him to be bordering on some form of Manichaean dualism. This, however, is
not the case. Barth would want to acknowledge that his account, as with all Christian
accounts, is analogical. By using the conceptuality of das Nichtige, Barth was able to
develop a strong account of creation ex nihilo that, on the one hand, is able to deny
any monist account that considers creation to have been begotten from God and, on
the other hand any Manichean dualist accounts that undermine the sovereignty of
God. He is also able to provide a formidable account of the relationship between sin
and evil in God’s creative purposes, which affirms the reality of sin and evil both as
an adversary to God’s creative purposes and as something over which God retains full
sovereignty. However, although Barth’s use of language in this context serves to
articulate some fundamental points it still has a paradoxical element and is not able to
answer all the questions that confront it, nor does it seek to. The creature’s incapacity
137 Barth, CD III.3, pp78-79.
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to understand sin and evil fully is not a problem for Barth, but a reality that the
creature should readily accept.
What Barth seeks to affirm is Scripture’s presentation of sin and evil as
something that exists temporarily. Sin and evil are a real adversary to God and one
that he ultimately overcomes through the life death and resurrection of Jesus Christ.
In his discussion of das Nichtige and references to it Barth is able to provide an
analogical account that strongly asserts Scripture’s message concerning the
relationship between sin and evil and God’s creative purposes. In so doing he adheres
neither to a form of monism on the one hand nor Manichean dualism on the other and
to the extent that his concept of das Nichtige is indeed coherent, is successful in the
task he sets himself.
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2. How Could Das Nichtige Have a Negative Effect Over Creation?
2.1 In the Shadow of the New Creation
So far it has been discussed how Barth considers das Nichtige to be a reality
without undermining the doctrine of creation ex nihilo or adhering to some form of
Manichean dualism. The question that now needs to be asked is how Barth sees das
Nichtige as bringing about sin and evil within creation without holding it to be an
eternal ‘lord of darkness’ that is independent from God. If he did consider das
Nichtige in these terms he would, of course, be advocating some form of Manichean
dualism and undermining God’s sovereignty.138 If, however, Barth does not hold das
Nichtige to be some independent creator of evil but holds it to be the mere
nothingness that God rejected in his initial creative act, it is very difficult to see how
it could have any influence over creation. How, in other words, can sin and evil be
grounded in or identified with nothingness?
Within Barth’s thought concerning good and evil there is a distinctly dualist
aspect between, as Nicolas Wolterstorff writes, “a bright side and a shadow side.” 139
As Wolterstorff goes on to write, “The bright side consists of all the things God
brought about by saying Yes to them; these are the creatures. The shadow side
consists of all the things God brought about by saying No to them; these are the
unactualised possibilities. It is these unactualised possibles, that which is not, which
menace the creature and thus constitute das Nichtige.”140 What Barth is suggesting, as
Wolterstorff understands him, is that “there’s an infinitude of possibilities that God
rejected at creation”141 and these possibilities are recognised by Barth as the shadow
side of creation. Wolterstorff then goes on to ask two seemingly obvious questions:
1. “[H]ow [could] God’s rejection of these possibles… bring them about?”142
2. “Don’t [the possibles] have to be there already if God is to reject them?”143
138 Cf. Rodin, 1997, p114.
139 Wolterstorff, 1996, p589.
140 Ibid.
141 Ibid.
142 Ibid.
143 Ibid.
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Of course, if Barth held that the rejected possibles were already there, in some
form or other, he would have needed to be adhering to some form of dualism, i.e. that
there was some other independent lord of evil that either controlled the rejected
possibles or, indeed, was the rejected possibles. Although there might be a dualist
strand in Barth’s thought, he adamantly does not endorse any form of dualism144 and
holds, as Wolterstorff writes, that there was and is no “previously existing creature,
nor some entity whose existence was entirely independent of God”145. In holding to a
dualist understanding but refusing to adhere to any form of dualism, Barth has no
option, for Wolterstorff, “but to say that in creating, God brought about the rejected
possibles.” 146 If this were what Barth was doing it would then raise the further
question of how das Nichtige, or ‘the unactualised possibles that constitute das
Nichtige’, could possibly guide creation away from God and bring it into a shadowy
existence? Surely this could not happen if what das Nichtige denotes were truly
nothingness, unactualised and rejected by God because, as Wolterstorff writes,
“unactualised possibles are… totally lacking in activity and power.”147
The answers to these problems will be considered by looking at the
interpretation of das Nichtige as ‘that which is not’. For Barth, sin and evil are that
which is not directly brought about by God, that which is not a part of God’s creation
but that which is, nonetheless, a very serious reality. They exist, he writes, because
“God still permits His kingdom not to be seen by us, and to that extent He still
permits us to be prey to nothingness”.148 For Barth, sin and evil are fundamentally not
a created reality but a permitted reality that comes into existence when God permits
his creation to ‘be prey’ to the alien powers of das Nichtige. The problem that would
again seem to arise here, however, is that by suggesting an alien power brings about
sin and evil, he might again seem to advocate some form of Manichean dualism.
144 Dualism being the view that there are two independent eternal things, such as gods or principles,
and that one is good and one is evil. A dualist account, however, does not necessarily imply that there
are two independent and eternal things, but that there are two independent and eternal aspects that need
to be considered. As Barth holds, for example, there is both God and das Nichtige, the existent and the
non-existent, a thing and no-thing. These two enter into confrontation when God wills to create
something ‘out of’ and, therefore, ‘over and against’ nothing. As a result of this confrontation ‘nothing’
becomes distinguished from God not only in its non-existence but, furthermore, as that which God does
not will for. Consequently, as God and what he wills for is good, so das Nichtige and what it represents
become recognised as evil.
145 Wolterstorff, 1996, p597.
146 Ibid. p589.
147 Ibid.
148 Barth, CD III.3, 1960, p367.
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It is very difficult to consider an alien power as coming from something that is
not an independent creator of evil. For Barth, however, the suggestion that sin and
evil are brought about by some alien power does not necessarily imply a Manichean
dualism. What it implies is two things: first, that the existence of sin and evil within
creation is alien to the creator and the purposes for which his creation has been
created and destined; and second, because das Nichtige is working against God and
his creative purposes they are a negative power, but a power nonetheless. As nihilum
or das Nichtige worked against God when he created ex nihilo, so das Nichtige, which
holds creation in bondage, continues to work against God when he perseveres to bring
about creation’s transformation, redemption and liberation of his fallen creation into
the new creation. The fallen creation, for Barth, exists in the shadow of the new
creation and it is this overshadowed existence that continues to portray and realise the
God-less reign of das Nichtige.
What should perhaps be made clear at this point is that although Barth might
hold das Nichtige to have been destroyed in Jesus Christ,149 he also holds that
“Nothingness may still have standing and assume significance to the extent that the
final revelation of its destruction has not yet taken place and all creation must still
await and expect it.”150 As such, although creation has not yet been brought into its
fulfilment and has, therefore, not yet been freed fully from the chains of das Nichtige,
this does not mean that it was not created for perfection and, indeed, was not
originally created perfect. The world was created perfect but because it proceeded to
become subject to the uncreated and alien powers of das Nichtige, it does not yet fully
realise this perfection or function in the manner for which it was created.
The important implication here is that God did not make a mistake when he
originally brought creation into existence such that he is now faced with making
changes to account for an original blunder.151 It means that the present creation exists
as it does because God has not yet brought it into fulfilment; it presently between that
for which it has been created for and that for which it has not been created. Creation
149 How can das Nichtige be destroyed? If das Nichtige has no negative reality with respect to the
positive creation it has no reality at all. As such, for Barth, when God says ‘Yes’ to creation an raises it
into perfection, the effects that das Nichtige had on creation will be confronted with a ‘No’ and will
ultimately come to an end. There will, therefore, no longer be any menaces, alien powers or negative
realities and hence there will no longer be any reality of das Nichtige.
150 Barth, CD III.3, 1960, p367.
151 Barth writes, “[The creature] has not come into being by chance but by necessity, and therefore not
as an accident but as a sign and witness of this necessity.” (Barth, CD III.1, 1958, p229.)
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is, as it were, being held back by the das Nichtige, out of which it was created, in
apprehension of its final consummation: the fulfilment of ‘that which it has been
created for’. It is only upon Christ’s coming to free creation from the powers of das
Nichtige that creation will fully realise its essential freedom and ultimately enter into
its essential destiny as the new creation. As Barth writes, “In the final act of salvation
history, i.e., in the revelation of Jesus Christ as the Foundation and Deliverer and
Head of the whole of creation, the history of creation will also reach its goal and end.
It will not need to progress any further, it will have fulfilled its purpose.”152 The
present existence of creation is, therefore, an existence that dwells in the shadow of
the new creation; it is, as it were, ‘that which is not’ the new creation.
So what does it mean for creation to be ‘that which is not the new creation’? It
means that it has not yet been brought into full participation with God and is
consequently subject to the alien powers of ‘that which is not God’. Creation has been
created for a covenantal relationship with God but by not yet fully participating in this
form of existence it has, to a certain extent, been left to its own ‘created’ devices, to
exist in a ‘relationship’ with itself, its own egocentricities, and develop as such.153
Although this understanding of Barth’s might show similarities to Plantinga’s free-
will defense, in that it presents God as permitting his creation to have the opportunity
to develop by its own dysfunctional form of freedom, it also has key differences. The
main difference being that Barth holds, as Wolterstorff writes, “[t]he sinful exercise
of the free will is to be understood as not only an action of the agent, but as also,
submission to the power of das Nichtige.”154 The alien powers of das Nichtige are not
just, therefore, a factor that disorientates creation and guides it into a dysfunctional
form of existence. It is, moreover, the overwhelming void in which creation is
deprived of the freedom to participate fully in communion with God and, therefore,
the void where creation exists in its fallen and chaotic state.
The world has been created to exist under God and, therefore, by not existing
in full communion with God it does not exist as it should. By not existing fully with
God there is an opening for the consequent negative power of das Nichtige to stop
creation from existing properly, to become dysfunctional and consumed by sin and
evil. Creation’s imprisonment in this situation does not suggest, however, that God
152 Barth, CD III.3, 1960, p87.
153 Barth, CD III:1, 1958, p94ff.
154 Wolterstorff, 1996, p599.
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does not continually uphold creation. The very continuing existence of creation is
testament to God’s constant preservation of it. What it does suggest, however, is that
God only partially upholds creation. As such, this gives das Nichtige the opportunity
to gain some dominion over it and cause it to exist in a confused, chaotic, imprisoned
and fallen state. Creation’s existence in this fallen state is not, therefore the result of
some independent lord guiding it into its dysfunction, but the result of the partiality
and lack of God’s mighty arm to guide it into its created perfection; creation has not,
as it were, been forcefully torn away from God by das Nichtige but has fallen away
from God.155 This is how a world consumed by the powers of das Nichtige needs to
be understood - as an existence that does not yet participate in full communion with
God and so does not yet have the eyes to see nor the ears to hear. Creation does not so
much gain blindness by being prey to das Nichtige, but, moreover, exists in a state of
blindness because it presently lacks the transforming power of God to bring it out of
its state of blindness and into its essential existence in communion with God.
The present creation, as it is consumed by das Nichtige, exists in the shadow
of the new creation i.e. the creation that it has ultimately been created to become.
Surrounded by God’s full embrace through participation within the triune koinonia,
the new creation is creation’s essential destiny and is at the very essence of what it
means to be one of God’s creatures. As such, what is truly alien to creation is a life
outside God’s kingdom of koinonia – a life that is ‘yet to’ discover its new form of
existence. This life in ‘alienation’ accurately describes the condition of the present
world in which creatures exist in communion with themselves, outside the full
embrace of God and in bondage to the reign of das Nichtige. It is in this manner that
das Nichtige has been permitted to have a negative effect over creation - by being the
‘something’ that is at the very essence of a life without God.156
155 This could be reworded to say that creation has become imprisoned and blinded by the power of das
Nichtige, which might seem similar to being stolen away. However, this bondage and blindness only
occurs because creation is not participating in full communion with God.
156 Again, Barth is speaking analogically here. He could have used ‘x’ instead of ‘das Nichtige’ to
describe what defines a life outside God’s embrace because creature’s are naïve to what truly lies at the
essence of sin and evil – they are completely incapable of explaining and rationalising sin and evil.
Why it is so significant to use the term das Nichtige, however, is that it correctly portrays the key
theological assertions that, first, Manichean dualism is heretical and, second, there is ‘nothing’ that
creation can use as a scapegoat for its sinfulness (it is creation itself that is wholly blameworthy for its
wrongdoing).
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2.2 The ‘Lacking’ or ‘Privatio’ of this Present World
The ‘lacking’ or ‘privatio’ that defines this present world is what characterises
it as a world consumed by the powers of das Nichtige. This suggests an understanding
of creation as ‘that which is not yet in full communion with God’ and ‘that which has
not yet had its eyes and ears opened’. This blind and deaf existence is still,
nonetheless, a very real form of existence, albeit a negative form of existence given
that it is lived out in the shadow of the new creation - the creation that it is yet to
become. This present creation that lacks the full transforming and reconciling power
of God is, for Barth, the creation consumed by the power of das Nichtige. By
understanding sin and evil in terms of the privation of God’s goodness, Barth is able
to play off God’s insurmountable goodness and put into perspective the utter
seriousness of sin and evil. Such an understanding of evil in terms of a ‘lacking’ or
‘privatio’ is closely connected with Augustine’s understanding of evil as privatio
boni, the privation of good. Barth writes on Augustine,
Augustine used the terms [Malum est privatio boni] quite correctly to
define the purely negative character of evil, i.e., the nullity of sin, evil
and death, its nature as opposition both intrinsically and in relation to
God and his creature. For Augustine privation is corruptio or
convérsio boni. It is not only the absence of what really is but the
assault upon it. Evil is related to good in such a way that it corrupts it
and harms it. It seeks to destroy and consume it, tendit ad non esse, as
the fire threatens to consume fuel, and is in process of doing so.157
With the apparent similarities between Barth’s and Augustine’s work it is
perhaps surprising that Barth did not enter into much further discussion with
Augustine on this matter. The reason for this could perhaps be because, whereas
Augustine tended to consider evil more in terms of the privation or corruption of
good, Barth tended to draw on it more as the consequence of creation only being
subject to God’s partial158 preservation i.e. the privation of God’s full embrace. Barth
holds that creation has always existed in a state that has fallen away from God and
157 Barth, CD III.3, 1960, p318.
158 In this context, ‘God’s partial preservation’ is intended to mean ‘God’s ‘less than full’ preservation.
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holds that it exists in this state because it has ‘not yet’ been brought into fulfilment. It
therefore lives in anticipation of its final consummation and fulfilment: when it will
be resurrected by the Spirit, in the person of Christ into its essential destiny in
communion with God.
These different tendencies between Barth and Augustine do not, however,
suggest that their two approaches are in disagreement. Barth would agree with
Augustine that the existence of sin and evil is the result of the privation of God’s
good preservation and his good creativity; and Augustine, who holds that all good
things come from God, would agree with Barth that the existence of evil could only
be the result of God’s unfulfilled and partial work. Where the two could perhaps be
seen to differ, however, is with respect to where they place their emphasis. Augustine,
on the one hand, would seem to place his emphasis on how evil implies a
privatio/corruptio boni. Barth, on the other hand, would seem to be more concerned
with how evil implies a digression from God’s creative purposes and a privation of
his full preservation and consummated creativity. For example, whereas Augustine
considers cowardice as the corruption of a brave mind and injustice as the corruption
of a just mind,159 Barth would perhaps be more inclined to interpret these two
weaknesses in terms of the consequence of creatures not yet existing as they were
created to - fully by the grace of God.160
Although Augustine and Barth might not take identical approaches to their
understanding of evil, they continue to adopt a similar stance on a number of matters
concerning this issue – the reason for this being the influence that Augustine had on
Barth. One of these matters is their mutual understanding that das Nichtige or nihil
does not retain existence in the same way that God and creation do. For Augustine,
“To have true existence is an exclusive prerogative of God”161 and, for Barth, evil can
only exist as the negation of this true existence. Barth and Augustine also both hold,
however, that das Nichtige/nihil and evil do have their own kind of existence as the
negation of this ‘true existence’.162
Das Nichtige and evil exist, for Barth, because God has not yet brought about
the consummation of his creative purposes and so, to a certain extent, has left his
159 Augustine, Against the Fundamental Epistle of Manichaeus, chap. 35, (accessed 2008).
160 Barth, CD III.3, 1960, p85.
161 Augustine, On the Nature of the Good, chpt 19, (accessed 2008).
162 Cf. Augustine, Enchiridion, chap. 13-14, (accessed 2008).
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creation to its own ‘created’ devices to attempt to live by its own self-preservation.163
Creation, in other words, is consumed by das Nichtige not because das Nichtige came
and transformed it, but because God has yet to come and fully transform it i.e. to
resurrect it. Sin and evil are not something that is gained by creation, but something
that exists within creation because creation presently lacks the full reconciliatory and
transformative power to deliver it from sin and evil. With respect to preservation, sin
and evil exist because the mighty arm of God does not yet fully preserve creation and,
as a result, the power of das Nichtige is able to subsume that which is not fully upheld
by God. This negative power is not, however, an active power with its own
independent freedom and existence; if there were no creation then there would be no
reality of das Nichtige. Nevertheless, because creation does exist das Nichtige can
also exist and have the opportunity to gain dominion over those aspects of creation
which are not fully preserved by God. Under this dominion creation is ‘that which is
not yet’ in full participation with God and ‘that which is not yet’ fully preserved by
God. It is this temporal dominion that leads to the sin and evil which constitute this
world in its fallenness.
2.3 Barth’s Account of the Rejected Possibles that Comprise Das Nichtige
At this point it would be significant to go back and consider Wolterstorff’s
suggestion that Barth has no option “but to say that in creating, God brought about the
rejected possibles”164. Wolterstorff understands Barth to hold, “that originally there
was God and non-being – that is, God and nothing else; now, after creation, there is
God, creatures and all that God did not create…God’s activity of creating perforce
brings about this new realm of that which is not.”165 He considers this position with
bemusement, asking how it is that Barth can suggest “that creation consists of
bringing about existent things, on the one hand, and non-existent possibles on the
other”166 He is stumped further by Barth’s decision to brand all rejected or
163 The understanding that creation’s ‘own devices’ are devices that are, nonetheless, created by God is
fundamental when coming to an appreciation of Gods ongoing preservation. Cf. Barth, CD III.1, 1958,
p94. – “The creature is not self-existent... It did not come into being by itself. It does not consist by
itself. It cannot sustain itself. It has to thank its creation and therefore its Creator for the fact that it
came into being and is and will be.”
164 Wolterstorff, 1996, p589.
165 Ibid.
166 Ibid.
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unactualised possibles as sinful, evil and objects of God’s wrath. He asks, “Why
should all those impotent, non-menacing, merely-possible wrens, robins, and
sparrows be the objects of God’s wrath?”167 Furthermore, he asks, how do these
“numberless swarm of possible wrens, robins, sparrows, and such like, to which God
in his wrath said “No, I refuse to create you”… now menace creatures by trying to
drag them down into the abyss where they too will become mere possibles”168? This
confused response of Wolterstorff’s is made in reference to Barth’s following
statement:
When in creation God pronounced His wise and omnipotent No… He
marked off the positive reality of the creature from that which he did
not elect and will and therefore did not create. And to that which He
denied He allotted the being of non-being, the existence of that which
does not exist… [T]hat which He did not elect and will, the non-
existent, comprises the infinite range of all the possibilities which he
passed over and with good reason did not actualise, the abyss in which
the one thing which he did create must inevitably sink… if he who
created it did not also preserve and sustain it.169
When considering this statement of Barth’s in isolation, Wolterstorff appears
fully justified in his criticisms and seems to provide a reasonable interpretation of
Barth. It is unlikely, however, that when Barth made this statement he was
committing himself to the kind of philosophical and conceptual claims which
Wolterstorff is critiquing. For this reason, it would seem that Barth’s problem, in the
face of Wolterstorff’s criticism, is not so much one of illogicality or incoherence as of
over-generality. If, however, it is the case that Wolterstorff has misinterpreted Barth,
the question still needs to be answered as to what Barth actually means when he
makes this statement and other similar ones.
Where Wolterstorff would seem to have misinterpreted Barth, I shall suggest,
is in his Platonic interpretation of what is negative or malevolent about the rejected or
167 Ibid.p590.
168 Ibid.p589.
169 Barth, CD III.3, 1960, p77.
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unactualised possibles - “all that God did not create”170. Wolterstorff would seem to
have interpreted Barth as attributing the negative or malevolent aspect of unactualised
possibles to the possible states of affairs or states of existence that do not become
actualised i.e. Tom’s not going to the shops on Thursday, square apples or the Loch
Ness Monster. However, it does not seem to be the case that it is these possibles that
Barth wants to consider as sinful, evil or negative but the non-existence of these
possibles. If it were the case that these possibles had been actualised, Barth would
have wanted to consider them in positive terms. As such, it is only the non-existence
of unactualised possibles that gives them a negative status. Furthermore, it is only as
non-existent possibles, qualified by their nothing-ness and non-being-ness, that they
can be considered to ‘constitute’ das Nichtige.
Although unactualised possibles are neither created nor actualised by God,
Barth does not imply that these possibles, in and of themselves (whether or not they
are actualised), should be associated with the evil of das Nichtige. While Barth would
want to hold, in the Augustinian tradition, that these possibles, or “exemplifiable
individual ideas”171, exist as ideas (i.e. are known) in the omniscient mind of God, he
would not want to hold that their rejection (in not being actualised) implies their
malevolence. When Barth writes, “that which is not is that which is actual only in the
negativity allotted to it by the divine decision, only in its exclusion from creation,
only, if we may put it thus, at the left hand of God”172, he is not, in this context,
referring specifically to ‘that which is not’ as the unexemplified ‘exemplifiable
individual ideas’. What he is referring to is the potential non-existence of the
actualised creation173, which God rejected and negated when he created. So, for
example, when God creates round apples he is ‘excluding’ and ‘allotting with
negativity’ the possibility of those apples not being created. As such, God’s creation
170 Wolterstorff, 1996, p589.
171 Ibid. p590.
172 Barth, CD III.3, 1960, p73-74.
173 This, of course, could be conceived of as all the unactualised possibilities for creation that exist in
the mind of God prior to his actualising creation. It is not, however, these possibilities that Barth wants
to consider in negative or malevolent terms. Moreover, it is the ‘non-being-ness’ of these possibilities
that Barth wants to consider in such terms i.e. Barth would suggest that, positively, the Loch Ness
Monster exists and, negatively, the Loch Ness Monster does not exist. This will be discussed in more
detail later.
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of round apples should be understood as a good thing, over and against, the
possibility of their not being created or being uncreated.174
As God rejects non-creation when he creates, so he also rejects sin and evil
when he ultimately redeems and reconciles the present creation to himself. As such,
when God ultimately raises the present creation into full communion with him, he is
rejecting the potential non-existence of the new creation.175 The ‘that-which-is-not’,
such as the non-creation of creation and the non-establishment of the new creation
only exist, for Barth, in the shadow of God’s creation and new creation. The only
circumstances under which Barth would consider unexemplified ‘exemplifiable
individual ideas’ as evil is if they were somehow, in and of themselves, working
against God and his creative purposes. Although the devil is said to take many forms
it would be puzzling if he chose to identify himself with Tom’s decision not to go to
the shops on Thursday, square apples and/or the Loch Ness Monster.
So what would need to happen for unactualised possibles to work against
God’s creative purposes and become evil? First, as Wolterstorff notes, in creating,
God would have needed to actualise176 rejected possibles, or permit them to come into
existence; second, rejected possibles would need to be working against the fulfilment
of God’s creative purposes; and third, God’s good creative purposes would need to be
understood as the moral standard by which right and wrong, good and evil are
defined. For example, consider that God had created apples to be round but somehow
and for some reason (perhaps some form of natural freedom177) against his good
will178, apples developed a square shape. In this scenario, the apples would not exist
as they were created to and the squareness of these apples would imply a wrongful
174 The possibility of something being uncreated would imply a division of God’s will, a change in
God’s mind or the existence of another god in battle with God. As such, this possibility, although
possible for God in his freedom, would be highly problematic to comprehend.
175 This is the present state of creation as it consumed by ‘that which is not’.
176 For this to have any cogency one would need to dichotomise the will of God into a good will and an
evil will, into good creative purpose and evil creative purposes that both exist in an eternal conflict
with one another. This would also mean, unless one wanted to separate God’s being from his will, a
dichotomisation of God and therefore imply some new form of Sabellianism. (One might suggest that
one could adhere to some form of monism, and hold that rejected possibles were initiated by the one
will of God. However, to adhere to a monist position would be to deny the possibility of a possible
being understood as rejected. In a monist understanding everything is a part of God’s good creative
purposes and therefore everything is intended and nothing is rejected.)
177 For example, evolution could be considered as permitted to creation such that it could develop
somewhat freely (God will have needed to determine some things). Of course, if apples evolve into
square apples, their evolving into square apples would need to be considered as a part of God’s creative
purposes (even if God did not ultimately will for apples to be square).
178 Cf. Wolterstorff, 1996, p590.
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existence. Furthermore, if God’s good purposes were considered as the moral
standard, the apple’s wrongful existence would need to be understood as evil. Apples
are, however, not square and as far as it is possible to know are fulfilling their created
purpose as round apples. With this assumed knowledge, the possible shape, size,
colour etc. need not be of any moral concern for this present world. It is similarly the
case with Tom’s decision of whether or not to go to the shops on Thursday. If God
created Tom to go to the shops every Thursday and then for some reason, perhaps
misguided individual free will, Tom decided to deny his essential destiny and not to
go to the shops on Thursday, this inaction would be in contradiction of his created
purpose and imply a wrongdoing on Tom’s part. His inaction would therefore be evil.
Creatures have not, however, been created for such a purpose and this means that
neither the unactualised nor the actualised possibility of Tom’s choosing to go to the
shops on a particular day needs to be considered as sinful or evil.
With respect to the grand scheme of God’s creative purposes, Barth would
want to argue that the possibilities of Tom’s not going to the shops on Thursdays, the
existence of square apples or the Loch Ness Monster are irrelevant because these
possibles seem neither to be a part of nor working against God’s creative purposes.
Furthermore, to question why God did not bring about such unactualised possibles
would be to question his creative purposes and attempt to play god. As creatures that
have been created by God, Barth would want to say that creatures should faithfully
accept their situation and trust that God has the best of all possible plans for it. When
Christ came to redeem the world from its fallen situation he revealed that God has,
from all eternity, ultimately planned to raise the world into its new home with him in
paradise. The revelation of this insurmountably good plan renders all concerns for
unactualised possibilities insignificant. Creatures should not, therefore, concern
themselves with questions of whether unactualised possibles are good or evil. The
only factors that should be branded as sinful or evil are those factors that have been
revealed as opposing God’s eternal plan for creation. Such factors are revealed as
malevolent when creation lies witness to God’s active working to deliver it from them
e.g. God’s active working in his act of creation (to deliver creation from non-creation)
and his active working in the life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ (to deliver
the present creation from its bondage to sin and evil). If this is the case, then, that
Barth is not concerned with questions concerning possibles that have not been
actualised, why does he identify sin and evil with ‘that which is not’?
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Although unactualised possibles are ‘that which God does not create’, this
does not necessarily mean that these possibles are, in and of themselves, the ‘that
which is not’ which Barth identifies with sin and evil. Barth does not suggest, as
Wolterstorff would seem to imply, that the ‘wren-ness’, ‘robin-ness’ and ‘sparrow-
ness’ of the unactualised wrens, robins, and sparrows are the object of God’s wrath
and the root of all evil. What Barth is suggesting is that it is the unactuality of such
unactualised possibles, that is, their being “allotted the being of non-being”179, that
needs to be understood in negative terms. His reason for arguing this point is that
unactuality is the negation of the positively understood ‘actuality’. Those possibles,
therefore, which have been allotted the ‘being of being’ have been given a positive
existence, whereas those possibles that are allotted the ‘being of non-being’ have not
been given existence and, therefore, cannot be understood positively (in the sense that
positively, a wren would have actual being and, negatively, a wren would not have
actual being).
Barth’s understanding on this matter is rooted in the tradition, which
Wolterstorff would also want to affirm, that being created and brought into existence
is a good thing and, therefore, not being created or being uncreated is a bad thing. As
we have seen, however, it is not the unactualised ‘wren-ness’, ‘robin-ness’, ‘sparrow-
ness’ or the ‘Tom’s-not-going-to-the-shops-on-Thursday-ness’, ‘square-apple-ness’
or ‘Loch-Ness-Monster-ness’ that constitute the negativity and malevolence of das
Nichtige for Barth’s approach. Contrary to Wolterstorff’s interpretation, it is only on
the basis that unactualised possibles are nothing that Barth understands them in
negative terms. Barth does not merely associate unactualised possibles with das
Nichtige but identifies them as das Nichtige and it is this non-Godliness that is at the
root of all evil.
If it is the case that it is only the non-being-ness of unactualised possibles that
constitutes their negativity, then why does Barth write, “that which He did not elect
and will, the non-existent, comprises the infinite range of all the possibilities which
he passed over and with good reason did not actualise”180? Consider the parents who
after having four children decide against having a fifth. This decision against the
potential little, blue-eyed, blonde-haired Jenny does not necessarily imply that the
parents consider this potential little Jenny as wrongful; there are other reasons, such
179 Barth, CD III.3, 1960, p77.
180 Barth, CD III.3, 1960, p77 (emphasis mine).
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as limited resources, for why the parents might have decided against trying for a fifth
child. It is along these lines that Barth would not consider the failure of non-existent
possibles to achieve existence as necessarily implying their wrongfulness; such a non-
event is not the negation of God’s creative purposes but an absence of God’s creative
purposes. The negation of God’s creative purposes, which Barth would want to
identify with wrongfulness, would, to reiterate, be the event of existent possibles
slipping back into the non-existence from whence they came. This movement would
be wrongful because it would be both a reversal and confrontation of God’s good
creative purposes.181 So, for example, it would be wrong for the four actualised
children to slip back into non-existence but it would not, therefore, be wrong for
Jenny not to come into existence, nor would it be wrong for all the other innumerable
potential Jennys not to come into existence.
If a person uses their imagination to assign names and descriptions to
unactualised possibles and then goes on to discuss such possibles in real terms this
should not be considered as giving them some form of reality. Just because Jenny can
be considered in real terms as a little, blue-eyed, blonde-haired girl, does not mean
that she is somehow actual; Jenny is not actual, she is non-existent and is, therefore,
like all other unactualised possibles, nothing. This is also, therefore, the case for
Wolterstorff’s non-existent possible wrens, robins or swallows that, along with Jenny,
need to be considered as constituents of das Nichtige.182 As such, discussion of
possible wrens etc. is and should therefore be no different from discussion of das
Nichtige, which Barth considers as the ultimate opponent to God’s creative purposes.
What might make them seem different, and why Wolterstorff might seem to conceive
of them differently, is if unactualised possibles are considered platonically in real
terms. By making this move and showing a concern for the ‘impotent, non-menacing’
unactualised possibles, Wolterstorff would seem to be attributing reality (in the sense
of a form of existence) to the unactualised possibles of das Nichtige as opposed to the
181 Unless, of course, God’s creative purposes had two wills: one for creation and one for uncreation.
This image of a surrendering and/or inconsistent god, however, does not describe the ever-persevering
God who is revealed in Scripture as the Good Shepherd and patient Father. This is not to suggest that
he is not free to have two conflicting wills, but to suggest that he has not been revealed as having a
dichotomised wills.
182 The term ‘constituents’ is being used analogically. ‘Nothing’ should not be understood as a
conglomerate of unactualised possibles; each and every unactualised possible is ‘nothing’ and,
therefore, a conglomerate of unactualised possibles is not a mixture of different non-existent ‘elements’
but, moreover, is nothing. There is no ‘different non-existent elements’ and for this reason the non-
existent wren is no different from the non-existent sparrow; they are both ‘nothing’.
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non-existent reality that Barth would want to affirm. Such a manipulation of Barth’s
thought would place him in the Manichean dualist camp that he is so adamantly
against.
To return to the analogy that was used above of the parents not having a fifth
child because of limited time or resources, it should be noted that this analogy is
clearly flawed because God does not suffer from limitations of time and resources.
This being said, however, there are certain things which God cannot do. It is not
possible for God to actualise every one of the infinite range of possibilities for the
simple reason that there will always be one more wren, situation or fantastical entity
for God to create.183 It is also not possible for God to actualise every alternative
possibility because some alternatives are inherently contradictory, for example, Tom
cannot simultaneously go and not go to the shop. Given such a limitation, God will
have needed to make some choices based on his purposeful preference. Such a
preference does not necessarily imply that unactualised possibles, such as square
apples, would have been malevolent but, at worst, implies that they might have had
lesser purposefulness. It could also be argued, if one wanted to hold to a less
deterministic account, that God determined that creation should have some ‘freedom’
to develop in its own manner. The consequence of this ‘freedom’ could be that apples
became round (as the result of the evolutionary process)184 and/or, to consider another
example, that Tom decides not to go to the shops on Thursday (as the result of free-
will).
Another limitation that should be considered here is the temporality of this
present state of affairs. God did not intend for this present world to be an unending
state of affairs and, therefore, there is only so much that can come into existence in
the short-term period between the beginning and end of creation. This time limit,
which God placed on this world, should not be understood as being implemented to
stop certain possibles from becoming actualised, but should be understood to exist
because God does not will for this present state of affairs to be an unending or
ultimate state of affairs. What about the possibles, therefore, that do not receive the
183 This renders it ridiculous to ask what more God could have created, because it is a question that can
always be asked no matter how much God decides to create.
184 Of course, if the roundness of apples were the product of evolution, then the theist would need to
hold that this roundness was the result of God’s determining apples to be directed towards this end
through the evolutionary process. It is for this reason that this account was considered as ‘less-
deterministic’ as opposed to ‘undeterministic’, which would imply perennial naturalism and random
natural selection.
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opportunity to come into existence? These were never an intended part of God’s
creative purposes and therefore these apparent ‘would have been possibles’ never
actually ‘would have been’; they are quite simply ‘nothing’ and so should not be
given a second thought. Whether an unactualised possible did not come into existence
because of God’s incapacity to create all possibles, whether it was the result of the
temporal limitations God placed on this world or whether it was the result of some
other reason, the fact that such a possible did not come into existence should mean
that it is of no concern to Christian thought.185 What God chose to create he created
with the greatest of all purposes. So for a person to seek to point to the shortcomings
of such a purpose would be to attempt to assume divine authority.
2.4 The Unactualised Possibles of Sin and Evil
Although Barth might not be concerned about the unactualised wrens, robins
etc., which have no influence over creation, he does concern himself with the
unactualised possibilities of sin and evil that do indeed influence creation and,
furthermore, are at work against God’s creative purposes. By not being directly
actualised by God, these products of das Nichtige are just as unactualised as the
unactualised wrens, robins etc. However, unlike the unactualised wrens and robins,
Barth holds that sin and evil are able to achieve a permitted actuality as a very real
opponent to God’s creative purposes. If it is correct to interpret Barth as holding that
God did not directly actualise sin and evil then Wolterstorff would seem to be
mistaken when he suggests that, for Barth, God did in fact bring about sin and evil.
However, if it is going to be suggested that Wolterstorff is wrong in this assertion,
then another response is needed to address Wolterstorff’s previous concern as to how
Barth could consider the rejected possibles of sin and evil as possessing actuality
without holding them to have been directly actualised by God.
For Barth, God did not directly bring about the rejected possibles of sin and
evil, das Nichtige did. This bare response to the problem is, of course, insufficient
because it still leaves open the question of how das Nichtige, if it truly is nothingness,
can have any power, let alone the power to bring something about. The key to
answering this question comes when creation is brought into the equation and
185 Unless, of course, unactualised possibles are being discussed with the purpose of undermining any
real significance they might be considered to have.
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considered as a reality that has been created by God, on the one hand, but has also
been permitted to lie prey to das Nichtige, on the other. Creation is key since das
Nichtige is only capable of actualisation and thus of bringing about sin and evil if
God creates something that lacks his full embrace. Creation is this ‘something’ and,
hence, it is only in and through creation that there can be this ‘lack’, which Barth
would want to associate with the power of das Nichtige taking hold. This has two
implications: first, it suggests that, although God may not directly actualise rejected
possibles, by actualising the creation that provides (and he knew would provide) the
way for sin and evil to achieve actuality he is indirectly actualising them; and second,
it suggests that it is not God’s but das Nichtige’s grasp over creation that directly
leads to the existence of sin and evil. God could be seen as planting the seed of
creation. However, by not yet nourishing it with his full preservation the world is not
able to flourish as it was created to but becomes strangled by the grip of das Nichtige.
In sum, these two implications suggest that in and through the act of creation
God brought about a situation whereby das Nichtige could achieve actuality and bring
about sin and evil. This interpretation of Barth is significantly different from
Wolterstorff’s interpretation186 because it does not make God out to be directly
responsible or culpable for the existence of sin and evil. It still, however, does not
answer the question of how sin and evil can achieve “actuality only under the
almighty No of God”187? The reasoning that something can achieve existence by
being rejected would seem to be, as Wolterstorff suggests, “flawed”.188 It becomes
even more problematic when it is considered, as Wolterstorff notes, that “presumably
God’s opus proprium, God’s Yes-saying [(and consequent no-saying or rejecting)],
continues; hence… das Nichtige also continues. Or does God’s opus proprium not
continue? Does God’s work cease? Does God rest?”189. To respond to these problems
it would be helpful to reconsider what Barth means when he refers to das Nichtige as
‘actual’ or ‘real’. It would also be significant to consider how, for Barth, achieving
actuality under the almighty ‘No’ of God means the same as being brought about by
das Nichtige.
186 To reiterate, Wolterstorff held that Barth had no option “but to say that in creating, God brought
about the rejected possibles.” Wolterstorff, 1996, p589.
187 Barth, CD III.3, 1960, p74.
188 Wolterstorff, 1996, p598.
189 Ibid. p602.
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As was discussed previously, for Barth, ‘real’ means “in opposition to the
totality of God’s creation”190. Understood in these terms, the reality of das Nichtige is
considered by Barth to be “a power which, though unsolicited and uninvited, is
superior, like evil and death, to all the forces which the creature can oppose to it. As
negation nothingness has its own dynamic, the dynamic of damage and destruction
with which the creature cannot cope.”191 This reality of das Nichtige is confirmed, for
Barth, by the “the sin of man” 192. In this confirmation das Nichtige is described as “a
factor so real that the creature of God, and among his creatures man especially in
whom the purpose of creation is revealed, is not only confronted by it and becomes its
victim, but makes himself its agent.”193 Although Wolterstorff does not question the
reality of sin, he questions the possibility of its reality being brought about by das
Nichtige and achieving actuality under the mighty ‘No’ of God. Barth, however,
wants to affirm this reasoning because,
1. Sin can only exist as ‘sin’ under the almighty No of God. If God did
not reject the reality of sin, then it would not be sin. Rather it would
have to be regarded as a significant part (purposeful good) of his
creative purposes.
2. If sin and evil are not affirmed as being brought about by das
Nichtige, and Barth is not to advocate a monist position and consider
them as part of God’s creative purposes, he would need to affirm some
form of Manichaean dualism and consider them as a part of some other
existent thing’s purposes.
It is unlikely that Wolterstorff would not have considered these reasons and a
mere presentation of them still leaves open the problem of how sin and evil can
achieve actuality under the almighty ‘No of God. To answer this question a further
question needs to be asked concerning how das Nichtige finds its actuality and power
in and through creation.
By creating a world that would be allowed to exist temporarily outside his full
embrace, God made it possible for das Nichtige to consume those parts of creation
190 Barth, CD III.3, 1960, p310.
191 Ibid. p310.
192 Ibid.p352.
193 Ibid.
58
that are not yet fully subject to God but are partly subject to nothing. Although it is
God that subjects the world to this present state of affairs, this does not mean that it is
a state of affairs that God ultimately intends for his creation.194 Barth, moreover,
considers them as a state of existence that is firmly at odds with God’s ultimate
creative purposes. It is within creation’s nothing-oriented195 state that sin and evil are
able to find their ground in creation and confirm the reality of das Nichtige as the
factor that leads creation into a life that it has not been created for. Under these
circumstances, the portrayal of creation’s existence as subject to das Nichtige is
merely a different way of describing the state of creation as it is deprived of God’s
full embrace - as it is subject to ‘that which is not’ God’s full embrace. In this present
state of affairs, therefore, on the one hand, God retains sovereignty over sin and evil
because he is able to determine the level of their existence by determining the fullness
of his embrace over creation.196 On the other hand, however, he is not culpable for its
existence because he does not actively determine its existence but,197 moreover,
actively confronts it, rejects it and overcomes it.
If it is the case, however, that God rejects the present state of affairs as it is
consumed by das Nichtige, then the question arises as to how das Nichtige can
achieve existence on the very basis of being rejected by God? It exists because,
although God has eternally rejected the dominion of das Nichtige, he still permits it to
have a temporal reign before ultimately actualising his full rejection of it and
vanquishing it forevermore. To have existence on the basis of being rejected by God
is, for Barth, to exist in the shadow of a new and transformed existence that has yet to
be actualised; to exist as ‘that which is not yet’ the new creation. This is the present
state of creation, as it exists in the shadow of the new creation. God’s ultimate
rejection of this present state of affairs and the anticipated breaking in of the new
creation is revealed to the world, for Barth, through the person of Jesus Christ. When
194 For Barth, “The creature’s right and meaning and goal and purpose and dignity lie – only – in the
fact that God as the Creator has turned toward it with His purpose.” (Barth, CD III.1, 1958, p94,
(emphasis mine).)
195 A nothing-oriented state inevitably implies a nothing-external-to-the-self-oriented state and this
clearly suggests a self-oriented state. This state of existence is lived out over and against a God-
oriented state. It is a state of existence animated by the flesh (soma psychikon) as opposed to a state
animated by the Holy Spirit (soma pneumatikon) (1 Cor. 15. 40-44).
196 Cf. Barth, CD III.1, 1958, p126-127.
197 A clear objection to this is that inaction can still imply culpability. This culpability is diminished,
however, if it is trusted that God has the best of all possible reasons for his inactivity and, furthermore,
when it is trusted that everything will ultimately turn out for the best in the consummation of God’s
creative purposes. This will discussed further later in the thesis.
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Christ suffers and is put to death on the cross God reveals and realises his eternal
rejection of the present sinful state of affairs. It is through this death that sin is
ultimately brought to an end. Then, however, through Christ’s resurrection God
reveals his eternal plan to resurrect the present creation into the new creation (1 Cor.
15.20-22).
The problem that Wolterstorff raises concerning whether the reign of das
Nichtige, will continue alongside God’s Yes-saying is answered by considering God’s
ultimate Yes. For Barth, das Nichtige can only exist and only continue to exist if
“God is against it [and]… against it in jealousy, wrath and judgement.” 198 For Barth,
it only exists “within [these] limits thus ordained.”199 What this implies is that das
Nichtige can only continue its incursions up to the point where God exclaims his
ultimate ‘No’ to it in judgement and becomes victorious over it. Following this
victory there is no longer anything to which God is against. As such das Nichtige only
exists as a past shadow that is no longer able to find any basis within or purchase on
reality. The new creation is brought into existence in the final consummation of
God’s creative purposes; it is the ultimate creation and does not exist in the shadow of
another and even better new creation. This ‘No’ to the reign of das Nichtige has
already been exclaimed by God when he sent his Son to suffer and die on the cross.
However, it is only upon the coming of God’s kingdom and the embracing of creation
into full communion with him that God will fully actualise his rejection of das
Nichtige’s reign and the sin and evil that results from it. In this ultimate act God and
his creation will no longer be confronted by the grasp of das Nichtige and God will no
longer subject himself to watching it in jealousy, wrath and judgement. On this new
day, all the No-saying is brought to an end because in the initiation of the new
creation God utters his ultimate and eternal and all-embracing Yes.
The unactualised possibles of sin and evil exist, for Barth, in opposition to
God’s creative purposes. They arise as a consequence of the world’s not yet being
fully upheld by God, but remaining under the reign of nothing (das Nichtige). The
subjection to das Nichtige over and against full subjection to God is at the very
essence of what undergirds sin and evil and is the main reason why they are identified
with nothingness. If, however, I am going to consider das Nichtige as the scapegoat to
198 Barth, CD III.3, 1960, p353.
199 Ibid.
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explain how Barth understands rejected possibles to come about, the next question
that arises is how das Nichtige could have come about.
2.5 How Does Barth Understand Das Nichtige to have Achieved its Dominion?
As has so far been discussed, Barth considers das Nichtige to have had its own
form of existence in its non-existence, “the being of non-being”200, and this reality is
realised in and through creation. On the one hand, das Nichtige’s existence as ‘the
nothing else apart from God’ was rejected when God willed for another. On the other
hand, however, its existence as ‘the voids that refuse, resist and therefore lack God’s
grace’201 were able to be realised when God created an existence that was not yet
encompassed by his full embrace – that had not yet experienced the fullness of his
kingdom.202 Barth understands these voids in creation’s preservation as the chaos in
which rejected possibles have the opportunity to exist. They are those aspects of
creation which do not yet experience in fullness the mighty arm of God; they are the
death and suffering, the unguided moral disasters, the untamed natural disasters, and,
essentially, they are sin and evil.
Although at times Barth’s understanding of das Nichtige’s distinct ‘existence’
might seem to undermine God’s sovereignty, it fundamentally does not because at no
point does he consider it in terms of an independent creator. For Barth, when rejected
possibles are brought about by das Nichtige it is the consequence of a lack of creation
and preservation and not an act of creation and preservation: it is the result of
inactivity as opposed to a specific act. When God originally brought creation into
existence he did not instantaneously transform it into its ultimate form by
immediately raising it into full communion with him, but created it such that it would
be permitted to exist temporarily outside his full embrace. God still preserved his
good creation however such that it could exist. Nevertheless, by not yet fully
preserving it he permitted the uncreated realities of sin and evil to develop. The
reason that these realities came into existence along with creation, for Barth, was not
because they were a part of God’s creation. For Barth, God’s creation is wholly good.
200 Ibid. p77.
201 Ibid. p353.
202 Ibid. p367.
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They came into existence alongside creation because they were dependent upon there
being a creation in which they could develop.
A parallel can again be drawn here between Barth and Augustine who holds,
“evil cannot exist without good or in anything that is not good.”203 By not yet fully
preserving creation but instead leaving voids in his preserving activity, the reality of
das Nichtige was able to constitute an environment in which sin and evil could
develop. Thus, by not yet choosing to bring creation to fulfilment, God permitted it to
become chaotic with sin and evil. Without the all-preserving power of God to
medicate it, creation fell sick; without the fully guiding hands of God to guide it,
creation became lost and imprisoned in a state of disorientation204; and without God’s
Spirit to revitalise it, creation became weak and helpless.205 These analogies206,
although problematic, seek to communicate the significant point that sin and evil
result from a lacking and privatio of God’s all-preserving power, his guiding hands,
and his revitalising Spirit. Put concisely, for Barth, sin and evil exist because “God
still permits His kingdom not to be seen by us”.207
Without yet experiencing the ultimate creative act for which creation has
been elected - the act which will raise it up into its essential destiny - creation does
not exist as it should. Consequently, it is consumed by das Nichtige. Wolterstorff’s
bewilderment at how rejected possibles could be ‘brought about’ is grounded in an
understanding that rejected possibles exist, for Barth, because of something gained as
opposed to something lacking. This is made apparent from Wolterstorff’s question
203 Cf. Augustine, Enchiridion, chap. 14 (accessed 2008) – “But although no one can doubt that good
and evil are contraries, not only can they exist at the same time, but evil cannot exist without good or in
anything that is not good. Good, however, can exist without evil. For a man or an angel can exist
without being wicked; but nothing can be wicked except a man or an angel: and so far as he is a man or
an angel, he is good; so far as he is wicked, he is an evil. And these two contraries are so far co-
existent, that if good did not exist in what is evil, neither could evil exist; because corruption could not
have either a place to dwell in, or a source to spring from, if there were nothing that could be corrupted;
and nothing can be corrupted except what is good, for corruption is nothing else but the destruction of
good. From what is good, then, evils arose, and except in what is good they do not exist; nor was there
any other source from which any evil nature could arise.”
204 Cf. Barth, CD III:2, 1960, p197-198 – “Sin means that he is lost in himself, but not to his
Creator…”
205 Cf. Augustine, Enchiridion, chap. 11, Against the Fundamental Epistle of Manichaeus, chap. 35 and
On the Nature of the Good, (accessed 2008).
206 This use of analogy does not intend to provide any form of historical account. Historically, Barth
would want to affirm that from the point when creation was first created to the point when it is
ultimately transformed into the new creation, creation does not find its fulfilment. It is only upon being
realised as the new creation, that creation is freed from the powers of das Nichtige and finds its
fulfilment in full communion with God.
207 Barth, CD III.3, 1960, p367.
62
about ‘how God’s rejection of these possibles could bring them about’208 and his
question, “Don’t [the possibles] have to be there already if God is to reject them?”209
Both these questions imply that rejected possibles, or the sin and evil that constitute
das Nichtige, need to have some kind of independent existence if God is to reject
them. This, however, is precisely what Barth is refusing to suggest. For Barth, sin and
evil need to be interpreted as ‘that which is not God’ and ‘that which is not creation’.
When Wolterstorff considers the dualist aspect in Barth between “a bright side and a
shadow side”210, there are points in his article in which he would seem to interpret
this dual aspect as a dualism.211 There is, however, fundamentally no dualism in
Barth’s account except between ‘that which is God’ and ‘that which is not God’;
between ‘that which is created by God’ and ‘that which is not created by God’; and
between ‘that for which creation has been created’ and ‘that for which creation has
not been created’. This being said, however, Barth also writes,
“[N]othingness is not simply to be equated with what is not, i.e., not
God and not the creature. God is God and not the creature, but this
does not mean there is nothingness in God… Again, the creature is
creature and not God, yet this does mean that as such it is null or
nothingness.”212
There is clearly not just a twofold relationship between God and das Nichtige
but a threefold relationship between God, creation and das Nichtige that needs to be
considered. This threefold relationship, however, does not undermine the dualist
aspect in Barth’s thought between God and das Nichtige. The fallen creation, it could
be said, is caught between God and das Nichtige: it is related to God in its createdness
and purpose but also related to das Nichtige in its fallenness and other-than-God-
ness.213 As such, the distinctions between God and the fallen world and between the
fallen world and das Nichtige do not have the same dual aspect that emerge when
God is distinguished from das Nichtige. How the threefold polarities between God,
creation and das Nichtige fit into the duality of God and das Nichtige will be
208 Wolterstorff, 1996, p589.
209 Ibid.
210 Ibid.
211 Ibid.
212 Barth, CD III.3, 1960, p349.
213 Cf. Augustine, Enchiridion, chap. 12 (accessed 2008).
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discussed further in the next section, but for now what is important to grasp is that,
first, although there is a duality there is no ontological dualism in Barth; second, there
is a clear threefold relationship between God, creation and, das Nichtige; and third,
the only seemingly dualistic distinction is between God and das Nichtige.214
For Barth, although das Nichtige might have a form of existence in its non-
existence this existence is, to reiterate, not comparable to the type of existence that
God or his creation have. Das Nichtige’s negative existence, which is realised through
the sin and evil in the fallen creation, is an existence that is dependent upon there
being a creation that does not participate in full communion with God – it is
dependent upon there being a next more complete stage in the fulfilment of God’s
creative purposes.215 When God ultimately raises creation into full participation with
him, he rejects those voids in creation where it has been consumed by das Nichtige,
and fills them with his embrace. He rejects the blindness and deafness of creation by
opening its eyes and ears, he rejects the prodigal and solo venture of creation by
embracing it into communion with him and he rejects das Nichtige’s stranglehold on
creation by welcoming it into his kingdom. In doing these things he brings about the
fulfilment of his creative purposes. As it is written in Hebrews, “God had planned
something better for us so that only together with us would they be made perfect.”
(Heb. 11.40 (NIV))
God’s rejection of das Nichtige’s dominion over creation, however, has not
yet been realised, as is apparent from the present existence of sin and evil. Although
God rejects das Nichtige he still permits it to retain a temporary dominion within
creation and, therefore, still allows it to bring about sin and evil. God, however,
ultimately rejects this dominion and therefore, for Barth, das Nichtige should be
understood as anything less than a menace and enemy to God and his creative
purposes. For Barth, it is “that to which God said No when He said Yes to the
creature.”216 Thus it is only from the perspective of God’s ultimate creative purposes
that das Nichtige can be understood as a menace. This is because God’s purposes
should be understood as the standard by which all menaces are defined as menaces
and all goods are defined as good. If something works against God’s creative
purposes it is a menace and if something is a part of his creative purposes it is good.
214 Although creation is affected by this dualist distinction, it is not incorporated in it.
215 Cf. Barth, CD III.3, 1960, p74.
216 Ibid. p76.
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Thus, when God reveals his plans to bring about the ultimate consummation of his
creative purposes and raise creation into communion with him he does so with the
direct intention of exposing the menaces that for the present, albeit temporarily,
consume his creation. More importantly, however, in Jesus Christ he reveals his
victory over - and abolition of - this menace, filling creation with the good news and
an eschatological hope for a new and eternal life.
From all eternity God has determined that creation would finally have its eyes
and ears opened; that it would ultimately be raised into perfection. This will occur
when God raises the present creation out of the shadow of the new creation (all that it
was created to become), and transforms it into this new creation. When this event
occurs creation will no longer be consumed by ‘that which it is not’ or overshadowed
by ‘that which it has been created to be’ but will finally become ‘that which it has
been created to be’. When this transformation and reconciliation are realised, creation
will become free from its dysfunction through participation within the triune
koinonia: the essential destiny for which it has been eternally elected.
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3.Why Would God Permit Das Nichtige to Have Any Grasp Over Creation?
3.1 Sin and Evil and the Good of the Creature
The questions that now come to the fore concern why God would permit das
Nichtige to have any grasp over his creation and the closely related question, what
effects das Nichtige has on creation. When considering these questions it is important
to realise that Barth did not intend to try and put himself in God’s shoes and engage
in some form of theodicy. This does not mean, however, that there cannot be a
consideration of the extent to which Barth did address these questions.
The reason that das Nichtige has any grasp over creation, for Barth, is, as we
have pointed out, that “God still permits His kingdom not to be seen by us, and to that
extent He still permits us to be prey to nothingness”.217 What this suggests is that
creation has not yet experienced the fulfilment of a life within God’s kingdom and,
therefore, has not yet undergone the transformation that will raise it into the fullness
of his kingdom. In this context das Nichtige is that which opposes God’s redemptive
and reconciliatory work by grasping onto creation and preventing it from achieving
this fulfilment. In seeking to deny a monist account, Barth would want to affirm that
das Nichtige is fundamentally not a part or aspect of God’s good creation but the
distinct shadow that falls behind it. Sin and evil are also, therefore, realities which
only exist in the shadow of the new creation. It is these that become non-existent
when creation is freed from das Nichtige’s stranglehold; when it is liberated from
bondage to this alien power and raised into the essential destiny that awaits it within
God’s kingdom.
This brief answer might provide some explanation as to why das Nichtige has
any grasp over creation and why creation does not exist as it was created to, in full
obedience to God. It does not, however, explain why God did not originally raise
creation into its final consummated state or, indeed, why God permits creation to
remain prey to das Nichtige. For Barth, as Wolterstorff understands him, “God for
God’s own reasons now permits the existential menace to continue its excursions,
these good reasons consisting, at least in part, of the fact that evil itself is now forced
to contribute to the good of the creature… for reasons which in their totality are
217 Barth, CD III.3, 1960, p367.
66
known to God alone; God permits das Nichtige to continue to work evil.”218 This
understanding of Wolterstorff’s would seem to be accurate. However, when he writes,
“evil itself is now forced to contribute to the good of the creature”, it is imperative
that this be interpreted carefully. Although Wolterstorff might be right in suggesting
this, it is extremely important that das Nichtige is not considered to be a tool that
comes from God but, rather as an instrument that is forced to become a servant of
God’s will and action.219 As Barth writes, “Even though [das Nichtige] does not will
to do so it is forced to serve [God], to serve His Word and work, the honour of His
Son, the proclamation of the Gospel, the faith of the community, and therefore the
way which He Himself wills to go within and with His creation until its day is done.
The defeated, captured and mastered enemy of God has as such become his
servant.”220
If Barth understands evil as being able to contribute to the good of the
creature, the question might arise as to why it should not be considered as a tool that
is directly intended by God? By holding that das Nichtige is forced to become God’s
servant, Barth is in no way wanting to affirm the sort of monist approach that
Plantinga takes advocating sin and evil as an aspect of God’s creative purposes. This
does not necessarily suggest, however, that Barth does not, like Plantinga, hold to
some form of Felix Culpa approach. In his book Evil and Theodicy in the Theology of
Karl Barth, Scott Rodin argues, “Barth unhesitantly embraces the idea of Felix
Culpa”221. He goes on,
We recognise that Barth wants to deny evil any positive role and yet
he employs this ‘necessary antithesis’ throughout his handling of the
problem of evil. It begins with the fundamental understanding of
God’s purposes in creation not to have fellowship per se, but to grant
to his creation a special status and participation which is only available
to it through the act of reconciliation and devotion to which God is
committed prior to the first moment of creation. Salvation and
redemption and all they mean for the eternal fellowship of God with
218 Wolterstorff, 1996, p605.
219 Barth, CD III.3, 1960, p367. This instrument arises as the unwilled but inevitable result of God
creating the particular creation that he does and which allows to exist temporarily apart from him.
220 Ibid. pp367-368.
221 Rodin, 1997, p85.
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His creation are the meaning and goal of creation… Salvation history
is the goal of creation, and therefore the Fall is fundamentally
important to the execution and completion of this goal. O’ Felix
Culpa!222
Rodin makes this statement in response to Barth’s discussion of the
significance of a post-Fall creature when Barth asks, “Is it not the case that now for
the first time the reality of the creature emerges as a reality distinct from God and the
preserving grace of God as grace that as such waits for gratitude and can only be
really received in gratitude?”223 In this statement a parallel can be drawn between
Barth and Irenaeus who also, as John Hick notes, hints at the Felix Culpa theme.224
The Irenaean type of theodicy holds that God created creatures to fall and experience
infancy and imperfection prior to being redeemed and reconciled into perfection.225
Like Irenaeus, Barth would seem to want to hold the Fall to be a part of God’s
creative purposes and a situation over which God retained full sovereignty.226
However, whereas Irenaeus’ Felix Culpa account of the Fall would seem to show a
greater concern for creatures having the opportunity to acquire a certain moral agency
(discipline through growth and nourishment227) Barth’s account would seem to show
a greater concern for the creature achieving an autonomy that would enable it to find
further distinction from God. Before going on to discuss this aspect of Barth in more
detail, the question needs to be asked as to whether Barth’s holding to a Felix Culpa
account would imply his adherence to a monist understanding of evil.
That Barth is indeed willing to identify with a Felix Culpa account is made
clear when he writes: “And He has turned more intimately to the creature than before.
Something other and greater than mere creation has now taken place. It is so much
greater that the dangerous saying is forced to our lips: felix culpa, quae talem et
222 Ibid. pp87-88.
223 Barth, CD II.1, 1957, p508. Translated from the German - ‘‘[I]ntimer hat er sich jetzt der Kreatur
zugewendet als vorher. Etwas Anderes, Größeres als die bloße Schöpfung ist jetzt Ereignis geworden:
so viel größer, daß sich das gefährliche Wort von der felix culpa, quae talem et tantum meruit habere
redemptorem (Missale Rom. Liturgie vom Karsamstag) schon hier auf die Lippen drängt - und gerade
in diesem Anderen, Größeren doch nichts Anderes als gerade die für uns verwirkte, jetzt erst offenbar
gewordene Herrlichkeit des Schöpfers und der Schöpfung.”
224 Hick, 1977, p218.
225 Although it would be greatly significant to enter into further discussion with Irenaeus, space does
not allow for this. Cf. Irenaeus, Against the Heresies, 4.38.2-3, 4.39.1, 3.20.2 (accessed 2008) and ibid.
pp207-276.
226 Cf. Barth, CD III.1, 1957, p233ff, CD II.2, 1957, pp128-129, and Cf. Rodin, 1997, p116.
227 Cf. Irenaeus, Against the Heresies, 4.38.3, 4.39.1 and 3.20.2. (accessed 2008).
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tantum meruit redemptorem (Roman Missal, Liturgy for the Saturday before Easter
Day).”228 Rodin is thus correct in asserting that Barth adheres to a form of the Felix
Culpa. Holding to such a stance does not, however, as I have already argued, lock
Barth into a monist account. As Rodin also makes clear, “For Barth, humanity’s fall
was its own doing despite its inevitability. He holds here to an Augustinian line
whereby the origins of sin are in the will and not in the nature of humanity as created
by God.”229 For Barth, God does not ultimately intend sin and evil in order to bring
about his good purpose. Rather, he consequently incorporates these inevitabilities
(which he permitted to arise within creation) within the benefits of the atonement and
its triumph over sin and evil.230
Although Barth is quite adamant that Scripture maintains creatures’ “full
responsibility for [sin’s] commission”231, he also wants to affirm the Scriptural
references to sin as “surrender to the alien power of an adversary.”232 As Barth goes
on, “[man] is led astray and harms himself, or rather lets himself be harmed. He is not
merely a thief but one who has fallen among thieves.”233 The ‘thieves’ that creatures
fall among are das Nichtige and the ‘concrete form’ of the creature’s relationship with
das Nichtige is revealed, for Barth, as,
“[man’s] personal act and guilt, his aberration from the grace of God
and its command, his refusal of the gratitude he owes to God and the
concomitant freedom and obligation, his arrogant attempt to be his
own master, provider and comforter, his unhallowed lust for what is
not his own, the falsehood, hatred and pride in which he is enmeshed
in relation to his neighbour, the stupidity to which he is self-
condemned, and a life which follows the course thereby determined on
the basis of the necessity thus imposed.”234
228 Barth, CD II.1, 1957, p507.
229 Rodin, 1997, p137.
230 This is how Barth would want to interpret Rom. 8.28 - “We know that all things work together for
good for those who love God, who are called according to his purpose.
231 Barth, CD III.3, 1960, p310 and Cf. Barth, CD III: 2, 1960, p197.
232 Barth, CD III.3, 1960, p310.
233 Ibid. and cf. Wolterstorff, 1996, pp598-599.
234 Barth, CD III.3, 1960, p305.
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In this revelation of the creature’s relationship with das Nichtige as also in the
light of Jesus Christ, Barth writes, “it is impossible to escape the truth that we
ourselves as sinners have become the victims and servants of nothingness, sharing its
nature and producing and extending it.”235
The creature’s responsibility for its sinfulness and its surrender to das
Nichtige are so completely intertwined that both, for Barth, seems to imply the other.
As such, when persons act sinfully it is they who are responsible for their sinfulness
because it is they alone (nothing else) that have determined their actions. However,
when it is considered that such persons cannot help but act sinfully it also becomes
apparent that they are in bondage to that way of living. This bondage is understood,
by Barth, as enslavement to the alien power of das Nichtige. It is only through
participation in Christ and through a life by the Spirit that a person can become free
from bondage to das Nichtige and find perfection in the arms of God. When a person
is delivered and liberated from das Nichtige he becomes a new and righteous person.
This new person, however, cannot claim responsibility for his righteousness because,
unlike the old person, the new person does not live by and is not subject to their inner
self but is subject to a life by the Spirit in Christ. It is only in and through the work of
the Trinity that a new person, participating within the triune relations, can be
determined as righteous. As such, the new person can only boast in the Lord Jesus
Christ and the Holy Spirit who raises them into new life. So, whereas the sinfulness
of a creature is inevitably determined by being subject to one’s own individuality (or
their being subject to the power of das Nichtige (nothing else)), the righteousness of a
creature is determined by participation within the Triune koinonia.
Barth holds that sin and evil can neither be associated with nor be understood
as a part of God’s creative purposes but, rather, they should be understood as an
inevitability that results from God’s decision to create a world that exists temporarily
apart from him. This inevitability is then consequently incorporated by God into his
creative purposes and used by him to develop the right relationship with his creation
through the processes of redemption and reconciliation. If evil were to be considered
as a tool that came directly from God and which he used for his creative purposes, the
whole of salvation history could not be understood as anything less than a process of
manipulation. If, on the other hand, it is understood that God merely permitted sin
235 Ibid.
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and evil to come into existence and then, consequently, incorporated them into his
creative purposes, God’s overwhelming sovereignty shines through and he is seen not
to be implicated in the existence of sin and evil.
Consider the analogy of a person who saves a stranger from falling over a
cliff. After this incident the two persons might become close friends and the victim
would probably have an overwhelming gratitude to the one who saved his life. The
relationship that might develop after this incident may be a good thing that would
have been achieved as a consequence of this incident. This would not, however,
imply that the incident of the person nearly falling over a cliff was a good thing nor
would it imply that it would have been good for the rescuer to have set the victim up
to fall over the cliff such that the two persons could develop a good relationship.236
What it does imply, however, is that the unfortunate incident was put to good use and
for a greater end, ‘O’ Felix Culpa’. The problem with this analogy, however, is that it
does not take into account God’s foreknowledge of the creature falling over the cliff
and becoming subsumed by sin and evil. When it is considered that God originally
created the world in a way that he knew would make it prone to falling into a sinful
and evil way of life, it is much more difficult to consider sin and evil as a factor that
is consequently incorporated into God’s creative purposes.
Although God’s foreknowledge might have been able to prevent creatures
from walking towards their cliff, this does not necessarily mean that the Fall was not
inevitable nor does it imply that God’s ‘negligence’ had the intent of manipulating
creatures into a good relationship with him. It is not God’s foreknowledge of a
situation that causes it to take place but, moreover, the occurrence of a situation that
causes God to have his foreknowledge. This being said, however, if it is suggested
that God created a scenario that he knew would lead the fall-prone creatures (which
he created as fall-prone) to submit to this inclination it becomes increasingly more
difficult to deny God’s culpability for the fallenness of creation. If God’s creativity
effectively set the world up to fall, how could creation not realise this destiny?
Furthermore, how could God be considered in such circumstances as less than the
architect of the Fall and this creator of the sin and evil that resulted from it?
To respond to this problem there needs to be a consideration of the priority of
God’s purposes for the world. If it is the case that God created the world with the
236 Such a set up could be related to Munchausen syndrome by proxy, which is seen as a dysfunctional
pathological condition.
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ultimate priority of its having particular qualities that would consequently (and
undesirably) lead to its becoming a fallen world, God would not need to be
considered the architect of such fallenness. Rather, he would be considered to be the
creator of a particular world in which short-term fallenness was a contingent matter of
fact, an inevitability. Although this would make God indirectly responsible, it would
not make him directly responsible. God would only be directly responsible for his
priority of creating the particular world and willing for a particular relationship with
it.237 If sin and evil are understood as the mere consequence of God’s particular
decision making, God can only be considered to be indirectly responsible for such an
inevitability. By making such a move, Barth undermines, on the one hand, the monist
positions that connect sin and evil directly to God and his creative purposes and, on
the other, the Manichean dualist positions that so remove God from the existence of
sin and evil that they undermine his sovereignty
3.2 Barth on the Creature’s Personal Autonomy
If it is the case that God created the world to have certain qualities that would
lead it into its fallenness, should these qualities not in and of themselves be
considered as evil and sinful? If God created the world to have a level of independent
‘freedom’ and autonomy, for example, which would inevitably lead to fallenness,
should this ‘freedom’ not be considered to be sinful and evil? Given that living a life
somewhat independently from God is not what creatures have been created for, this
‘freedom’ should be understood as sinful and evil. As Barth writes, “Sin… is posited
with free self-development”.238 Furthermore, because having this ‘freedom’ and
autonomy inevitably leads to a state of affairs that can only be described as sinful and
evil, it is clearly appropriate to suggest that creation is not meant to live by this form
of ‘freedom’.239 Despite that, for Barth, God’s creation is wholly good and should
not, therefore, be understood as sinful or evil, in and of itself.
237 Under these circumstances, the priority of God’s creating a particular world with particular qualities
is understood to take precedence over his will to stop the temporary existence of sin and evil.
238 Barth, CD III.3, 1960, p321.
239 This state of affairs is sinful and evil not simply because they occur apart from God but because
they conflict with the loving way of life that God intends for creation; a way of life that can only be
discovered by living in full communion with God and by his grace. (Cf. Barth, CD III:1, 1958, p96).
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The ‘partly independent’ existence of creation does not, in and of itself,
however, imply sin and evil.240 Moreover, the very fact that creation temporarily
exists in such a state implies that God has ordained it. As Barth writes, “in so far as
the consciousness of sin is a true element in our being, and to that extent sin is a
reality for us, it is ordained by God as that which makes redemption necessary.241
Although the type of ‘freedom’ that inevitably leads to sin and evil has malevolent
consequences, it is also a ‘freedom’ that can be considered to contribute towards the
good of the creature. The positive consequence of creation having its own autonomy
includes the potential, in Barth’s view, for creation genuinely to become another.
This consequence, it will be suggested can only come about, however, if creation has,
at least temporarily, been given the chance to lead its ‘own’ life242; in other words, if
creation becomes subject to the dominion of das Nichtige (‘that which is not’ God).
Barth writes,
The diversities and frontiers of the creaturely world contain many
“nots.” No single creature is all-inclusive. None is or resembles
another. To each belongs its own space and time, and in these its own
manner, nature and existence. What we have called the “shadow side”
of creation is constituted by the “not” which in this twofold respect, as
its distinction from God and its individual distinctiveness, pertains to
creaturely natures. On this shadow side the creature is contiguous to
nothingness, for the “not” is at once the expression and frontier of the
positive will, election and activity of God. When the creature crosses
240 Cf. Barth, CD III: 2, 1960, pp197-198.
241 Barth, CD III.3, 1960, p322.
242 This might seem to conflict with Barth’s understanding when he writes, “Nor does the creature exist
for itself. It is not the creature itself but its Creator who exists and thinks and speaks and cares for the
creature.” (Barth, CD III:1, 1958, p94.) And when he also writes, “It would be a strange love that was
satisfied with the mere existence and nature of the other, then withdrawing, leaving it to its own
devices.” (Ibid. p95.) In response to the first quote, a consideration is needed of Barth’s anthropology
and his definition of what it means to be a creature. Barth writes, “the one creaturely being in whose
existence we have to do immediately and directly with is the being of God.” (Barth, CD III:2, 1960,
p32.) For Barth, a creature does not find its true essence as a creature when it exists for itself, but only
when it exists for God. Therefore, the genuine creature does not exist for itself. In response to the
second quote, for Barth, it would indeed be a “strange love that was satisfied with the mere existence
and nature of the other, then withdrawing, leaving it to its own devices.” As such, God, for his own
reasons, only partly and temporarily leaves creation to its ‘own’ devices, before ultimately raising it up
into a new and eternal life of koinonia with him. This is the true and ultimate end that God has elected
and prepared for his creation.
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the frontier from the one side, and it is invaded from the other,
nothingness achieves actuality in the creaturely world.243
When God created the world ex nihilo it is important to understand that, for
Barth, it was created out of ‘that which is not God’ and therefore it must not be
understood as begotten from God. In his understanding of creation ex nihilo Barth
would seem to portray himself as a realist with respect to ‘nihilo’ or ‘das Nichtige’.244
For Barth, das Nichtige would seem to have its own independent existence in its non-
existence, a ‘being of non-being’; it is the ‘nothing else’ that existed with God prior to
creation. By coming across as a realist in this seemingly paradoxical respect he is able
to emphasise that there really was nothing else apart from God prior to creation.245 As
has been previously discussed, however, this non-existent existence can only be
realised when the fallen creation comes into existence through the sin and evil that
constitute das Nichtige and oppose God’s creative purposes.
Although Barth might seem to hold some form of realist stance with respect to
das Nichtige, he does not seem to hold to a realist stance regarding sin and evil. When
it comes to his understanding of sin and evil Barth would appear to be an anti-realist
by holding that sin and evil are dependent upon the fallen creation for their existence.
Das Nichtige, on the other hand, would not seem to be dependent upon the fallen
creation for its existence, but only dependent upon the fallen creation for the
realisation of its existence. By holding to a position that appears to be realist with
respect to das Nichtige yet anti-realist with respect to sin and evil Barth appears to
obviate all forms of monism or dualism. On the one hand, by holding that neither
243 Barth CD III.3, 1960, pp349- 350 (emphasis mine).
244 When discussing das Nichtige and sin and evil in realist and anti-realist terms, realism and anti-
realism are being understood as they are defined by Edward Craig in the Routledge Encyclopedia of
Philosophy: “A realist about Xs, for example, maintains that Xs (or facts or states of affairs involving
them) exist independently of how anyone else thinks or feels about them; whereas an anti-realist holds
that they are so dependent.” (Vol. 8, 1998, p116.) For example, with respect to humour a realist would
hold that amusement has an eternal conceptual reality whether or not a person has ever been amused,
whereas an anti-realist would hold that amusement only finds realisation if and when a person is
amused.
245 Although Barth’s understanding that das Nichtige only exists as the shadow of creation and the New
creation could come across as implying an anti-realist understanding i.e. the existence of das Nichtige
is dependent upon their being a creation to realise the shadow of das Nichtige (i.e. a ‘something else’ to
realise the shadow of ‘nothing else’) this is not his intention. If a person has a ten-pound note and
nothing else, that person does not need to receive another ten-pound note to realise that there was
previously nothing else apart from the single ten-pound note. When Barth understands that das
Nichtige only exists as the shadow of creation and the New creation he simply wants to emphasise the
temporality of das Nichtige’s reign as it anticipates God’s ultimate victory over it.
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creation nor sin and evil are ‘out of God’ but ‘out of nothing’ he denies monism, and,
on the other hand, by holding that prior to creation it was only God that had an
‘existent existence’ he denies dualism.246
Although Barth does not endorse any form of dualism he does, however, seem
to affirm a duality with respect to God and das Nichtige.247 This dual relation affects,
but does not incorporate creation. As such, it is not problematic to consider there to be
a duality when there are three distinct forms of ‘existence’: God’s, Creation’s and das
Nichtige’s. If this is the case, however, then the question arises as to where creation
comes in this account? As was mentioned earlier, creation could almost be considered
as being suspended between God and das Nichtige. This does not suggest that
creation is half God and half das Nichtige; creation is clearly distinct from both of
these. What it suggests is that creation is related both to God in its createdness and
purpose and to das Nichtige in its fallenness and other-than-God-ness. It is this other-
than-God-ness, which creation achieves from being ‘created out of’ and ‘subject to’
das Nichtige (that which is not God), that will be considered to be the fundamental
contributing factor to God’s creation of another and a possible answer to why God
permitted creation to fall prey to das Nichtige. By being created out of and subject to
that which is not God, as opposed to being created out of and fully subject to him,
God gives creation the opportunity to develop ‘out of’ and ‘into’ another.248 Barth
writes,
God created [the creature] “out of nothing,” that is, by distinguishing
that which he willed from that which he did not will, and by giving its
existence on the basis of that distinction. To that divine distinction it
owes that fact that it is. And to the same distinction it owes the fact
246 Das Nichtige, for Barth, has never had an actual existence, but has only ever existed in its non-
existence.
247 For the distinction between ‘dualism’ and ‘a dualist account’ see the previous footnote on p41.
248 If God had originally created creatures to be animated by the Spirit (soma pneumatikon – 1 Cor.
15.44) then creatures would not have been able to develop their own particular identity and would have
seemed very much like puppets. If, however, God temporarily gives creatures the opportunity to live a
life apart from him, they will be able to develop an original identity and will become like sheep
awaiting their shepherd, as opposed to dolls awaiting their puppeteer. It is arguably the case that a
person’s distinctiveness and particularity from God is one thing that God cannot give a person, but that
a person must attain for themself.
75
that it can continue to be. By preserving the distinction God preserves
the creature.249
By living a life subject to the dominion of das Nichtige and ‘that which is not
God’, creation has been given the ‘freedom’ to come into its own and develop truly
into another. This “autonomous reality [and]…freedom of individual action”250 that
God gives creation to become another is, for Barth, a good thing. However, although
it was God who made the decision to give creation this autonomy and let it exist
temporarily as prey to das Nichtige, this does not imply that everything which
constitutes this existence is a part of God’s creative purposes. Furthermore, it does not
imply that God is directly responsible for all that occurs within creation.251 Parallels
can be drawn here with the parable of the prodigal son and the father’s decision to
respond to his son’s wishes and give him his inheritance early. Although it might have
been the father who permitted his son to receive his inheritance early (for the
justifiable reason of wanting to respond to his son’s free wishes), this does not imply
that the father either intended or was responsible for the son’s squandering of his
inheritance. The father’s decision in this parable does, however, have significant
differences to God’s decision to give creation its own independent ‘freedom’. When
God gave creation its autonomy he knew what it would do with it. Furthermore, he
gave it to the world without it even asking. However, even if it were the case in this
parable that the father knew the son would squander his inheritance and gave it to the
son without his asking, this would still not make the father directly culpable for his
son’s actions. It might make him indirectly responsible but this does not imply direct
culpability. The son is still the one that is freely performing the wrong actions.
If it is the case that the father of the prodigal son could be considered to be
irresponsible under these circumstances, could it not also be the case that God should
be considered as being irresponsible when he gives the world its particular ‘freedom’,
even if he is not considered directly culpable? Not if it is the case that in giving
creation the ‘freedom’ to genuinely become another he was achieving a significant
part of his plan for creation, which, as Barth would want to argue, he is.252 Barth
writes, “The creature does not belong and is not subject to him like a puppet or a tool
249 Barth, CD III.3, 1960, p73.
250 Ibid. p87.
251 Cf. Wolterstorff, 1996, p601-602.
252 Cf. Barth, CD III:2, 1960, pp92, 172.
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or dead matter – that would certainly not be the lordship of the living God – but in the
autonomy in which it was created, in the activity which God made possible for it and
permitted to it.”253 However, because creation’s essential destiny, as Barth writes, “is
to live of and by the grace of God” 254, creation’s present ungodly life would have also
led to its inevitable destruction had it not been for God’s redemptive intervention.
What is important to grasp here is that by living this present ‘self-conscious’
life, creation experiences and discovers its own particularity. This experience should
therefore be understood as nothing less than an experience that has been foreordained
by God. It is, furthermore, a significant part of God’s creative purposes to develop the
right relationship with his creature.255 This relationship that God wills to develop with
this particular creation, however, has the inevitable consequence of sin and evil. If
God were to create the sort of world for communion with him that could not lead a
sinful or evil existence it would be a fundamentally different creation from the
creation that presently exists. As such, the question as to why God permitted creation
to lead a sinful and evil existence directly corresponds to the question of why God
wanted to create this particular creation for the right relationship with him. By taking
this corresponding question into account it becomes apparent that God permits the
existence of sin and evil in exchange for creating this particular created order and
developing the right relationship with it. What Barth would seem to imply is that there
is an apparent trade-off between God’s will to enter into a relationship with a
particular other in exchange for his having to witness his creation fall subject to das
Nichtige and all that for which it has not been elected. As Wolterstorff writes,
[Barth’s] move, like the free-will account as a whole, consists of
viewing God as making a trade-off. Having defeated das Nichtige at
the cross, God could have called to a halt its ingressions. But God did
not, for reasons which in their totality are known to God alone; God
permits das Nichtige to continue to work evil.256
What Wolterstorff should perhaps have added to this statement is that the
omnipotent and omniscient God could have called a halt to the possible ingressions of
253 Barth, CD III.3, 1960, p93 and cf. Barth, CD II.1, 1957, p508 and Rodin, 1997, p85.
254 Barth, CD III.3, 1960, p80.
255 Cf. Barth, CD III.2, 1960, p127.
256 Wolterstorff, 1996, p605.
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das Nichtige in his initial act of creation prior to them ever having the opportunity to
develop. This being the case, the trade-off257 was actually made by God prior to his
defeating das Nichtige on the cross. This point is significant in order to affirm the full
and eternal sovereignty of God when he initially permitted creation to become prey to
das Nichtige. The original trade-off that God makes, however, is a trade-off that he is
only willing to make temporarily and not eternally. This was made apparent when
God came to counter his original trade-off with a further trade-off by sending his Son
to suffer and die under the stranglehold of das Nichtige in order to raise his creation
into communion with him, “to participate in the divine covenant of grace”258. In this
exchange God makes creation’s situation his own through the incarnation of his Son
Jesus Christ. In the incarnation God not only “ennobled [creation] and made it a
promise”259 but, in an anhypostatic (God-humanward) movement, also realised the
possibility of communion between the transcendent God and the lowly creature. This
counter trade-off is, for Barth, God’s answer to and, therefore, the answer to the
problem of evil. It is from this forward-looking ‘post Christum’ perspective that
creation can know that the alien powers of das Nichtige have been fully confronted260
and overcome through the work of Christ. Rooted in this faith and hope creation can
eagerly await the day when its freedom from das Nichtige will be fully realised. Barth
writes,
There is, therefore, no further reason to be ashamed of our situation,
nor to bewail it, nor to complain against God for putting us in this and
not in some other situation... Hence it is no empty assertion when we
say that the future honour and dignity and glory of the creature is
reflected in its need. In fact its need means that the creature discovers
257 The trade-off that is being made here is between his decision to ‘not call a halt to the ingressions of
das Nichtige in his initial act of creation’ and his decision for ‘x’.
258 Barth, CD III.3, 1960, p80.
259 Ibid. p82.
260 When Christ died on the cross he experienced the very worst of suffering and evil at the hands of
das nichtige; he saw the burden of das Nichtige in all its fullness (Cf. Barth, CD IV.1, 1956, p266 and
CD IV.2, 1956, p487.). In so doing he stood alongside creation and compassionately made the problem
of sin and evil his own. Through this anhypostatic movement God came to really know his enemy and
was, thus, able to confront and defeat it once and for all. This defeat abridged the vast chorismos that
separated creatures from God and, as such, made it possible for creatures participate in the person of
Christ and the enhypostatic (human-Godward) movement.
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itself as such at the very place where in Jesus Christ God himself
entered in to save it.261
When creation is ultimately delivered from bondage to das Nichtige and enters
into a new life of communion with God it will ‘function properly’ i.e. as it was
created to. Creatures will become empowered and animated by the Holy Spirit (soma
pneumatikon) (1 Cor. 15.42-45). They will move beyond their own otherness and
proud individuality to love as they were created to love. In this transition, powerfully
articulated through the metaphor of ‘rebirth’, creatures will become like little children
who are warmly embraced by the Father into a new life under his grace. Although this
transformation and renewal might imply an element of discontinuity, God also wills
for a radical continuity between the old and new creation. God’s creative plan for his
creatures and the world they inhabit, does not, however, involve annihilation in
preparation for a reattempt at creating a better world ex nihilo. It is orientated, indeed,
towards transformation, reconciliation and what might be termed as recreation ex
creatione. The consummation of God’s creative purposes is, to reiterate, not
characterised by surrender and defeat, as the former would imply, but is rooted in his
loving purpose and steadfast persistence for his original creation – his “plan for the
fullness of time, to gather up all things in him on heaven and earth” (Eph. 1.10). As
such, God does not overwhelm the distinctions that distinguish him from creation but
abridges them such that he can become united with creation in communion. Upon
achieving this unity, God does not undermine the particularity between him and his
creation but preserves it. For Barth, when God creates the creature it “does not exist
casually. It does not merely exist, but exists meaningfully. In its existence it realises a
purpose a plan and order…This is already implied in the fact that it is a creature and
therefore the work of the Creator, of God.”262 When God created creatures he
purposefully created them as individuals distinct from him such that he would be able
to raise them into a genuine communal relationship with him. Barth writes,
In the language of the New Testament, koinonia or communicatio is a
relationship between two persons in which these are brought into
perfect mutual coordination within the framework of a definite order,
261 Barth, CD III.3, 1960, p82.
262 Barth, CD III.1, 1960, p229.
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yet with no destruction of their two-sided identity and particularity but
rather in its confirmation and expression.263
3.3 What Effects Can Das Nichtige Have on Creation?
This brings us to the question of what effects das Nichtige can have on
creation? In other words, what aspects of this world can be understood as sinful and
evil? Sin and evil, it could be said, are the consequent malfunction that creation
experiences when it does not function in the manner for which it was created, that is,
to exist in communion with and within the full grace of God. This does not suggest,
however, that it is the independent existence of creation that is sinful and evil.
Creation, as God has created it, is a good thing. What it suggests is that the existence
of creation apart from God leads to a sinful and evil situation. Sin and evil are, as it
were, the inevitable consequence that arises when creation exists semi-independently
from God. By understanding sin and evil in these terms Barth is not adhering to a
monist position and holding God to be the author of sin and evil but holding him to be
the creator of a world which is freely able to fall captive to sin and evil. As such
Barth is placing the root of sin and evil within creation itself and holding it to be the
inevitable result of God permitting creation to exist temporarily apart from him. Sin
and evil develop as the result of creation’s semi-independence, its subjection to das
Nichtige, and not as a direct result of its createdness.264 To speak analogously, it is not
God that painfully injects sin and evil into creation but creation itself through its own
self-condemnation.265 In this exposition of sin and evil, Barth understands das
Nichtige as the void that exists where God does not fully embrace creation; it is the
void that implies creation’s existence in less than full communion with God.
The effect or result of das Nichtige having this grasp over creation is, as we
have seen, to cause it to malfunction. This malfunction, however, is not a problem
that Barth thinks creation needs to dwell on but, moreover, a problem that has already
263 Barth, CD IV.3, 1961, p535.
264 The understanding that the world was created for the purpose of being in communion with God
should not be considered to entail that God created the world such that the uncreated realities of sin and
evil would arise if creation existed apart from him apart from him. Moreover, it implies that sin and
evil are the direct consequence of the particular created reality God chose to create and gave the
opportunity to exist apart from him. Under these circumstances, sin and evil are an indirect result of
God’s creativity.
265 Cf. Barth, CD III.3, 1961, pp305-306, 321-322.
80
been overcome in Jesus Christ. As John Webster writes, “Barth is generally only
interested in sin post Christum… [This] means that Barth refuses to treat sin as other
than a reality that has already been accused, condemned, and abolished in Jesus
Christ: its existence is that of a defeated reality, an ‘impossible possibility’.”266
Creation should therefore exist in a state of anticipation, looking forward with hope to
the Eschaton when it will ultimately be transformed and raised to its proper function
and fulfilment by the grace of God. Barth writes,
What is nothingness? In the knowledge and confession of the Christian
faith, i.e., looking retrospectively to the resurrection of Jesus Christ
and prospectively to his coming again, there is only one possible
answer. Nothingness is in the past, the ancient menace, danger and
destruction, the ancient non-being which obscured and defaced the
divine creation of God but which is consigned to the past in Jesus
Christ, in whose death it has received its deserts, being destroyed with
this consummation of the positive will of God which is as such the end
of His non-willing.267
Creation, in its blindness, cannot fully realise what the effects of das Nichtige
are, nor can it realise their full seriousness. It therefore depends on Scripture, given to
it in Providence, for the guidance to show it the true way and for the Spirit to give it
the eyes to see the trueness of this way.268 Certain things can, however, be understood
as the consequence of living in a world that is subject to the dominion of das
Nichtige. Take, for example, the limitations that consume this world in its
insufficiency, i.e. the pain and suffering, the battles for survival, moral evil, disease,
natural disasters etc. All these things result from Creation’s inability to live self-
sufficiently i.e. to live without the fully nourishing hands of God.269 Given this
incapacity, creation leads a very different life from the one it would lead were it to
exist (and will lead when it exists) in full communion with God. It lives in a world
that struggles with limitation, impediment, decay, indigence, failure and ultimately
266 Webster, 2003, p67.
267 Barth, CD III.3, 1960, p363.
268 Cf. Augustine, Enchiridion, chap. 16 (accessed 2008).
269 Cf. Wolterstorff, 1996, p587.
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the prospect of death;270 it lives in a world that is defined by bondage to the dominion
of das Nichtige.271
This being said, however, although such things as pain and suffering can be
understood as the consequence of living in a world consumed by das Nichtige, this
does not necessarily mean that they should be classified as sinful and evil. As Barth
writes, “it is irrefutable that creation and creature are good even in the fact that all that
is exists in this contrast and antithesis.”272 For Barth, not all the seemingly negative
aspects and limitations of creaturely existence need to be interpreted as sinful or
evil.273 They could, for example, be recognised as a gift created by God and given to
creation in order to help it to survive and exist within this fallen state because, as
Augustine notes, “it is worse to rejoice iniquity than to bewail corruption”.274 As
Wolterstorff also writes, in parallel with Barth, “It is part of our design plan, part of
being a properly-functioning human being, that we should dislike pain, suffering,
loss, failure, infirmity, that we should experience them negatively. And it’s a well-
nigh inevitable consequence of creatures with our design plan living in a world of this
present sort that we should in fact experience pain, suffering, loss, failure, infirmity...
These negative experiences are not as such, evils. To creatures of our sort, living in a
world of this present sort, experiencing these sorts of things, and experiencing them
negatively, God said Yes.”275 What Barth continually wants to affirm, as Wolterstorff
rightly interprets him, is the goodness and purposefulness of creation as God has
created it.276 For Barth, even the negatively perceived aspects of Creation should be
praised. He writes,
For all we can tell, may not His creatures praise him more mightily
in humility than in exaltation, in need than in plenty, in fear than in
joy, on the frontier of nothingness than when wholly orientated on
God… on bad days than on good, more surely in sorrow than in
rejoicing, more truly in adversity than in progress?... How
surprised we shall be, and how ashamed of so much improper and
270 Barth, CD III.3, 1960, p297.
271 Cf. Wolterstorff, 1996, p588.
272 Barth, CD III.3, 1960, p297, (emphasis mine).
273 Cf. Ibid. p85.
274 Augustine, On the Nature of the Good, chap. 20 (accessed 2008).
275 Wolterstorff, 1996, pp593-594.
276 Cf. Barth, CD III.1, 1960 p229.
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unnecessary unquiet and discontent, once we are brought to realise
that all creation both as light an shadow, including our own share
in it… was laid on Jesus Christ as the creation of God, and even
though we did not see it, without and in spite of us, and while we
were shaking our heads that things were not very different, it sang
the praise of God just as it was, and was therefore right and
perfect.277
The creature’s incapacity to recognise truly what sin and evil are, and its
consequent inability to distinguish the good things in creation from sin and evil
reiterate creation’s need for the atonement. Creation is not only dependent on Christ
for redemption from sin, but is also dependent on Christ as ‘the Judge judged in our
place’278 to reveal the reality of what sin and evil are in all their seriousness. Barth
writes, “That we are sinners, and what our sin is, is something we can never know by
reflection about ourselves in the light of a standard good and evil which we have
freely chosen or discovered… We have to learn it where God Himself has told it to us
by taking so seriously the accusation against us in our corruption that he took upon
Himself in His Son, that he willed to encounter us as the man corrupted and
accused.”279 Creatures should not, because they cannot, engage in any self-attempts to
try and understand what sin and evil are. Such questions, which creatures in their
blindness are incapable of answering, should not be speculated over and any attempt
to do so would be to engage in a form of natural theology that would inevitably lead
to ill-conceived and misguided answers. Barth describes this state of confusion as “a
triumph of nothingness.”280 If creatures want to develop any knowledge of sin and
evil they must look solely to Scripture for guidance on how to be obedient to God and
for the answer of how sin and evil have been overcome in Christ. Otherwise, creation
should accept its naïveté and in this naïveté persevere onward, praising God for the
wonders of his creation. It should march forth, energised with the hope and guidance
given to it in revelation and live with eager longing for the glory that is ‘not worth
comparing to the sufferings of this present time’ (Rom. 8.18-27). Barth writes,
277 Barth, CD III.3, 1960, p297.
278 Barth, CD IV.1, 1956, p211ff.
279 Ibid. p240..
280 Barth, CD III.3, 1960, p299.
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The creature must not exist like the unhappy centre of a circle which
has no periphery. It must exist in a genuine circle, its individual
environment. It must not exist everywhere, but in a specific place. It
must not exist endlessly, but in its own time. It must not comprehend
or understand or be capable of or accomplish everything. It has
freedom to experience and accomplish that which is proper to it, to do
that which it can do, and to be satisfied. It is in this freedom that it is
preserved by God. It is in this freedom that it comes directly from God
and moves towards Him. It is in this freedom that it is read to fulfil its
destiny, i.e., by the grace of God to live by the grace of God. The fact
that it is here and now, that it exists in one way and not another, is its
opportunity; the one opportunity which does not recur; an opportunity
that corresponds to the oneness of God and the uniqueness of the work
of liberation which he accomplished in Jesus Christ. It is its own
particular opportunity, the opportunity which is given specifically to it,
the opportunity which is definitely rich and pregnant with promise. As
this opportunity is given to it, the creature is preserved by God for the
kingdom of God.281
3.4 God’s Compassion for His Creation
When Barth writes, “The creature must not exist like the unhappy centre of a
circle which has no periphery”282 the question arises as to whether he is suggesting
that the creature should simply accept its situation, namely one that is consumed by
sin and evil, and see this as ‘its opportunity’. To a certain extent this is what he is
implying. However, he is not suggesting that God has no compassion for the
creature’s present situation. Throughout Scripture there is ongoing and rightful
lamentation for the world as it is consumed by sin and evil, particularly pre-Christ in
the Psalms, Job and Lamentations. In Psalm 22.1-2, for example, the psalmist writes,
“My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me? Why are you so far from helping me,
from my words of groaning? O my God, I cry by day, but you do not answer; and by
281 Ibid. p85.
282 Ibid.
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night, but find no rest.”283 The initial words of this Psalm, ‘My God, my God, why
hast thou forsaken me?’, are carried into the New Testament when Jesus Christ cries
them out on the cross (Matthew, 27.46, Mark 15.34). In this moment in particular, but
also throughout Christ’s life sufferings, God makes the world’s lamentations and the
problem of evil his own.284 As Barth describes, “Jesus did not run away from the state
and situation of the fallen man, but took it upon Himself, lived it and bore it himself
as the eternal Son of God.”285 He did this, Barth writes, by being “exposed to real
inward temptation and trial… [by crying] to God and [wrestling] with God in real
inward need.”286 These words of Barth correspond to the verses in Hebrews 5.7-8,
In the days of his flesh, Jesus offered up prayers and supplications,
with loud cries and tears, to the one who was able to save him from
death, and he was heard because of his reverent submission. Although
he was a Son, he learned obedience through what he suffered; and
having been made perfect, he became the source of eternal salvation
for all who obey him.
Christ’s expressions of suffering and anguish are marked by his utmost faith
in his Father. When, in Mark 14.36, Jesus speaks to his Father in anticipation of his
crucifixion, he prays ‘Abba, Father, for you all things are possible; remove this cup
from me; yet not what I want, but what you want.’ Jesus does not face the inevitability
of his suffering and death with an enthused outlook towards his ascension but as
Barth writes, “[the New Testament portrays] the obedience of Jesus throughout as a
genuine struggle to obey.” It is not without struggle that Barth thinks the world
should face the problem of evil, but with this Christocentric faith in God’s greatest of
all plans for his creation.
Barth’s depiction of how Christ anticipates his death draws close parallels
with that of Oscar Cullman’s who, in his book Immortality of the Soul or
Resurrection of the Dead, compares the death of Socrates to the death of Jesus Christ.
283 Cf. Psalms 6, 12, 44, 60, 74, 79, 80, 83, 85, 90, 94, 123, 126, 129.
284 When Christ cries out ‘My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?’ he is asking a question that
corresponds to the question that has always seemed to eat at the heart of both the Christian and Jewish
followers – why does the omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent God permit evil to exist in the
world?
285 Barth, CD I.2, 1960m p158.
286 Ibid. and cf. Barth, CD IV.1, 1956, p271ff., John 12.27 and Heb. 2.9.
85
He writes, “[In anticipation of death] there is Socrates, calmly and composedly
speaking of the immortality of the soul; here Jesus, weeping and crying.”287 When
Jesus died “[he] underwent death in all its horror, not only in his body but also in his
soul.”288 He was filled with the fear of dying because “whoever is in the hands of
death is no longer in the hands of God, but in the hands of God’s enemy.”289 Socrates,
on the other hand, died with calm composure, eagerly awaiting liberation from his
physical body and the transition from the realm of particulars to the realm of
universals. It could be argued that part of the reason there is such a contrast between
Socrates’ and Jesus’ anticipation of death was because Jesus’ experience was fraught
with pain over and against the calm passing of Socrates. However, it is clear that the
fears of Jesus were not simply anxieties over physical suffering from his final cries in
Mark 15.34. In this verse his suffering and despair are portrayed as deep within his
soul.
Like Cullman, Barth also compares Jesus’ anticipation of his death to that of
Socrates. However, when Barth makes his comparison he does not just compare
Christ’s anticipation of death to that of Socrates but also to “so many a Christian
martyr.”290 Although there are clear differences, as Cullman has shown, between
Socrates’ “glad resignation”291 and Christ’s anticipation of death, it is much more
difficult to see why Barth would also want to affirm that such a difference lies
between Christ’s anticipation of death and ‘so many a Christian martyr’. As Barth
writes, “It is obviously not simply a matter of suffering and dying in itself.”292 What,
for Barth, so clearly distinguishes Christ’s anticipation of death is that “He saw this
world as it was. He saw what it was that dominated and was fulfilled in it. He saw and
felt the “great burden of the world.” He saw…that this burden is overwhelming, that
in the last resort it can only overwhelm and crush Himself and other men.”293
Furthermore, he knew that in his dying “there [would be] no one to bear the burden
with Him.”294 For Barth, it is in this situation that,
287 Cullmann, 1958, p24.
288 Ibid. p25.
289 Ibid. p23.
290 Barth, CD IV.1, 1956, p265.
291 Ibid.
292 Ibid.
293 Ibid.p266.
294 Ibid.p267.
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No man but Jesus has ever known the true breadth and depth, the true
essence and darkness of human misery. What we see and note and
know and more or less painfully experience of it is only the shadow of
His cross touching us… We cannot see it in the terror and doubt and
despair which may come on us. Or we can see at as these only as a
distant recollection of the misery of which he has made an end in his
death; only as a weak echo of his cry; only as a sign that we are truly
in him, and therefore share his sufferings. We have no direct
experience of it. We cannot speak of it as though it were an element in
our own history. 295
What Christ experiences and fears is the fullness of what it means to be alone
and to exist under the dominion of das Nichtige.296 To reiterate Cullman’s words,
Christ was filled with the fear of dying because “whoever is in the hands of death is
no longer in the hands of God, but in the hands of God’s enemy.”297 Creatures only
distantly experience this subjection to das Nichtige and when they experience it they
cannot even come close to understanding its seriousness. Moreover, they find
themselves constantly embracing and grasping onto it. Creation, however, will never
have to experience das Nichtige in the fullness that Christ had to because in Christ’s
death and resurrection he overcame its dominion and prepared a new way for creation
that will ultimately be realised in its consummation. This new way, which has been
brought about by God’s victory over the alien power that has consumed creation,
means that creation needs to undergo a complete renewal. As Cullman writes, “If life
is to issue out of so genuine a death as this, a new divine act of creation is
necessary.”298 For Cullman, “The contrast for the Christian is… between the creation
delivered over to death by sin and new creation.”299 On the one hand, this destruction
of the old creation, and the institution of the new and eternal creation make this
resurrection of the dead into new life a fundamentally discontinuous movement. On
the other hand, however, the definition of this movement as the consummation of
God’s original creative act also makes it a radically continuous movement.
295 Barth, CD IV.2, 1956, p487.
296 This is not to suggest that Christ actually was alone i.e. separate from the Father and the Spirit. It is
to suggest that he experienced the fullness of what it means to be alone.
297 Cullmann, 1958. p23.
298 Ibid. pp25-26.
299 Ibid. p31.
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The affirmative answer ‘yes’ to the question of whether the world simply
needs to accept its fallen situation and stop being confounded by the problem of sin
and evil is given with the understanding that it is a problem that has already been
answered and overcome in the person of Jesus Christ.300 Creation no longer needs to
dwell in a state of confusion concerning the problem of evil and should no longer
look at it as a problem that genuinely challenges the Christian faith. For the world to
continue to be challenged by the problem is, for Barth, a triumph for the dominion of
das Nichtige.301 This is particularly apparent when it is considered that sin and evil
tend to be problem that challenges not the reign of das Nichtige but the reign of God.
The world’s confusion over and blaming of God for the problem of evil is nothing
short of puzzling. It is like the person who has been suffering from extreme thirst in
the desert and then chooses to blame the person who will ultimately quench their
thirst. It is nothing less than biting off the hand that feeds it.
What Barth wants to affirm is that God is not directly responsible for the
existence of sin and evil but is only responsible for creating a world in which it could
exist. What God is directly responsible for, however, is his bringing the existence of
sin and evil to an end. With this knowledge Barth suggests that a strong hope should
dwell with and uplift the world as it cries its tears of suffering. The Christian faith,
Barth would want to affirm, although it might know and experience the weeping that
lingers in the night, can also know of the joy that comes with the morning (Psalm
30.5).302 N.T. Wright articulates this perceptively when he suggests that a Christian
believer should be considered as someone who gets up very early, while it is still dark
before dawn.303 In Scripture, the successive lamentations are generally written within
a context of hope and anticipation grounded in a faith in God’s promise, his unending
goodness, and his persistent faithfulness to his creation. Barth writes,
His merciful will was to take up the cause of the creature against the
non-existent, not from the safe height of a supreme world-governor,
but in the closest possible proximity, with the greatest possible
directness, i.e., Himself to become a creature. He placed himself
300 This is perhaps the reason that most of the lamentations in Scripture would seem to be found pre-
Christ’s death and resurrection.
301 Barth, CD III.3, 1960, p299.
302 For Barth, “The Psalmists are aware of God’s absence not although, but precisely because, they are
in a position to confess and glorify his presence.” Barth, CD I.2, 1960, p29.
303 In reference to Thess. 5:4-8. - Wright, 2003, p216.
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within the contradiction. He drew to himself and bore away the whole
enmity and problem and power of the non-existent… This is the
eternal will of God fulfilled and accomplished once and for all in time
in Jesus Christ. And in the light of this will and work we have to
regard the question of the conservatio of the creature as one which has
already been decided.”304
304 Barth, CD III.3, 1960, pp78-79.
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IV. Conclusion
In Plantinga’s monist understanding of the role of sin and evil within God’s
creative purposes, Plantinga seeks to provide a philosophically logical account of why
evil exists in the world. Barth, on the other hand, by adhering neither to monism nor
to dualism, which Hick describes as “the only two wholly consistent solutions that are
possible”305, provides an account that would seem to be riddled with paradoxes and
loose ends. This may be argued to reflect not Barth’s folly but his genius, however.
Whereas Plantinga might provide a philosophically cogent account, it is much more
difficult to recognise it as a biblically viable account. Barth, on the other hand, while
being less prepared to engage in the type of theodicy in which Plantinga chooses to
engage, is able to provide an account that seems to be much more consistent with the
knowledge given to the world in special revelation. Furthermore, although there
appear to be paradoxes in Barth’s account this does not conceal an underlying
theological rigour and consistency.
Barth’s humility and reverence are apparent in his willingness to admit to the
creature’s blindness and inability to answer and understand some of the questions
with which Scripture presents us. Unlike Plantinga, he is unwilling to make any non-
scripturally-informed presuppositions or to engage in the sort of second-guessing that
characterises natural theology.306 This is not to suggest, however, that Plantinga’s
engaging in this sort of theodicy is unjustified or unconstructive. It could be argued
that it is only by considering certain logical and non-scripturally-driven possibilities
that Christians are able to counter and engage the sort of atheistic thinkers and
philosophers who challenge Christianity from outside the Christian sphere and
attempt to undermine the mission of the church. The problem with Plantinga’s Felix
Culpa and free-will defense approaches, however, is that they would seem to be less
concerned with engaging in a specifically Christian apologetics and more concerned
with engaging in a more general theistic apologetics.307 In so doing they appear at
305 Hick, 1977, p21.
306 It could be argued that his das Nichtige conceptuality finds very little, if any, support in Scripture. If
this is the case, this does not mean that he can be accused of cutting off the branch he sitting on. By
bringing in the das Nichtige conceptuality, which finds strong grounding in the Augustinian tradition
and the fundamentally Christian doctrine of creation ex nihilo, he is able to articulate the rest of his
thoughts in a clearly scripturally affirmative manner.
307 This is not to deny that there are Christian principles which shape Plantinga’s account such as, for
example, his incorporation of the atonement and the incarnation in his Felix Culpa article. However,
90
times to brush over some key Scriptural assertions and risk conclusions which are in
tension with the thrust of Scripture. In this regard, Plantinga could be considered as
confusing rather than helping a faithful church dogmatics.
This illustrates the extent to which a ‘generally theistic’ and a ‘Christian’
apologetic will not always be mutually consistent for the simple reason that Christian
thought makes more specific assertions than mere theism.308 If Plantinga had been
more focused on engaging with the specific details that Christian apologetics requires,
he might have developed his two approaches in a more scripturally informed manner.
Barth, for example, was still able to develop a Felix Culpa approach and ‘free’-will
account from a more Christian perspective by simply including and taking into
account a few additional scriptural tenets. For the Christian thinker, Christian and
theistic apologetics should go hand in hand and they should both find their grounding
in Scripture. By readily engaging in a more exegetically informed and driven
approach (from his specifically Christian epistemic base309), it is possible that
Plantinga’s position might have been closer to Barth’s. Furthermore, his arguably
more theoretical approach might have meant that he would have been able to develop
an account that was more oriented towards some of the problems facing the mission
of the Christian Church in the present. For example, his account might have been
more pertinent to the audience of contemporary atheistic philosophers.
By seeming to engage in a more general theistic apologetics, Plantinga would
appear to sacrifice three fundamental Scriptural assertions in particular –
1. By understanding sin and evil as an intended means to the
actualisation of God’s ultimate creative purposes he appears to
undermine Scripture’s ongoing emphasis on the genuine malevolence
of sin and evil. He risks, in other words, calling “evil good and good
evil” (Is. 5.20). Such a move would also seem to disregard God’s
even in this article he would seem to be more concerned with arguing for the existence of God vis-à-vis
evil than providing an account that retains adequate consistency with Christian Scripture (even
although he is taking into account the atonement and incarnation). This is made apparent when he
makes the sacrifice of considering evil as a fundamental part of (and, therefore, ultimate good and
associate in) God’s creative purposes, in favour of trying to argue for God’s existence in the face of the
problem of evil.
308 Christian apologetics will, of course, always be consistent with the cause of the theistic apologists
because one of its specific assertions is that a god exists. However, theistic apologetics will not always
be consistent with and sympathetic to Christian apologetics and its specific assertions for the simple
reason that this is not a requirement of this more general discipline.
309 Cf. Plantinga, 1984.
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whole-hearted confrontation of and opposition to the sin and evil of
this present world that confronts God in his ultimate creative
purposes.310 As Kevin Diller notes with respect to Plantinga’s
formulation of the Felix Culpa theodicy, “in a Felix Culpa theodicy
God desires evil as a means to his good purposes. This move has a
dangerously distorting moral and theological impact. We can no longer
condemn evil and injustice as wholly antithetical to what is good. Evil
is ultimately the will of God…in the Felix Culpa theodicy it is the evil
itself that is essential to the greater good. Evil is made reasonable as a
functional good.”311
2. By presenting sin and evil as being God’s ally, he makes it very
difficult to understand the biblical metaphor of God’s victory over sin
and death (i.e. 1 Cor. 15.54-57).
3. By seeming to define true freedom as being free from external
influence, he would seem to undermine Scripture’s understanding
(particularly in Romans) that true freedom is found by becoming
subject to God. It also makes it very difficult to make sense of the
transformative processes of redemption and reconciliation, as Scripture
presents them, without holding them to be processes that are invasive
of, as opposed to ‘fundamental for’, humanity’s freedom.
In all three respects Plantinga’s account would seem to be incompatible with
Barth’s. This being said, however, the line that distinguishes these two Christian
thinkers is not always as clear as it might seem. For example, both Christian thinkers
hold that God is not the direct cause of sin and evil. For Plantinga, sin and evil are the
result of the creature’s misuse of its particular ‘contra-causal’ freedom and for Barth,
sin and evil are the result of the creature’s being subject to the dominion of das
Nichtige. The line that distinguishes Barth and Plantinga, in this context, becomes
even hazier when it is considered that for Barth das Nichtige is essentially nothing.
As such, when Barth is referring to the creature’s subjection to das Nichtige, he is
310 Cf. Barth, CD III.3, 1960, pp126-127.
311 Diller, 2008, p96.
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simply saying that the creature is partly312 subject to nothing other than, of course,
itself.313 If this were simply the case, the difference separating the two on this matter
might seem to be simply a semantic one. This would then raise the question as to
why, if the difference really is semantic, Barth did not simply refer to creation as
being partly subject to itself314, instead of bringing in the confusing conceptuality of
das Nichtige.
I have argued that it is Barth’s non-dualistic emphasis on duality, expressed
by means of the concept of das Nichtige, that keeps him from the type of monist
approach to which Plantinga adheres. If, however, das Nichtige is essentially nothing,
then the question arises as to whether Barth is not, in actual fact, adhering to some
form of monism. Surely if it is merely the semantics of das Nichtige that separates
Barth from a monist understanding, then to all intents and purposes there is actually
‘nothing’ separating him from this type of approach. This, however, is not the case.
As has been discussed throughout this thesis, although for Barth das Nichtige is
essentially nothing it is also something very real, which exists “in opposition to the
totality of God’s creation”315. By using the conceptuality of das Nichtige to refer to
this reality, Barth was able to provide, among others, three important emphases that
clearly distinguish him from the monist understanding of Plantinga’s –
1. He was able to move away from an understanding that creation is
inherently sinful and evil, without pushing him to suggest that sin and
evil are ultimately a good part of creation. On the one hand, by
showing that creation is created perfect to live in full communion with
God, Barth is able to emphasise creation’s inherent goodness. On the
other hand, however, by also taking into account that the world
presently lives outside this full communion in a life oriented towards
itself (by being subject to das Nichtige), Barth is able to explain why
312 Again, it is important to reiterate that, for Barth, creation never exists completely independent from
God (Cf. Barth, CD III:1, 1958, p94).
313 For a creature to be subject to itself is for it to exist in a state of inward focus and egocentricity. This
is closely connected to Martin Luther’s account of sin in terms of incurvatus in se (being curved in
upon oneself) as opposed to being curved outward toward God and neighbour (excurvatus ex se).
314 To re-clarify, a creature can be ‘partly subject’ by, on the one hand, being subject to their own sinful
desires and, on the other hand, being subject to God’s continual preservation. A creature can be
‘subject to itself’ by living by its own sinful desires (animated by the flesh - soma psychikon) as
opposed to living in Christ, by the Spirit, subject to the grace of God (animated by the Spirit - soma
pneumatikon).
315 Barth, CD III.3, 1960, p310.
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there is sin and evil in the world without associating them with God’s
ultimate intentions.316 For Barth, sin and evil exist in the world
because God gives creation the opportunity to lead a short-term
existence that is not the way it has ultimately been created to i.e.
within the full embrace of God.
2. It meant that he could consider sin and evil in truly negative terms
in relation to God’s creative purposes. That is, positively creation
exists as it was created to be - within the full embrace of God.
Negatively creation does not exist as it was created to be – without the
full embrace of God. It could be said that the conceptuality of das
Nichtige provided a flip side to the coin of God’s creative purposes317 -
a duality that made sin and evil alien from God’s plan for creation.
3. It meant he was able to refer to scripture’s account of creation being
in bondage and subjection to an alien and adverse power (over which
God could achieve a real victory (as opposed to a manipulated one)). If
Barth had chosen to refer to ‘creation as being in bondage to itself’, he
would have essentially been making the same suggestion. However, by
using this ‘bondage to self’ language he would have made it much
easier for his position to be misinterpreted. For example, if creation is
considered as created good by God, it can become very easy to move
to a monist understanding which misinterprets sin and evil as a part of
this created good. If, however, the conceptuality of das Nichtige is
brought into the equation, it becomes much easier to consider there to
be a ‘real’ adversary to God’s creative purposes, which, as
‘nothingness’, does not undermine God’s sovereignty. By introducing
this adversary into his thought, Barth was able to articulate clearly the
fundamental point that sin and evil have a basis apart from God.
By adopting the (albeit potentially challenging) conceptuality of das Nichtige,
Barth was able to portray a duality between God and an adversary that is other from
him (das Nichtige). In so doing he was also able to use the semantics of das Nichtige
316 It is important to note here that he is not attempting to explain how sin and evil come into existence,
but explaining how it is possible for them to exist alongside an omnipotent, omniscient and
omnibenevolent God.
317 Heads – creation as it subject to God, and tails – creation as it is subject to das Nichtige.
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to articulate some key assertions about the discontinuity in God’s transformative plan
for his creatures without suggesting a change in God’s intentions for his creatures.
That is, he avoids any suggestions that God creates his creatures to be sinful and then
changes his mind and transforms them to become sinless. Instead he presents das
Nichtige as an adversary to God to which he was able to use to attach the depraved
and therefore discontinuous elements. So when God brings an end to (makes
discontinuous) the fallen aspect of his creation, he brings to an end the dominion of
‘something’ other from him – das Nichtige. So, for example, in his account of
freedom he was able to portray creatures as presently living by a freedom
characterised by slavery to sin and freedom from righteousness (Rom. 6.20) as a
result of being subject to das Nichtige. He was then able to present God as coming to
redeem creatures from their bondage to decay (at the hands of das Nichtige) and
transform them into a new life with “the freedom of the glory of the children of God”
(Rom. 8.21), which is characterised by a freedom from sin and a slavery to
righteousness (Rom. 6.18).318 What distinguishes these two forms of freedom is
whether a person is subject to das Nichtige or is subject to God. What this suggests is
that there is a duality that is defined by what a person is subject to. Therefore, when a
person moves from being subject to das Nichtige to become wholly subject to the
grace of God they experience the discontinuous aspect of God’s transformative plan.
As has been suggested a couple of times in this thesis, this fallen creation
could be considered as being suspended between God and das Nichtige: it is related to
God in its createdness and purpose but is also related to das Nichtige in its fallenness
and other-than-God-ness. When creatures are transformed there is an element to their
fallen being that comes to an end in order to make way for a new form of existence.
For example, as was considered above, the creature’s present freedom (in subjection
to das Nichtige) comes to an end in order to make way for a new freedom in Christ.
On a more general level, when creatures are transformed their fallenness (which
associates them with das Nichtige and unrighteousness) comes to an end in order to
make way for the consummation of their created purpose (which associates them with
God and righteousness).
Although for a transformation to take place there needs to be an element of
discontinuity, there also needs to be an element of continuity (otherwise x would not
318 Cf. Barth, CD IV:1, 1956, p43.
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become a new x, but would become y). As such, when God redeems creatures, they
continue to exist in their createdness (as they are related to God) and also in their
particularity/other-then-God-ness (as they were originally related to das Nichtige319).
In this transformative process creation moves away from its relationship to das
Nichtige towards a fuller relationship with God. This is how God’s transformation of
the world should be understood: a process that, through the person of Christ, delivers
creation out of exile in this present world (as it is consumed by das Nichtige) and into
the new home that has been prepared for it in communion with God. As the author of
Ephesians expresses it, “So [Christ] came and proclaimed peace to you who were far
off and peace to those who were near; for through him both of us have access in one
Spirit to the Father. So then you are no longer strangers and aliens, but you are
citizens with the saints and members of the household of God” (2.17-19).
When contrasting Barth to Plantinga, one of the key distinctions that would
seem to arise is what they consider to be the means, ends and ‘unwilled but
inevitable’ consequences of God’s creative purposes. For Barth, sin and evil should
fundamentally not be considered as a predetermined part of or means of God’s
creative purposes, but as an unwilled and inevitable consequence of his particular
plan for creation. Barth would also want to affirm that ‘contra-causal’ freedom and
the atonement, which deliver creation from sin and evil, are a predetermined means to
the end of developing the right relationship (at-one-ment) with God. Plantinga,
however, would seem to want to consider sin and evil as a desired part of God’s
creative purposes, brought about by his giving creation its particular ‘contra-causal’
freedom. They are, furthermore, the directly intended and desired means through
which God could bring about the ends of contra-causal freedom and the atonement,
which are definitive of the right relationship as willed by God.320
One of the underlying themes in this essay is that God is a god who creates
with purpose and it is in this purpose that the world finds its meaning. As Barth
writes, “[the creature’s] destiny lies in the purpose of its Creator as the One Who
speaks and cares for it. The creature’s right and meaning and goal and purpose and
319 Creatures do not need to remain subject to das Nichtige in order retain their particularity.
320 Plantinga would seem to imply that the ‘good-making characteristic’ of the atonement is its capacity
to induce a feeling of indebtedness within a response to God’s unrivalled display of love and mercy
(Cf. Plantinga in Van Inwagen, 2004, pp7-11), as opposed to its capacity to achieve the right
relationship between God and his creation. Cf. Diller, 2008, p92.
96
dignity lie – only – in the fact that God as the Creator has turned toward it with His
purpose.”321 This theme is one that runs throughout the Bible, from Genesis through
to Revelation. When the Israelites left Egypt on their journey to the Promised Land,
God had a purpose to bring them out of exile into their new home in the household of
God; and when God created this present world to live as it does, he did so with the
purpose of ultimately raising it into new life, in the final consummation of his creative
purposes.
Although God’s eternal purpose might be central to the Biblical witness this
does not mean that it is a purpose that directly causes and desires all that occurs in the
bible and, for that matter, all that has occurred within the history of creation. The sin
and evil that have consumed creation’s history must not be considered as a desired
part of God’s creative intentions - they are nothing less than a real enemy and menace
to God and his purposes. The wrongful ways of this world are not the way that God
has ultimately intended for his creation, but a short-term way that is brought to an end
in death. This does not suggest, however, that this short-term way is not filled with
purpose. Creation’s present existence provides the context from which creation is
given its true direction through being raised into its new life through the reconciling
presence of Jesus Christ and by the Spirit in obedience to the Father. Through this
once and for all triumph over sin and evil, God delivers his creation from bondage to
unrighteousness and in so doing achieves the ultimate consummation of his creative
purposes.
321 Barth, CD III.1, 1958, p94.
97
Bibliography
Adams, Marilyn McCord, Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God, Cornell
University Press, New York, 1999.
Augustine, Against the Fundamental Epistle of Manichaeus, www.newadvent.org/
fathers/1405.htm, (Accessed 25/02/2008).
Augustine, City of God, www.newadvent.org/fathers/1201.htm, (Accessed
25/02/2008).
Augustine, Confessions, www.ccel.org/ccel/augustine/confessions.x.html, (Accessed
25/02/ 2008).
Augustine, Enchiridion, www.leaderu.com/cyber/books/augenchiridion/enchiridion01
-23.html, (Accessed 25/02/2008).
Augustine, On the Nature of the Good, www.newadvent.org/fathers/1407.htm,
(Accessed 25/02/2008).
Barth, Karl, Christ and Adam, Tom Smail (trans.) Oliver and Boyd, Edinburgh, 1956.
Barth, Karl, Church Dogmatics – The Doctrine of the Word of God I:2, Geoffrey
Bromiley and T.F. Torrance (eds.), T&T Clark, Edinburgh, 1960.
Barth, Karl, Church Dogmatics - The Doctrine of the Word of God II:1, Geoffrey
Bromiley and T.F. Torrance (eds.), Harold Knight (trans.), T&T Clark,
Edinburgh, 1957.
Barth, Karl, Church Dogmatics - The Doctrine of the Word of God II:2, Geoffrey
Bromiley and T.F. Torrance (eds.), Harold Knight (trans.), T&T Clark,
Edinburgh, 1957.
Barth, Karl, Church Dogmatics - The Doctrine of Creation III:1, Geoffrey Bromiley
and T.F. Torrance (eds.), Harold Knight (trans.), T&T Clark, Edinburgh, 1958.
Barth, Karl, Church Dogmatics - The Doctrine of Creation III:2, Geoffrey Bromiley
and T.F. Torrance (eds.), Harold Knight (trans.) T&T Clark, Edinburgh, 1960.
Barth, Karl, Church Dogmatics - The Doctrine of Creation III:3, Geoffrey Bromiley
and T.F. Torrance (eds.), Harold Knight (trans.) T&T Clark, Edinburgh, 1960.
Barth, Karl, Church Dogmatics - The Doctrine of Creation III:4, Geoffrey Bromiley
and T.F. Torrance (eds.), Harold Knight (trans.) T&T Clark, Edinburgh, 1961.
Barth, Karl, Church Dogmatics - The Doctrine of Reconciliation IV:1, Geoffrey
Bromiley and T.F. Torrance (eds.), Harold Knight (trans.), T&T Clark,
Edinburgh, 1956.
98
Barth, Karl, Church Dogmatics - The Doctrine of Reconciliation IV:2, Geoffrey
Bromiley and T.F. Torrance (eds.), Harold Knight (trans.) T&T Clark,
Edinburgh, 1956.
Barth, Karl, Church Dogmatics - The Doctrine of Reconciliation IV:3 (first half),
Geoffrey Bromiley and T.F. Torrance (eds.), Harold Knight (trans.) T&T
Clark, Edinburgh, 1961.
Barth, Karl, Church Dogmatics - The Doctrine of Reconciliation IV:3 (second half),
Geoffrey Bromiley and T.F. Torrance (eds.), Harold Knight (trans.) T&T
Clark, Edinburgh, 1962.
Canlis, Julie, The Ascent of Humanity in Calvin: Anthropology, Ascension and
Participation, Unpublished PhD thesis. University of St Andrews, 2006.
Craig, Edward (general editor), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Routledge,
New York, 1998.
Cullmann, Oscar, Immortality of the Soul or Resurrection of the Dead – The Witness
of the New Testament, The Epworth Press, London, 1958.
Diller, Kevin, ‘Are Sin and Evil Necessary for a Really Good World? - Questions for
Alvin Plantinga’s Felix Culpa Theodicy’, Faith and Philosophy 25 no. 1, 2008.
Heintz, John, ‘Wolterstorff and Bradley on Ontology’, The Journal of Philosophy,
1973.
Hick, John, Evil and the Love of God, Collins, Glasgow, 1977.
Holy Bible – New International Version, Zondervan, New International Bible Society,
1984.
Irenaeus, Against the Heresies, www.newadvent.org/fathers/0103.htm, (accessed
3/3/2008).
Mackie, J.L., The Miracle of Theism – Arguments for and Against the Existence of
God, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1982.
McDowell, John C. ‘"Nothing Will Come of Nothing": Karl Barth on Das Nichtige,
www.geocities.com/johnnymcdowell/Barth_Evil.htm, (Accessed 22/2/2008).
Moltmann, Jürgen, God in Creation, SCM Press Ltd, Munich, 1985.
Plantinga, Alvin, ‘Advice to Christian Philosophers’, Faith and Philosophy 1, 1984.
Plantinga, Alvin, God, Freedom and Evil, George Allen & Unwin, London, 1975.
Plantinga, Alvin, God and Other Minds – A Study of the Rational Justification of
Belief in God, Cornell University Press, London, 1967.
Plantinga, Alvin, The Nature of Necessity, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1974.
99
Rodin, R. Scott, Evil and Theodicy in the theodicy of Karl Barth, Peter Lang, New
York, 1997.
Van Inwagen, Peter, Christian Faith and the Problem of Evil, Eerdmans, Grand
Rapids, 2004.
Webster, John, Barth’s Moral Theology: Human Action in Barth’s Thought, T&T
Clark, Edinburgh, 1998.
Wolterstorff, Nicholas, ‘Barth on Evil’, Faith and Philosophy 13, 1996.
Wright, N.T., The Resurrection of the Son of God, SPCK, London, 2003.
